The writer of this article welcomes the call of EPDP and would like rewrite and post this paper regarding the call in 2014 presented at seminar held in Addis 2014. I hope the EPDP leadership read and compare the two calls

This is a paper presented at the seminar under the title, ” Saving the Eritren people and land from totalitarian system of destruction” that was held from 3-10 march 2014 in the capital city of Ethiopia- Addis- Ababa.

 Introduction: The Eritrean conflict is intra-state conflict originating from early statehood and now after liberation in state organization. The state formation and government organization proces was an exclusive not accommodating the Eritrean diversity. The internal Eritrean conflict is identity- based on differences of ethnics( religion,culture, language) and combined by unjust policies political, economic, social and cultural rights. Most conflicts of the world today are intra-state conflicts much less amenable to compormises. In this seminar I hope my paper will lead us to create tools for internal and external conflicts now at this time of struggle against dictatorship and post –dictatorship. This paper will try to  explore some tools for conflict management inside the opposition forces for democratic change. The Eritrean democratization process is still in its initial phase despite many initiativs since 1999 with building of coaltions of political organizations.

In the past 15 years and more  we have only seen waves of accusations and blames that led us to more disintegration and infighting in the camp of the Eritrean opposition forces for democratic change.

Conflicts are escalating between different personalities and clientelist politics both inside the political and civic organizations. The Eritrean forces for democratic change are in uncertain and conflict-prone unable to work within the current situation and prepare for the future.

How can we descalate these conflict –prone attitudes? How can the Eritrean forces for democratic change build trust by joining their efforts? This paper will argue on some approaches that can help us come together and reunite our efforts in the following fields:

- political approaches

- diplomatic relations

- popular mobilisation

- media

- economy

How can the opposition manage joint political affairs

The historical circumstances behind the renaissance of most of the Eritrean opposition organizations makes them closely related to their  respective old programs, and even a large number of the opposition leaders are historical leaders, to the extent that the spirit that influenced the political discourse and the leaders in the era of struggle against colonization still more or less reflected in the political performance of the Eritrea Government and the opposition alike, and this discourse undoubtedly instilled in the Eritrean people, particularly the  younger generation that has emerged in the beginnings of the 21st of the century, not to mention the  generation born after the independence of Eritrea at home who haven’t been acquainted with the opposition and its political discourse, consequently lacks the needed stimulus to participate and support the opposition, therefore the political  discourse of the opposition must undergo a radical change of mode or paradigm shift  through broader modernization in concepts and  terminologies, and that should be reflected in the practical performance of the political forces and civil rights’ organizations.

 The opposition today requires a political discourse that would combine the history with the present, highlighting that the values of democracy are fundamental rights that doesn’t allow compromise, founding its political discourse on the concepts of human rights, the political  discourse must attract the wishes of the  new generations to  encourage them participate in the bid to highlighting the benefits of the moral and material meaning of home, the opposition’s discourse must make use of the modern media communications which would surely attract our young generation, This discourse is based on: -

1- To stress the legitimate right of the Eritrean people to own their political decision and share the wealth of the country and to take their deserved part in ruling over their country, by the well-defined means of democracy methods and the right to enjoy justice by the virtues of the law that they established through their representatives in the parliament.

2-To focus on the concepts and values of democracy and human rights.

3- To pay much attention to the civil society, especially the associations of youth and women, and to involve them in the formulation of the political discourse so that they would be empowered enough, because they know how to conduct a successful dialogue to win over their peers.

How can the opposition gain the popular confidence?

 Joint Popular mobilization

Since the Eritrean  masses as stakeholders would directly benefit of the democratic change , then the opposition must mobilize the entire sectors of the Eritrean Public at home, as well as abroad in the process of change through the mobilization and raising public awareness, the political and civic organizations which are leading the endeavours  towards change  should recognize the differences in the political programs and coordinate a mechanisms and consolidate a unified political discourse to accelerate the project of democratic change in Eritrea

Today the Eritrean public needs a glimmer of hope that could encourage them to work for democratic change, they need a leadership that could convince them about the credibility of the struggle for change, alas the opposition leadership seemed to be dominated by the differences over secondary issues that dominate and hinder its unity on the key issues and consequently keeps the public away from any mass action, public mobilization must be based on the following:-

1- Build-up of credibility through positive attitudes and behaviour on the part of the political leadership interacting with the public.

2- Paying much attention to the suffering of the public and provide alternative solutions, especially the issues relating to the legal status of refugees and migrants, particularly with countries that have good relations with the opposition

3-Recruiting the public in the branch-offices of the opposition and mandating of leaders that can serve as role models to help the public come close up to the opposition, and not the kind of leaders that scare people away from the ranks of the opposition.

4- The establishment of service sectors, that could serve the public such as education and health services, wherever Eritrean communities exist, and to refrain from providing such public services according to one’s political or organizational affiliation.

5- Establishment of grass-roots associations such as youth, women, workers and other sectors and to give those institutions a real attention through professional understanding and practice.

6-Establishment of branches combined of members of collective umbrella of the Eritrean national council for Democratic change/ENCDC and EPDP to furnish information and programs for the public to ensure improving it beyond the organizational differences.

Joint diplomacy/international relations

Countries are no longer an islands isolated from each other in our era of intertwined interests, as the foreign policies of countries are driven by interests, therefore, it must be well-understood  that foreign counties would  have to take their respective positions towards Eritrea according to their political and economic interests, perhaps it is an ironic that the foreign policies of the Eritrean Regime had to play a  catalyst helpful role on the part of the opposition  to pursue a constructive productive and effective diplomacy in their struggle for change, but the Eritrean opposition ,despite the just and legitimate cause in the struggle to bring about democracy, but it has shown incapability to  win the sympathy and support of  foreign states, the opposition have to make use of the diplomacy based on the know-how of the modus operandi of international relations which had been administering the world today, the interests of countries with national sovereignty, and international organizations attends to the interests of international security, regional organizations that sponsor the security and interests of the countries in the region, as well as non-governmental organizations that has become of great influence in international politics and overseas companies with a significant impact on the process of political decision-making.

Therefore any formulation of diplomatic action plan must be based the above mentioned backgrounds, it would be helpful to point out some important guideline here bellow:

1. A diplomatic action built on positive interaction, that is to say, there are parties in the world who have their respective stakes in Eritrea, who need to be convinced that the opposition can be faithful to their interests as long as not inconsistent with the national interests of Eritrea, therefore countries which their interests have been damaged by the Eritrean Regime will cooperate with the opposition, but first, the opposition must confirm its credibility and seriousness

2- A diplomatic action built on negative interaction, and we mean that there are parties in the world that Eritrean Regime constitutes a source of concern for their respective national security, whether serious or minimal concern, such forces would be more than happy to watch the Eritrean Regime disappearing, they have genuine interests in the disappearance of this Regime due to the keenness to their respective national security,  but these countries cannot risk to establish relations with the opposition unless ascertained in the seriousness of the opposition, for fear that the establishment of such a relationship might deteriorate the internal affairs of their respective countries, the Eritrean Regime is notorious in exploiting the internal contradictions of foreign countries, which constitute a threat to the security of those countries, the seriousness of the opposition would be associated with its political discourse and its mechanisms.

3- A diplomatic action built on bilateral policy and attitudes, where some countries are in harmony with opposition on their stance towards many issues, attitudes towards public issues is inconsistent with the positions of the Eritrean Regime, therefore compatibility with opposition or contradiction with the regime, is stimulus for diplomatic cooperation between the opposition and the foreign nations.

4- Diplomatic functioning based on lobbying through local communities, civic organizations and individual relationships, where every vote counts on the part of the Western countries in times of elections, the grouping of communities and activating civic organizations or take advantage of individual relationships can influence and stimulate the policies of Western states towards Eritrea.

5- Benefit from Non-governmental Organizations of certain areas of concern, such as human rights organizations, and organizations concerned with freedoms of religion or press, or transparency and those NGOs fighting corruption, and even the relief and health humanitarian organizations that the Eritrean Regime refused to give access to providing aid to the Eritrean people, all these factors could be valuable for the diplomatic advancement of the opposition if used properly.

The Eritrean opposition need to muster the factors that manipulate world politics through a specialized and skilful apparatus the make use of its political and administrative authority, and perhaps the most important aspect in this regard is appoint united-external-political unit composed of the ENCDC and EPDP.

The following points might be useful in this respect.

1- Formation of diplomatic apparatus for the Eritrean forces for democratic change to run the international relations with political and administrative competency and capabilities.

2-Consensus on the features of the external political discourse by all components of the opposition/ ENCDC and EPDP

3-Coordination of the foreign policies of the political organizations through a united committee consisted of the external relations officials of the ENCDC and EPDP organizations. With the task of making ENCDC- EPDP joint foreign policy a non-partisan policy through the evaluation of external policy functioning, exchange of information and proposal of plans, and benefiting from the relationships of organizations and individuals in this area.

4-Coordination with the civic organizations that support the overall objectives of the opposition, especially in Europe, America and Australia, and take advantage of their relations, and to mandate the civic organizations to implement and illuminate the foreign policy of the Eritrean opposition.

5-To draw a maximum benefit from the partnership’s presence in the capital of the African Diplomacy Addis Ababa, where the African Union Head Quarters is located, beside a high-ranking diplomatic missions of the most important powers, the ENCDC- EPDP joint diplomacy should approach these countries by taking advantage of the public events that these missions held as well as the occasional events held in the host country , Ethiopia, and to constantly send messages  in the occasion of public National Holidays of diplomatic missions.

6- Establishing a joint website so that it could be a reference to all the questions that may arise in the mind of any policy-maker or a diplomatic mission, as well as writing leaflets carefully prepared and in different languages.

Joint  Media development strategy

In today's world, which is dubbed as the “age of information evolution”, though the media of the Eritrean opposition is not commensurate with the magnitude of the cause it is raising and the challenge it is facing, despite the progress that opposition media has registered in general, but that is not enough to deliver the message of opposition, especially when the regime it is opposing has an information outlets that are considered the most prominent strengths of the regime.

even the improvements that opposition’s media outlets have shown are due to efforts without any coordination which is not enough to deliver the message of the opposition , most of the oppositions media outlets lack professionalism, most of the member opposition organizations have their own media outlets which lessen the effectiveness of the spirit needed for change, even the oppositions media outlets are often used to highlight the secondary political contradictions between the various organizations , we could point out the following points in this respect:

1-    Formulation an information policy with clear goals and instructions to convey a convincing message through all available information means.

2-    Tolerate secondary contradictions of political and civil forces, and focus on the overarching challenge of removing the dictatorial regime in Eritrea.

3-    Coordination of work between media organizations and the signing of the Code of Conduct for the media outlets, so that the media war between the organizations, degradation or questioning of the principles, personal attack would be perceived as a red-line.

4-    Development of the radio through the creation of an independent radio with working-hours for as long as possible pursuing a dynamic approaches in conveying the opposition’s message  to resist the Regime and to deliver opposition’s message in an intelligent way.

5-    Diligences in founding a TV-channel to convey the goals of the opposition and reflect the suffering of the Eritrean people, and work to highlight the abuse of the regime against our people.

6-    Establishing  opposition Satellite TV challenging the PFDJ’s ERITV.

7-    Develop opposition websites on the web and make it more professional and more easily viewed, and more substantive and meaningful.

8-    Pay much attention to the Internet to benefit from groups on facebook, Twitter and other tools that gains the attention of a large number of sympathizers.

9-    The importance of training and the adoption of assigning media work according to individual competency and not organizational affiliation.

10- Opening up communication with TV channels, news agencies, global and regional newspapers and magazines and all that can contribute to delivering the message of the opposition.

11- Use the universal language in the media, in terms of focus on the concepts of human rights, democracy, transparency and good governance.

12-Documentation of the regime’s Violations, and reporting the evidences in figures and images because it makes the message of the opposition more credible and acceptable to the recipient.

13- adoption of mechanisms and means to evaluate the feedback such as surveys, questionnaires and others to determine the effect of the message on the recipient

Joint Economic Development strategy

The biggest dilemma of the opposition is how to finance its activities, as it is known , that,  those who lack financial sources cannot  fully own their decisions, The people of Eritrea have had an honourable history in financing and supporting the Eritrean revolution, therefore the opposition need to explore extraordinary alternative plans to attract support and to discover funding sources, its economic plans must not depend only on funding sources, but in drying-up the support of the Regime, especially as  the Regime draws-in support from neutral places where the opposition exists.

We can refer to the following points in this respect:

1-    Authentication of the relationship between the opposition and the public, encouraging the people to bear the responsibility of regime change as the sole beneficiary of the change, this can be achieved only through a high degree of transparency and openness, and building bridges of trust between the opposition and the public.

2-    Establishing a constructive relationship with countries that can accumulate with the political positions of the Eritrean opposition, then to make use of these relations in opening economic cooperation to finance the activities of the opposition

3-    Presenting partnership projects with organizations that have relations with the Regime such as the European Union in order push them towards parallel treatment between the Regime and opposition, through pressure by voters in the European countries, and to benefit from these projects in financing the opposition in particular with regard to the entrenchment of the values that form the agenda fixed in the concerns of the European Union and organizations alike.

4-   Cooperation with NGOs on human rights, freedoms, gender, transparency etc., and enter into partnerships with them to serve the common goals of the organizations and the opposition alike.

5-   Search for investment projects, and not necessarily to be at the centre level, but can be done at the branch level, so that the opposition activities can be financed by its own projects.

The above points are relevant to improving the financial capabilities of the opposition; the following steps are to cut off the sources of financing of the Regime.

Boycott…………….Disinvst……………Sanction

1-    On the official level, by persuading countries and organizations that sponsor projects in cooperation with the Regime until it stops financing of such projects, or at least could proceed funding the Regime’s projects but after imposing its own terms and conditions,  to prevent the Regime from using such funds in the oppression of our people.

2-    At the grassroots level to stop the tax imposed by the Regime on Eritrean nationals living in Diaspora, and projects that the Regime claims to support the families of martyrs and the disabled, especially since the Regime is using the means of blackmail and intimidation in the collection of such tax which contradicts the laws of the countries in which the Eritrean communities live.

In conclusion, I would like to urge the opposition forces –political, civic and independents to join their efforts to win the dictatorship and lay foundations on the future Eritrea after the fall of dictatorship. The process of national unity can only be achieved by boosting working relationship and activities but not rhetoric or attacking each other and let us be soft with each other and hard for problem solving.

ተጋድሎ ሓርነት ኤርትራ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ፡ ተሓኤ ብሰንኪ ውግእ ሕድሕድን ውሽጣዊ ጸገማታን ሜዳ ኤርትራ ለቒቓ ናብ ሱዳን ምስ ኣተወት፡ “ተሓኤ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ” ዝብል ስም ሒዛ እያ ቀጺላ። ኣብቲ እዋን  ተሓኤ ብዓባያ ኣብ ሰለስተ ጉጅለታት ተመቕለት። ነቲ ብጉባኤ ዝተመርጸ መሪሕነት ብጉባኤ ክወርድን ኣብ ህዝቢ ቀሪቡ ክሕተትን ስልጣኑ ከረክብን  ሕጋዊ ብምንባሩ ብምእማና ካብተን ዝተረፋ ክልተ ጉጅለታት ጸብለል ኢላ ዝወጸት ነበረት። ህዝቢ እውን ነዚ ሓፈሻዊ መስመር ወይ ከኣ ብዓረበኛ “ተያር ኣልዓም” ብዝብል ስም ይጽወዓ ነይሩ።

ተሓኤ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ ዋላ ካብ ሜዳ ኤርትራ ትውጻእ እምበር፡ ምስቲ ኣብ ሜዳ ዝተረፈ ሓይሊ ህዝባዊ ግምባር ክትደጋገፍ ድልውቲ ነይራ። ነዚ ብተግባር ከተሰንዮ ከኣ ካብቲ መንግስቲ ሱዳን ሒዛቶ ዝነበረት ኣጽዋር ተሓኤ እቲ  ከበድቲ ብረት ንህዝባዊ ሰራዊት ንኽወሃብ ወሰነት። ቀጺላ ኣውን ሰውራዊ ባይቶ ምእንቲ ሃገራዊ ነጽነት ንምቅላስ ምስ ህዝባዊ ሰራዊት ሓቢራ ክትሰርሕ ናታ ስትራተጂካዊ ቦታ ንኽትሕዝ ሓቲታ  ተቐባልነት ግን ኣይረኸበትን።

ኣብ 1991 ህዝባዊ ሰራዊት ንመላእ ኤርትራ ተቖጻጺሩ መሬት ኤርትራ  ካብ ባዕዳዊ መግዛእቲ ነጻ ኣውጸኣ። ሓይሊ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ እናዓኾኸን እናዓበየን መጺኡ ህዝቢ እውን ክስዕቦ ምስ ጀመረ፡ ነዚ ብምርኣይ  ህዝባዊ ግንባር ብ1992 ኣብ ልዕሊ ሰራዊት ሰውራዊ ባይቶ፡ ንካልኣይ ግዜ  ሰፊሕ ወተሃደራዊ ስጉምቲ ወሰደት። 

ድሕር’ዚ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ፡ ኤርትራ ነጻ ምውጻኣ ደገፋ ኣብ ልዕሊ ምግላጻ፡ ኣብ’ቲ ንኤርትራ ዝተቖጻጸረ ኣውንታዊ  ፖለቲካዊ መርገጻ ኣነጸረት። እቲ ፖለቲካዊ መርገጻ ከኣ “እቲ ዝተበገስናሉ ዕላማ  ነጻነት ኤርትራ ሽቶኡ ስለዝወቕዐ፡ ደጊም ብረታዊ ቃልሲ ኣብቂዑ ቀጻሊ ንሓርነት ምቅላስ እዩ” ዝብል ሓላፍነታዊ ውሳነ ወሰነት። ነዚ እውን ፖለቲካዊ ዋጋ ከፊላትሉ እያ። ምኽንያቱ በቶም ካልኦት ሓይልታት ነቲ ዕላማ ከም ምኽሓድ ስለዝተወስደ።

ብድሕሪ እዚ ኣብ ኤርትራ ብሰንኪ እቲ ኣብ መንጎ ኢትዮጵያን ኤርትራን ዝተባርዐ ህዝቢ ዘይተጸበዮ ውግእ፡ ንስርዓት ህግደፍ ጠንጢኖም ምስ ዝወጹ እሞ ውድብ ዝመስረቱ ሓይልታት ህዝባዊ ግምባር ነበር ንሓርነታዊ ቃልሲ ሓቢርካ ንምቅላስ ብዝብል ምስ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ ርክብ ተጀመረ። ኣብ 2008 ከኣ ተሓኤ ሰውራዊ ባይቶ ናብ ሰልፊ ማዕበለት’ሞ ስለፊ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ዝብል ስም ሒዛ ወጸት። በዚ መሰረት ከኣ ምስ ሰልፊ ዲሞክራሲ ኤርትራ ክካየድ ዝጸንሐ ርክባት ኣብ 2010 ኮንፈረንስ ተኻይዱ ናይ ክልቲኡ ሰልፍታት መሪሕነታት ከምዘለዎ መሰጋገሪ መሪሕነት ክኸውን ተወሰነ። ኣብ 2011 ከኣ ቀዳማይ ሰልፋዊ ጉባኤ ተኻይዱ ሰልፊ ዲሞክራሲ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ (ሰዲህኤ) ናብ ዝብል ሰፊሕ ሰልፊ ተሰግረ።

ሰልፊ ዲሞክራሲ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ድሕሪ ምቛሙ ኣብ ክልቲኡ ሰልፍታት ዝነበረ ኣባል፡ “ሓቢርካ ምቅላስ ዝያዳ የዕውት” ዝብል ተረድኦ ሒዙ ተበጊሱ። እዚ ተባዕ ስጉምቲ ዝሓለፈ ውግእ ሕድሕድን ምንጽጻግን ዘሕደሮ ስንብራት ናይ ምሕዋይ ከቢድ ግና ድማ ኣድላይ ሓላፍነት ሒዙ እዩ ነቒሉ። ብዘይካዚ ኤርትራ ናይ ጀብሃ ወይ ናይ ሻዕብያ ጥራይ ዘይኮነትስ፡ ናይ ኩልና እያ ብዝብል ናይ ክልቲኤን ገዳይም ውድባት ታሪኽ እወንታኡ ይኹን ኣሉታኡ ናይ ኩልና ምዃኑ ምቕባልን ምኽባርን ግድን እዩ ዝብል ካልእ ኣገዳሲ ነጥቢ ነይሩ። እተን ክልተ ባንደራታት ሓንቲ ታሪኻዊት መለልዪት ቃልሲ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ፥ እታ ሓንቲ ከኣ  መለለዪት ናይ ሎሚ  ሃገረ ኤርትራ ብምዃነን ክልቲአን ክሳብ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ሕገመንግስታዊ ውሳኔ ዝህበሉ ብሓባር ከም ምልክት ክንጥቀመለን ተሰማምዐ።

እቲ ናይ ስምረት ጉዕዞ ብብዙሕ መስርሓት ተጓዒዙ ኣብ ናይ ፍጹም ምጽንባር ተበጽሐ። ነቲ መስርሕ  ብዙሓት ክድግፍዎ ከለዉ፡ ዝነጽግዎን ዘይናቱ መልክዕን ስምን ዝህብዎን’ውን ነይሮም። ሕሉፍሓሊፎም ነቲ ተባዕ መስርሕን ውጽኢቱን ከም ካልኣይ ገጽ ናይ ህግዲፍ ኣምሲሎም ዝገልጽዎ’ውን ነይሮም እዮም። ሓለይቲ ታሪኽ ተሓኤ ወይ ህግሓኤ መሲሎም ዝቐርቡ’ውን ውሑዳት ኣይነበሩን።  ግብራዊ ውጽኢቱ ከምይ ነይሩ፡ ኣሎን ክኸውን እዩን ብዘየገድስ ብመትከላዊ ዓይኒ እቲ በተን ክልተ ሰልፍታት ዝተውስደ ስጉምቲ ቅቡል እዩ። ንመጻኢ እውን ኩሉ ዋጋ እናተኸፍሎ ክቕጽል ዝግበኦ እዩ እብል።

by Martin Plaut

Eritrea is coming in from the cold. Could that spark a shooting war with Ethiopia?

By Tom Gardner

• June 21, 2017
• Source: Foreign Policy

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — Two recent and seemingly incongruous events may one day be seen as symbolic turning points for Eritrea, an authoritarian, one-party state often referred to as Africa’s hermit kingdom. The first was a bloody clash on Eritrea’s border with Ethiopia in June 2016, which left hundreds of people dead and brought back memories of the devastating 1998-2000 war between the two archenemies. The second was an academic conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara in July, the first of its kind in 15 years. Visiting academics were shocked by the relative freedom for debate — on everything from women’s rights to foreign policy — in the notoriously repressive state.

“It was as much a political event as an academic event,” said Harry Verhoeven, an assistant professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar who attended the conference. “It was remarkable — by regional standards and certainly by Eritrean standards.”

 These apparently contradictory episodes were in fact both subplots of the same story: Eritrea’s gradual emergence from more than a decade of international isolation and the uncertain attempts to come to terms with that shift by its rival neighbor, Ethiopia. The conference indicated that the Eritrean government is coming tentatively in from the cold; the border war showed that Ethiopia is worried that a rehabilitated Eritrea could threaten its regional dominance. Together, the two events demonstrated that the 17-year-old status quo of “no peace, no war” is coming undone.

In April, Ethiopia announced that it is working on a new policy toward its Red Sea neighbor. The details are still emerging, but one thing is clear: The government recognizes that its strategy of containment, imposed on Eritrea after the end of the border war in 2000 and ratcheted up with a U.N. arms embargo in 2009, has failed. For the first time in years, there is serious talk of a change of course in Addis Ababa.

The U.N. sanctions regime is dependent on support from the international community, which is gradually eroding. The sanctions were always controversial for singling out Eritrea as a uniquely bad actor in a region of bad actors. Now there is growing consensus at the United Nations that the main justification for the sanctions no longer applies: There is no evidence that Eritrea is still supporting al-Shabab militants in Somalia, and though it continues to support armed opposition groups in the region — notably in Ethiopia — its neighbors do as well.

Ethiopia may be able to stave off a softening — or lifting — of the sanctions until the end of 2018, when its term as a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council is slated to end. Tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti, which have spiked in the past week following Qatar’s decision to remove its peacekeepers from the troubled border between the two countries, may well strengthen Ethiopia’s case in the short term. But in the long run it will struggle to persuade other members to continue the status quo without the backing of the United States, which now that President Barack Obama — and in particular his national security advisor, Susan Rice, who was seen as implacably hostile to the Eritrean regime — has departed may be less inclined to keep Asmara in the penalty box.

“They didn’t have an inch of space when she was there,” Bronwyn Bruton, the deputy director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., said of Rice. Now that Donald Trump is in office, “all the African strongmen are rejoicing,” she added.

Wider winds are blowing in Eritrea’s favor, too. The war in Yemen, which is less than 70 miles away across the Red Sea, has sparked a rush on Eritrean coastal real estate by Gulf states looking to base their troops there. For example, the United Arab Emirates has been leasing the port of Assab since 2015 and is reportedly building a military base there. Meanwhile, some 400 Eritrean troops are reportedly fighting as part of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, in return for which Asmara has received fuel and finance.

“The Gulf countries have repositioned Eritrea in the geopolitical context of the Horn in quite a remarkable way,” said Kjetil Tronvoll, a senior partner at the International Law and Policy Institute in Norway.

Meanwhile, the migration crisis has spurred renewed engagement by the European Union, which is desperate to stem the flow of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean. Eritrea was Africa’s largest single source of refugees to Europe from 2014 to 2016, a distinction that won President Isaias Afwerki, who has been in power since 1993, an additional source of income. In 2015, the EU approved a 200 million euro aid package for Eritrea, though it has yet to disburse all the funds. This came on top of promises of training for the judiciary and security services designed to combat trafficking.

Individual European countries and humanitarian agencies are also stepping up engagement. Germany has resumed technical assistance programs while Britain’s Department for International Development is planning to open an office in Asmara. U.S. State Department officials, who long avoided the country, have started visiting again. “

The wall that the Ethiopians had carefully erected has frankly crumbled

The wall that the Ethiopians had carefully erected has frankly crumbled,” said Martin Plaut, the author of Understanding Eritrea. “Everybody seems to be queuing up to love them.”

Most unnervingly from the Ethiopian perspective is Eritrea’s strengthening relationship with Egypt, Ethiopia’s historic rival and now the closest thing Eritrea has to a regional ally. Addis Ababa accuses Cairo of working with Eritrea to support armed groups that have attempted to sabotage the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the continent’s largest hydroelectric project, which Egypt regards as an existential threat because of its dependence on the Nile River’s downstream waters.

High-level exchanges between Asmara and Cairo have intensified in recent months. Afwerki traveled to Egypt in November to meet President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Eritrea’s foreign minister held talks with his Egyptian counterpart in May. Multiple Egyptian delegations have descended on Asmara, fueling rumors of a potential Egyptian air base in Eritrea. Such a provocation is highly unlikely, analysts say, but not impossible: Egypt has not ruled out the possibility of airstrikes against the dam.

Meanwhile, Eritrea has made its own efforts to rid itself of pariah status. It has begun courting foreign investors, especially in the mining sector. Three new mines are expected to be operational by 2018, joining the majority-Canadian-owned Bisha gold, copper, and zinc mine, which opened in 2011 and generated nearly $2 billion in revenues in its first four years of operation. (The mine has been dogged by allegations of forced labor and dangerous working conditions.) The government also created a free trade zone in the port of Massawa in an effort to attract more investors.

This comes on top of small but symbolically significant measures by the government to improve its terrible reputation on human rights. According to the Atlantic Council, some 50 foreign journalists were permitted to enter and report on the country between May 2015 and May 2016, and the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was recently permitted to tour a prison.

Much of this is worrying to Ethiopia, which dislikes the prospect of Eritrea projecting its influence over the Red Sea littoral — a deep-seated anxiety tied to its own landlocked status. Addis Ababa also worries that Afwerki will use his growing financial resources to step up support for armed opposition in Ethiopia at a time when the country is already under a state of emergency following months of unrest. Above all, Ethiopia fears encirclement by hostile regimes.

But so far it has struggled to craft a coherent response to Eritrea’s rapidly changing circumstances. “Ethiopia was completely blindsided by what happened in Yemen,” said Cedric Barnes, the director of research and communications at the Rift Valley Institute. “They seem to have lost their way diplomatically.”

Unlike Eritrea, Ethiopia has only distant relations with the Gulf states, and its efforts to dissuade the UAE and Saudi Arabia from engaging with Asmara have apparently been unsuccessful. As a result, it has resorted to displays of military strength, including bombing the Bisha mine in 2015. In private, government officials in Asmara claim that scores of similar provocations have occurred in recent years.

Analysts are unsure what a new Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea might entail. Some suggest it will amount to little more than a rearticulation of its existing approach, setting firm red lines and spelling out exactly what sort of military action their breach might warrant. Others wonder if the government is considering secret bilateral talks, perhaps including the offer of withdrawal from the border town of Badme, which Ethiopian troops have occupied illegally for the past 15 years. But war — to bring about regime change in Asmara — is not out of the question either, though military overstretch and fear of full-blown state collapse north of the border make this unlikely.

The problem is that domestic politics in Ethiopia makes bold thinking difficult. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front is deeply divided, and the prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, lacks the authority to make a bold move toward resetting relations with Eritrea. Whatever happens, hawks in the military and intelligence agencies will need to be brought onside, which will mean avoiding anything that looks like a humiliating climb down from the country’s aggressive stance.

Eritrea may have earned the title of Africa’s North Korea, but it has no patron like China that can force it to the table. Afwerki still benefits from the status quo, which justifies keeping the country on a permanent war footing. Reports that Eritrean troops have occupied disputed territory following the withdrawal of Qatari peacekeepers from the Djibouti border last week serve as reminder that Eritrea can still play the part of regional spoiler. And though it’s now less isolated, Asmara remains much weaker than Addis Ababa. In the end, movement must come from the Ethiopian side. “It’s a high-risk, high-reward situation,” Verhoeven said. “But I’m cautiously optimistic.”

ኣቶ መንግስተኣብ ኣስመሮም ኣቦመንበር ሰልፊ ዲሞክራሲ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ (ሰዲህኤ) ንዝነውሐ ናይ ስራሕ ዑደት ኣብ ሕቡራት መንግስታት ኣሜሪካን ካናዳን ንምክያድ ካብ ተዳልዩሉ ዘሎ ከተማታት፣ ናይ መጀመርያ ኣኼብኡ ኣብ በይ-አርያ፣ ከተማ ኦክላንድ ብ17 ሰነ 2017 ዕዉት ሰሚናር ኣካይዱ።