“For instance, in our first operation against the Junta, it only took us three weeks.

It (the junta) used to have a uniform, its place was known and it fought using all armaments.

The Junta which we had eliminated within 3 weeks has now mingled in the farmers and started moving from place to place and now, we are not even able to eliminate it within 3 months.

Eliminating an enemy which is visible and eliminating an enemy which is in hide and operates by assimilating itself with others is not one and the same.

It is very difficult and tiresome. We have conducted a wide operations in the last three days and we have caused a heavy damage to the enemy of the people and weakened its capacity seriously. And this will be strengthened and continued.”

“Currently, the national defence forces and the federal forces are in a major  fight  on 8 fronts in the north and the west (parts of the country) with the enemies which are anti-farmers, anti-civilians and caused strife among Ethiopians and are paying a sacrifice.”

How different this is from PM Abiy’s confident prediction of 9 November 2020

As a colleague pointed out – it is almost as if PM Abiy has never heard of guerrilla warfare.

Both federal and resistance forces are digging in for a lengthy battle in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Conditions for civilians are dire, with famine a growing danger. Outside powers should urge Addis Ababa to let more aid into the war zone, while maintaining pressure for talks.

Source: International Crisis Group

What’s new? War rages on in Ethiopia’s Tigray region – with civilians bearing the brunt of a brutal conflict marked by atrocities. Under international pressure, Addis Ababa has offered concessions on aid access and pledged that Eritrean troops will withdraw. But prospects of a negotiated settlement appear dim.

Why does it matter? An entrenched Tigrayan resistance combined with Ethiopian and Eritrean authorities’ determination to keep Tigray’s fugitive leaders from power mean that the conflict could evolve into a protracted war. That would further devastate Tigray and greatly harm Ethiopia, the linchpin state in the Horn of Africa.

What should be done? With a decisive battlefield win for either side a remote prospect, parties should consider a cessation of hostilities that allows for expanded humanitarian aid access. This practical first step would reduce civilian suffering and ideally pave the way for a return to dialogue down the road.

I.Overview

Though Ethiopia’s federal government claimed the war in the country’s Tigray region was over in November, fighting continues – at great cost to a stricken population trapped in a multi-sided conflict. Tigray’s ousted leadership appears to have consolidated its position in rural areas and its resistance commands support from a Tigrayan population that values the region’s autonomy. As part of the federal war effort, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed enlisted forces from Eritrea and also from Ethiopia’s Amhara region. This move added to Tigrayans’ sense of injustice and broadened backing for the rebellion, particularly as Eritrean and Amhara combatants stand accused of atrocities against civilians. While mounting evidence of abuses and international pressure have forced concessions from Addis Ababa, including an announcement that Eritrean forces will withdraw, the war looks set to continue. Led by the U.S., European Union, African Union and UN, external actors should press for a pause in the fighting as an urgent priority so as to allow increased aid delivery – and keep demanding that the parties pursue a negotiated settlement.

All sides in the conflict in Ethiopia’s northernmost region appear to be girding for a protracted battle. The Tigrayan leadership, though driven from power in Mekelle, the region’s capital, has rallied under the banner of the Tigray Defence Forces, an armed resistance group. It is led by the removed Tigrayan leaders and commanded by former high-ranking Ethiopian National Defence Force officers. It currently operates primarily from rural areas in central and southern Tigray, while federal troops control the main roads and urban areas. Eritrean soldiers have their heaviest presence in northern Tigray and Amhara forces patrol western Tigray and the far south. All sides are fixated on securing a military victory. None appears capable of achieving one in the near term. The Tigrayan resistance appears to enjoy broad support in the region, while federal authorities and their allies are determined to capture its leaders and put them on trial. The parties’ positioning means that the conflict could well last for months, or even years, an outcome that would be even more disastrous for Tigray and the rest of the country.

Urgent measures are needed to stem the tragedy. Direct talks between the parties appear a distant prospect at present, given that Prime Minister Abiy rejects the notion of engaging Tigray leaders he portrays as traitors. For now, the U.S., EU, AU, UN Security Council and other actors should press for more limited but critical gains. Notably, they should demand a cessation of hostilities that at least allows for rapidly expanded aid delivery. To stave off the risk of mass starvation it is critical that ploughing and planting take place as Tigray’s rainy season arrives in the next few months. Addis Ababa should also tacitly allow aid groups to negotiate access to Tigray-held areas. Getting Eritrean forces out may not be easy, given Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s apparent determination to crush the Tigrayan leadership, but Ethiopia’s foreign partners should hold Abiy to his pledge that these forces will leave. First steps along these lines could – if all goes well – eventually usher in talks between the federal government and Tigrayan representatives.

II.An Entrenched Resistance

The war in Tigray has become a grinding stalemate. Neither side appears poised to achieve a definitive victory, despite the federal government’s success in pushing Tigray’s leadership out of Mekelle.The presence of Eritrean and Amhara forces fighting alongside federal soldiers has galvanised Tigrayan resistance to the intervention. On 26 March, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that Eritrean troops would withdraw “effective immediately”.These were welcome words, though it remains to be seen whether the soldiers will in fact depart. Nor is it clear that Eritrean forces can withdraw without giving a boost to the Tigrayan forces Addis Ababa is set on defeating.Amid international outcry, authorities have increased media and humanitarian aid access, while promising to probe atrocities. But outside parties’ key demand – the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces – will not be easy to achieve, given that one of the political imperatives that drew both these actors into the conflict, namely the elimination of Tigray’s former ruling party as a political force, remains unmet.

After fleeing to rural areas, Tigray’s fugitive leaders have dug in. Their campaign commands popular support, meaning that it will most likely endure.Meanwhile, the federal government has signalled its intent to keep pursuing a military victory.A drawn-out conflict would lead to even greater suffering for civilians, potentially subjecting those in inaccessible areas to mass starvation. It would also threaten Ethiopia’s stability and potentially that of the Horn of Africa, given the country’s pivotal position in the region.

The rival combatants’ fortunes have waxed and waned over the past few months. In the early weeks of fighting, federal forces and their allies made rapid territorial advances, culminating when they ousted Tigray’s government and took control of Mekelle on 28 November, just over three weeks after war broke out. In December, the removed Tigrayan leadership went into survival mode, retreating to far-flung rural areas in the face of a drone-led aerial campaign that killed some leaders and destroyed military hardware commandeered from the federal army.To avoid detection, they shut down all external telecommunications and went to ground.Since December, however, their resistance has hardened. The Tigray Defence Forces appear to have established a foothold in rural central Tigray.Tigrayan media regularly report what they describe as victories by these forces over either the Ethiopian or Eritrean armies.These claims are hard to verify due to an internet blackout and access restrictions.

Broadly speaking, Tigray’s territory is now a battleground for four different forces fighting on two sides. The Tigray Defence Forces are on one side. They hold territory in rural parts of Central Tigray Zone, as well as some areas of Eastern, South-eastern and Southern Tigray Zones.Those forces are pitted against the Ethiopian military, which occupies towns and cities; Amhara regional forces, both regular and irregular, which patrol most of western Tigray and parts of southern Tigray; and the Eritrean army, which is present mostly in the northern sections of North-western, Central and Eastern Tigray Zones. In early 2021, the Eritreans have also fought further south, according to, among others, the UN.

Most of the combat over the past few months has occurred in central Tigray, where Tigrayan leaders fled from Mekelle, and increasingly in the two southern zones. For example, battles erupted in Samre district in South-eastern Zone on 14 February, and again in March, as well as further south in several locations (Tigrayan claims of the latter received rare corroboration from non-Tigrayan media on 14 March).From 9 to 12 February, a major clash broke out between Tigrayan and Eritrean forces to the north in the Werie Leke district of Central Tigray Zone.February fighting between, on one side, Tigrayan forces and, on the other, Ethiopian and Eritrean forces also clustered around Abiy Adiy town, whose roads the UN says are inaccessible due to insecurity. More recently, the Ofla and Endamehoni districts in southern Tigray experienced heavy fighting, with Tigray forces’ victory claims over Ethiopian and Eritrean troops contradicted by media that support the federal intervention.Tigrayan forces also staged a deadly attack inside Amhara region on 18 March.

International pressure appears to have contributed to a shift in Addis Ababa’s public positioning on the presence of Eritrean troops. In the third week of March, U.S. President Joe Biden dispatched Senator Chris Coons to deliver a message to Prime Minister Abiy. A Democrat from Biden’s home state of Delaware, Coons is close to the president and sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Shortly after the senator’s visit, Abiy publicly acknowledged the Eritrean role for the first time.After making a trip of his own to Asmara on 26 March, the Ethiopian premier said Eritrean troops would withdraw.

The presence of Eritrean soldiers – and their reported role in atrocities in the course of the war – has inflamed Tigrayan popular sentiment.While getting the Eritreans out is critical, their exit could bring its own complications. It would give some respite to civilians who seem to have borne the brunt of Eritrean forces’ violence and may win some political space for the interim administration, which has demanded that the Eritreans pull out.But it could also relieve pressure on Tigray’s forces and allow its emboldened leaders to claim they had forced the withdrawal, thus intensifying the conflict as they next seek to force a federal retreat.The Eritreans’ continued presence, however, particularly if more atrocities ensue, would also strengthen Tigrayan resolve to fight on.

The incursion of Amhara combatants into Tigray has not helped, either. Amhara regional leaders say they have reclaimed territory that they contend the rebels-turned-rulers from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) snatched from Amhara hands as they consolidated their power in the early 1990s.Even though the western areas are relatively quiet at present in terms of fighting, sustained Amhara control – or formal inclusion of the territory in Amhara region – could trigger years of instability as many Tigrayans, including top officials from the federally appointed interim Tigray government, strongly reject Amhara administration.

The Tigrayan armed resistance seems to have grown in strength, although it has still at times been under considerable pressure, even surrounded.Its commanders include former Chief of Staff General Tsadkan Gebretensae, who led the Ethiopian military into war with Eritrea from 1998-2000, and another, more recently retired former senior officer, Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede. The Tigrayans appear to have held mostly central rural areas and claim to have been able to stand up to federal and Eritrean forces.The war began with Tigray’s leaders capturing tanks, missiles and rocket launchers from the federal military, but that equipment was destroyed or discarded in the face of the aerial campaign. Now, Tigrayan forces are more mobile and lightly armed. While it is unclear how many fighters are involved, Tigrayan ranks are said to be swelling due to popular anger at the intervention, in particular at the atrocities allegedly committed against civilians.

Hundreds of Tigray’s fugitive political and military leaders are still at large (including ousted Tigray President and TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael), with only around a third of those sought in custody.The Ethiopian government did not report having detained or killed any of the wanted leaders in February or March, again suggesting that the TPLF leadership has steadied its position. Tigray’s commanders claim they routinely capture and kill enemy combatants, and seize trucks, rifles and ammunition to sustain their rebellion.From the outset, senior TPLF figures said they do not need an external supply line (though they would like one), because the supportive population will provide food – even amid the shortages – and they can grab more materiel from their foes.

Federal authorities offer a strikingly different assessment of battlefield dynamics, however. In a 23 March address to parliament, Abiy cast the TPLF as an all-but-defeated force. “What I would like to tell the people of Tigray, the friends of Tigray and the honourable parliament is that the TPLF has now become like grain powder that has been dispersed by the wind. We can’t collect it again and make it edible powder”.

But in addition to the factors noted above that are fuelling the rebellion, there are other considerations suggesting that the war will continue. For one, a sizeable number of Tigrayans oppose the Eritrean and Amhara forces’ presence and are outraged at the atrocities both are reported to have committed against civilians.The fury runs so deep that even the interim Tigray administration, appointed by the federal government, has expressed it.Still, that interim administration enjoys little support. Most Tigrayans back the ousted regional leadership.Eritrean withdrawal would perhaps ease opposition to the interim administration, but it would be unlikely to dilute anger at the federal overthrow of Tigray’s government or at the Amhara irredentism. Even more worryingly for long-term stability in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, many Tigrayans now voice support for secession from the Ethiopian federation.A sustained bid for independence would inflame the Amhara-Tigray territorial dispute and might destabilise Eritrea, causing many years of strife.

With the conflict still in the balance, it remains to be seen whether the federal military will seek to calm the situation somewhat by jettisoning its Eritrean and Amhara allies, thereby risking boosting Tigray’s resistance. Even if it wishes to do so, Addis Ababa might find it challenging to move in this direction. Although his government has still not admitted its role, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has an opportunity to claim areas in northern Ethiopia granted to Asmara by a 2002 UN boundary commission decision that Addis Ababa refused to respect.Moreover, the Eritrean leader has a longstanding ambition to cut the TPLF down to size. Isaias views Tigray leaders as ungrateful junior partners who turned Ethiopia’s military against his regime in 1998 despite strong Eritrean support for the TPLF’s rebellion against Mengistu Haile Mariam’s military dictatorship.Eritrean troops’ looting of Tigray could be seen as payback for the destruction Eritrea suffered in the 1998-2000 war, said a close observer, who dismissed the idea the Eritreans would pull out: “Isaias will not sleep until the TPLF is destroyed”.

Additionally, federal forces’ reliance on Eritrean support has grown amid Ethiopia’s armed confrontation with Sudan over a disputed borderland. In mid-December, clashes broke out again in the al-Fashaga area along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border after Sudan’s military – taking advantage of Ethiopia’s distraction by the Tigray conflict – moved to control territory it claims Ethiopians occupied from the mid-1990s. The hostilities, which also have drawn in Eritrean forces, are of particular concern to Amhara leaders, as farmers from that region were evicted by Sudan’s incursion.The border fight means that, for now, an Eritrean exit from Tigray would further stretch Ethiopia’s military, unless Asmara repositions troops to Ethiopia’s Sudanese border.

Another factor suggesting the conflict will continue is that the federal government has not fully achieved its key intervention objectives: to disarm the TPLF, prosecute all wanted Tigrayan leaders and re-establish a constitutional government in Tigray.With elections in Ethiopia (excluding Tigray) just over two months away, Abiy is likely to worry that he will look weak if he submits to talks with a fugitive Tigrayan leadership that his government has classified as treasonous. Moreover, Abiy faces little domestic pressure to change course. The war in Tigray enjoys broad popular support in much of Ethiopia and, outside Tigray itself, Abiy has successfully cast the TPLF as villains who have been sowing the seeds of civil strife for the past two years.Nonetheless, whether Eritrean troops maintain a presence or not, Addis Ababa seems unlikely to dislodge the Tigray Defence Forces from rural areas and convince Tigrayans to curtail their support for the resistance. The sad reality is that the war looks set to grind on, probably for months, if not longer, absent significant action by outside powers to bring it to a close.

III.Civilians in the Firing Line

Conditions on the ground are dire. Aid agencies estimated on 5 March that 4.5 million people in the region, or more than two thirds of the population, needed emergency food supplies.The UN’s humanitarian agency said the same number of people “have been without access to electricity, communications and other essential services for more than four months”.In March, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network projected that parts of eastern and central Tigray would suffer “emergency outcomes” – just below “famine” conditions – through at least September.Until February, the federal government was blocking media and aid agency access to Tigray. Although it has now relaxed these restrictions, progress has been slow, with aid workers expanding their operations only incrementally over the last few months.

Tigray suffers from chronic food shortages. Even before the war, these had been aggravated by the worst desert locust invasion in decades.Fighting then broke out around harvest time. The shutdown of telecommunications, closure of banks and, seemingly primarily at Eritrean troops’ hands, destruction of more than two thirds of health facilities and widespread looting of public and private property – including food stores and oxen for ploughing – has exacerbated the hardship.Moreover, the conflict has displaced almost one million people inside Tigray, many of them from western Tigray.The federal government said on 30 March that it is delivering food aid to 4.2 million people in Tigray, a huge increase over the 950,000 who needed assistance before the war, while humanitarian actors say they have delivered adequate food to one million of the 3.5 million people in need who are in accessible areas.

International pressure has contributed to the federal government promising “unfettered” aid access, which should lead to more relief getting into areas under federal control.Authorities have also eased bureaucratic obstacles to access to the region and there already are more humanitarian workers on the ground.But the fact that the Tigray Defence Forces hold territory and the presence of Eritrean troops means aid workers will not reach large parts of Tigray unless authorities allow them to negotiate access to Tigrayan-held areas and persuade the Eritreans to consistently allow increased aid flows. Greater humanitarian access to some Eritrean-held areas did start to occur in March.Yet with no end to the conflict in sight, humanitarian assistance is likely to remain insufficient.There is a genuine threat of mass starvation in the months ahead, especially if the ploughing and planting season is interrupted, with heavy rains starting around June.

All four belligerents stand accused of committing atrocities against civilians. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a legally autonomous federal institution, has joined Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in accusing Eritrean forces of mass killings of civilians in the ancient city of Axum in late November.Human Rights Watch also said the federal military indiscriminately bombed urban areas.The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated on 4 March that “serious violations of international law, possibly amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed by multiple actors in the conflict”.So far, however, the evidence for such crimes is mainly limited to witness accounts obtained remotely, given that research into the reported atrocities was carried out amid a blanket ban on media and aid agency access. Ethiopian and particularly Eritrean soldiers have reportedly engaged in widespread sexual violence, looting and massacres.

There have also been several reports of serious rights abuses in western Tigray, where federal troops first intervened before Amhara regional forces took control.They suggest that Amhara factions have forcibly moved Tigrayans en masse from western Tigray, with an intensification of the depopulation in the last month.Also in western Tigray, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said Tigrayan militiamen backed by local officials killed hundreds of mostly Amhara civilians in Mai Kadra town on 9 November.

Equally worrying are multiple reports of retaliatory attacks on Tigrayan civilians by Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers following armed confrontations with Tigray forces, particularly as such atrocities may well increase as fighting intensifies.Notable incidents include an early January massacre at Debre Abay to the south west of Shire city, one at Axum in late November and, most recently, the reported murder of civilians by federal soldiers near Wukro town.Although Abiy has recently pledged that Ethiopian soldiers will be held to account for abuses, days before that his office also said Tigrayans will face “misery” if their leaders do not surrender and those who joined the rebellion do not return home.

IV.Preventing Contagion

If war persists, it would pose a serious threat to Ethiopia’s overall stability and potentially to that of the entire Horn of Africa. A concern Crisis Group highlighted at the conflict’s outset was that it could exacerbate problems in Ethiopia, such as mounting intercommunal killings in Benishangul-Gumuz region, bordering Sudan in the west, simmering discontent in the country’s largest region of Oromia, and national fault lines.Growing hostilities with Sudan complicate the picture further.

For now, the authorities seem to have sufficient control in most areas outside Tigray, but they could lose it. In Oromia, home to a burgeoning insurgency, political discontent is high, though the opposition is relatively fragmented. If fighting intensifies in Tigray – and clashes with Sudan escalate – Addis Ababa’s opponents in this region may feel emboldened as the 5 June election approaches. The election could deepen fault lines, particularly given that the main opposition parties in Oromia are boycotting it, citing state repression.Thus, while Abiy still commands domestic support for the intervention in Tigray, protracted conflict there nonetheless risks sparking unrest elsewhere.

Peace talks seem a long way off. On the battlefield, both sides are swinging for a knockout blow, but neither can realistically hope to land one, regardless of whether or not Eritrea withdraws. The federal government cannot eradicate the armed resistance, which appears to be entrenched in rural areas and command widespread popular support. The Tigray Defence Forces have zero chance of re-establishing control over Tigray given the resources – especially manpower – at Addis Ababa’s (and Asmara’s) disposal. Moreover, the federal government rejects the idea of negotiating with the ousted Tigray leadership, which it accuses of treason.That position, it seems, still has plenty of popular support in Ethiopia outside of Tigray. Meanwhile, many Tigrayans, including senior former officials, consider the TPLF regional government’s reinstatement as essential to honouring Tigray’s self-determination rights.It is hard to imagine Addis Ababa acceding to this demand.

Moreover, the path to Eritrean and Amhara withdrawal is strewn with obstacles. In addition to President Isaias, who for reasons noted above, and despite Abiy’s announcement that Eritrean forces will withdraw, may baulk at doing anything that eases pressure on the TPLF, Amhara’s leaders and activists may present a challenge. They believe they acted in justice’s interest by reclaiming territory in Tigray they contend the TPLF annexed in the early 1990s.Even if he wanted to remove the Amhara, Abiy would have to do so by force, which would strain his ties with their leaders, weaken him politically, and so boost Tigray’s resistance and Sudan’s position. A federal move against the Amhara would widen rifts in Abiy’s Prosperity Party, where tensions are already evident between the two largest regional chapters in Amhara and Abiy’s home region, Oromia.Amhara control of western Tigray also creates a buffer zone to prevent the Tigray Defence Forces from resupplying through eastern Sudan. Simmering Khartoum-Addis tensions may tempt Sudan’s military to support Tigray’s forces if the Amhara leave Tigray.

But despite this bleak picture, there are things outside actors can do. Abiy’s declaration that Eritrean troops will exit illustrates how important international pressure is. Foreign leaders should proceed by targeting limited initial goals. They should press for a pause in the fighting to increase aid coverage. Crucially, that would allow more ploughing and planting to occur, with Tigray’s rainy season arriving around June. They should push Addis Ababa to tacitly allow aid groups to negotiate access to Tigray-held areas, as occurs with rebel groups in other war zones. They should also keep pressure on Abiy to fulfil his pledge to get Eritrean troops out, investigate abuses and allow unrestricted aid access. The territorial dispute between Tigray and Amhara can only sustainably be resolved via negotiations and legal means, starting with a boundary commission assessment. The African Union and UN Security Council should follow Brussels’ and Washington’s lead and pressure all parties to pause fighting. The AU Bureau of Heads of State and Government is well positioned to urge Abiy to abandon the quest for a total victory on the battlefield.

A cessation of hostilities in Tigray and improved humanitarian conditions just might then pave the way for talks. Abiy will perhaps want to pursue those negotiations after the elections, assuming that his Prosperity Party wins a majority in the federal parliament and the premier is in a stronger position. Talks would focus on finding a sustainable settlement, including the vexatious issue of political representation in Tigray, given the TPLF leadership’s broad popular support. As the issues are so thorny, this process should feed into the sort of inclusive National Dialogue that would address Ethiopia’s wider destabilising schisms – as Crisis Group and others have long advocated.

V.Conclusion

With Tigray’s resistance growing, fuelled by anger at alleged atrocities by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, and given deep popular attachment to the region’s hard-won self-determination rights, the conflict looks set to grind on. A long war would further devastate Tigray, wreck any prospect of a democratic transition led by Abiy and destabilise Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa’s fulcrum. It is imperative that outside actors do all in their power to encourage Addis Ababa to facilitate access for humanitarian aid, reassess its calculations regarding the war and seek to stop this stain on Prime Minister Abiy’s record from spreading.

Nairobi/Brussels, 2 April 2021

Source: Guardian

An Orthodox Christian refugee who fled the conflict in Tigray reads prayers with his son at the Hamdeyat transition centre near the Sudan-Ethiopia border. Photograph: Nariman El-Mofty/AP

Video: You can see the report here

Here is the BBC online report

Evidence suggests Ethiopian military carried out massacre in Tigray

By Africa Eye
BBC World Service

Published1 hour ago

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• Tigray crisis

An investigation by BBC Africa Eye has uncovered evidence that a massacre in northern Ethiopia was carried out by members of the Ethiopian military. It also reveals the precise location of the atrocity, in which at least 15 men were killed.

In early March, a series of five video clips surfaced on social media showing armed, uniformed men leading a group of unarmed men to the edge of a cliff, shooting some at point blank range, and pushing dead bodies over the cliff.

image captionUnarmed men in civilian clothes seen on the ground shortly before the massacre began

The BBC has confirmed that the massacre took place close to the town of Mahbere Dego in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, where the Ethiopian army is fighting the regional forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPFL).

The fighting began last November when the government launched a military offensive against the TPLF, which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accused of attacking a government military base. The TPLF is opposed to efforts by Mr Abiy to increase the power of the federal government, and has said it is committed to “extended resistance”.

The conflict has so far displaced more than two million people, according to Tigray’s interim administration, and left more than four million people in need of aid.

Geo-locating the footage

The BBC Africa Eye investigations team, working together with analysts from the media outlets Bellingcat and Newsy, set out to establish where the massacre took place.

The first people to post the clips to social media claimed they were filmed near Mahbere Dego. Africa Eye analysed geographical features seen in the videos, including a dirt road, a plateau, and an escarpment with a distinctive profile, and compared them with satellite imagery of the area around the town.

image captionAn escarpment with a distinctive profile was used to compare the footage with satellite imagery

The direction and length of shadows cast by the armed men helped to pinpoint the likely time of day and showed that the escarpment was oriented north-south, allowing Africa Eye to identify a likely location.

A ridgeline in the video footage was then overlaid on a topographical map of the location to confirm it was an exact match. A dry riverbed, band of vegetation, and pattern of trees further confirmed the match.

image captionFootage from one of the video clips was overlaid on a 3D rendering of the terrain to find a match

image captionVegetation seen in the footage was matched against the 3D satellite model

The BBC spoke by phone to a resident of Mahbere Dego, who said the Ethiopian army took away 73 men from the town and surrounding area in January this year, including three of his relatives. He said none of them had been heard from since.

The BBC also spoke to a resident in a neighbouring village who said that his brother was among those killed in this massacre. He said that the killings took place in Mahbere Dego, and gave the same month: January 2021.

“They killed them at the cliff,” he said.

Identifying the armed men and victims

Africa Eye was not able to confirm the identities of the armed men seen in the video footage, but the details of their uniforms – including the camouflage pattern and arm badge in the colour of the Ethiopian flag – appear to match those worn by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF).

Other features also match the ENDF uniform, including the cut and style of the pockets. One of the armed men wears a green beret bearing an insignia that appears to closely match the colour and insignia of the ENDF beret.

image captionBadges in the colour of the Ethiopian flag seen on the armed men in the footage (right) match those worn by ENDF soldiers (left). The camouflage patterns are also a match

The armed men are speaking Amharic, the main official language of Ethiopia. In the first of the five video clips, they can be heard speaking to one another as they stand around the group of unarmed men, who are seated on the floor.

“We should not free these people. Not even one of them should be spared,” says a voice off camera.

“We have to get this on video, how these people die,” says another voice.

• Tigray crisis: What does it mean for east Africa?
• ‘We’re the government and we know what you’re doing’
• MSF ‘witnessed soldiers killing civilians’ in Tigray

The next four clips show the unarmed men being led at gunpoint towards the cliff edge, and capture the armed men killing several prisoners and pushing the bodies of the dead over the cliff.

In some sections of the footage, the gunmen can be seen firing bullets from close range into the bodies. In others they can be heard insulting and mocking the dead.

“I wish we could pour gas over them and burn them,” says a voice off camera in one clip.

“It would have been great if there was gas to burn these people,” replies a second voice. “Burn their bodies like the Indians do.”

The identity of the victims, who are seen wearing civilian clothes, is not known. They can be heard speaking Tigrinya, the language of the Tigray region. In the footage, the killers appear to suggest they believe the victims belong to the TPLF.

“This is the end of woyane,” says a voice of one of the armed men, using a slang term for the TPLF.

“We don’t show mercy.”

IMAGE COPYRIGHTGETTY IMAGES

image captionDisplaced people at a temporary shelter in Tigray last month

Laetitia Bader, the Horn of Africa director for Human Rights Watch, told the BBC that observers had seen “a whole magnitude of very serious abuses” in the region in recent months, but that this footage was “obviously particularly alarming”.

“We see what appear to be unarmed detained men, who are being executed,” she said. “This is absolutely an incident that requires further investigation, because what we are seeing here in these videos could amount to war crimes.”

The BBC put the evidence it had gathered to the Ethiopian government, which said in a statement that “social media posts and claims cannot be taken as evidence”, adding that the Tigray region was “open for independent investigations to be undertaken”.

Investigation by Aliaume Leroy, Giancarlo Fiorella (Bellingcat), and Jake Godin (Newsy).

Additional reporting by Daniel Adamson, Joel Gunter, Chiara Francavilla, Bertram Hill, Carlos Gonzales, Mohammed Osman, and Samir.

It is not very often that you see such a rapid change of direction. But hardly had the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Dina Mufti, stopped speaking than the sparks began to fly.

One can only speculate on what his masters had to say and ask how long Mr Dina will be in the post.

His declaration that Eritreans and Ethiopians longed to return to being a single country caused a storm.

“By the way, each and every Eritrean, they won’t be asked, but if they were, they (would admit that they) don’t celebrate the day they separated from Ethiopia.

They don’t like it. The ones (Eritreans) abroad confess it. Ethiopians also have the same feeling.

Let alone with Eritrea, it would be good to become one with the rest of our neighboring countries. The relationship we had with Eritrea is, we are one people, we are one country.”

“In my weekly briefing on 30th March 2021 , I have cited the fact that Ethiopia and Eritrea as close neighbours deserve wholerounded relationship. I also said both Eritreans and Ethiopians equally abhore the unfortunate war and adversity. Ethiopia is committed to the Eritrean sovereignty and I have been also equally committed . Therefore I would like to bring to the attention of fellow Eritreans and others that there has been an understanding of my presentation out of the context .l humbly apologize for the confusion . Long live Ethio -Eritrean solidarity!!!!!!”

Martin Plaut

The opening clashes that led to the Tigray war on 4 November have been the subject of two competing myths.

The first myth is that the conflict erupted after forces loyal to the Tigray Regional Government attacked the Northern Command, situated in the Tigray capital, Mekelle.

This was a Tweet from Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In this narrative, the war is the fault of the Tigrayan authorities and the TPLF in particular.

The second myth is that the war was sparked off by a failed attack by Ethiopian commandos on Mekelle, disguised as security forces guarding a banknote transfer.

This version of events suggested that very early Wednesday morning aircraft carrying Ethiopian commandos took off on a mission to eliminate the Tigrayan leadership.

Ethiopian sources suggest that the force was airlifted into Mekelle in two helicopters and an Antonov from Bahr Dar, to try and seize the TPLF leadership at a hotel.

Social media reports that the hotel in question was the Planet. The commandos landed without a problem and drove into Mekelle, seizing control of the hotel.

But the intelligence they were operating from was faulty. The Tigrayan leaders they were seeking were not there. The commandos then withdrew.

It is not clear if the unit was involved in any fighting.

But after the failed raid Tigrean forces took over the Ethiopian National Defence Force camp (the Northern Command barracks for Mekelle) near the airport (when there was some fighting), as well as taking control of the airport itself.

This explanation is also questioned and not seen as plausible.

Abiy’s problem of legitimacy

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was widely portrayed in the international media as a democrat and a former, who deserved his Nobel Peace prize in October 2019.

His reputation inside Ethiopia was less positive. In June 2019 opposition parties were querying his democratic credentials when the date of the general election due in May 2020 started to be questioned.

As Reuters reported on 21 June 2019: “Opposition politicians in Ethiopia are warning against a delay to national elections due in 2020 that would be the first under reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed but are under threat from an explosion of regional ethnic rivalries.”

The possibility of a postponement when the government mandate expired had nothing to do with Covid-19, as Reuters made clear.

“Earlier this month, the election board said insecurity, which has driven 2.4 million people out of their homes according to the United Nations, could delay next year’s parliament vote. A national census has already been postponed twice, potentially undermining logistics for the polls including the drawing up of constituencies.”

“If the government is going to postpone the general election … it will anger the public,” former political prisoner Merera Gudina told Reuters by phone. He chairs the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress party from a region, Oromia, at the heart of anti-government protests in recent years.

Debretsion Gebremichael, chairman of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and vice president of Tigray regional state, also warned that postponement could have “grave consequences.” The TPLF is part of the governing coalition. “Not holding the election on time … is unconstitutional,” he told a television station. “It means the Ethiopia government after 2020 is illegitimate.”

By 2020 the situation was no better

The Prime Minister continued to lose support and an election looked increasingly unpalatable.

As the Washington Post reported: “Abiy’s platform is particularly unpopular in two ethnic regions: Tigray, in the far north, where power was centered during previous governments before he wrested it away; and his own Oromia, home to the country’s biggest group, the Oromo, who make up at least a third of the national population and whose ethno-nationalist leaders helped Abiy gain power but now want Oromo interests to be put first.”

Prime Minister Abiy was clearly considering postponing the election, which he was not assured of winning. The Economist headline summed up his dilemma. “Ethiopia is entering constitutional limbo. Postponed elections may leave it without a legal government.”

But then the Covid pandemic had arrived, which allowed Prime Minister Abiy to revisit the issue. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia has announced that it will be unable to conduct the 2020 national elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Subsequently, the House of Peoples’ Representatives approved the election postponement. Opposition parties protested, pointing out that this was unconstitutional.

Abiy Ahmed responded unequivocally. He would not allow any challenge to the postponement. In a video message the Prime Minister issued a stern warning that his government would take action against anyone who took part in what he described as “Illegal political activities and acts that are threatening to violate the constitution and constitutional order in Ethiopia.” The Prime Minister said his government will do anything necessary to protect and defend the safety of the country and its people.

The statement was rejected by many, including Tigrayans, who felt increasingly marginalized. The president of the Ethiopian parliament, a Tigray politician, resigned after accusing Abiy of authoritarian tendencies. Her party — the TPLF — announced that it would hold regional elections in Tigray. This put Tigray on a collision course with the government.

The build-up to war

Anyone who had followed the situation in the Horn of Africa would have known that tensions between the Tigray region and Addis Ababa had been ratcheting up for months. The peace treaty with Eritrea in 2018 had allowed Prime Minister Abiy to forge an alliance with President Isaias and their plans for a confrontation with Tigray were well advanced.

The Tigray regional government had not helped matters by staging demonstrations in late 2019 and 2020 which prevented heavy weapons from being withdrawn from their northern border with Eritrea. The Tigray elections – a success in themselves – were held in September 2020, despite being ruled illegitimate by the federal election commission.

The last straw perhaps came when the Tigray government rejected an attempt to replace the head of the Northern Command, based in Mekelle with a new commander, General Jumal Muhammad.

The stage was set for war – and everyone knew it.

On 30 October the International Crisis Group published a prescient article entitled: Steering Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis Away from Conflict. It explained that “A clash over budget transfers is the latest flashpoint in the bitter dispute between Ethiopian federal authorities and their rivals in Tigray. To avoid the standoff triggering a damaging conflict, both sides should back down and embrace comprehensive dialogue.”

On 2^nd November – two days before the fighting erupted – the European Union said that: “Developments in Ethiopia are a cause of deep concern. All parties as well as Ethiopia’s neighbours must act to reduce tension, eliminate inflammatory language and abstain from provocative military deployments. Failure to do so risks destabilising the country as well as the wider region.”

How right they were.

Debretsion Gebremichael – President of Tigray Region – went on television on 3^rd November, the day before the fighting began, to warn his people to prepare for a looming war. He said repeatedly that the Tigrayan people wanted peace but if war was waged against them, they were prepared to fight and to win.

If these are myths – what is the truth?

A different version of events has now emerged.

This suggests that until very close to the eruption of the conflict on 4 November, the Tigrayan government, led by Debretsion, were not really expecting a war. They had certainly not made adequate preparations for one.

When it appeared that some kind of confrontation was inevitable, the Tigrayan authorities went to the Northern Command to hold a series of talks with the military stationed at the base. The Northern Command was the best armed in the country and had stores of artillery, rockets and ammunition that were necessary to mount a sustained war.

The Tigrayan authorities argued that it was clear that Prime Minister Abiy was about to launch an attack and that Eritrean forces and Amhara militia would also be involved. Some kind of informal agreement was reached with the officers at the base. This would have allowed the Tigrayan Regional Government to have removed the weapons they needed.  from the base.

Many of the troops and their officers agreed with this proposal and the Tigrayans arrived to collect the military equipment. But not everyone in the Northern Command was prepared to accept the terms of the deal and fighting erupted. This allowed Prime Minister Abiy to mount what could be presented as a rescue mission for the besieged troops.

In reality most officers and troops had left the Northern Command and were being housed in Mekelle university. They were well cared for. Food and clean water were provided. Among the troops held at Mekelle university were 741 female soldiers, and sanitary towels were donated for them by local women. The troops were held at Mekelle university for days – at a time when they could have been mown down by the Tigrayans, if they had wanted to.

In the end an agreement was reached with the ICRC – the Red Cross – to allow any of the troops who wanted to leave Mekelle to do so. Some 1,200 – 1,300 took advantage of the offer. They were transferred out of Tigray, to Gondar or Addis Ababa.

In the meantime the conflict had erupted, with Prime Minister Abiy sending the Ethiopian Federal army into Tigray, alongside supported by Eritrean forces and Amhara militia. The war in Tigray had commenced.