January 28, 2020 News

Source: The diplomat

Through Eritrea, China Quietly Makes Inroads Near the Red Sea

China is finding an eager partner in Eritrea, an autocratic state generally overlooked entirely by world powers.

By Austin Bodetti

January 25, 2020

Isaias Afweri military training ChinaIt is often forgotten that Isaias Afwerki received military training in China in the 1960’s

As Iran continues to dominate headlines across the Western world, China’s far quieter quest to influence Africa and Asia has escaped the news media’s attention of late. The many examples of this Chinese strategy include the world power’s relationship with Eritrea, a country on the Horn of Africa that rarely features in geopolitical discussions. Nonetheless, officials in Beijing intend to turn what some analysts still label “Africa’s North Korea” into a centerpiece of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s costly economic megaproject inspired by the Silk Road.

In May 2019, Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Beijing to laud what Eritrean officials dubbed “a healthy and strong partnership for the benefit of their two peoples.” Just five months later, Chinese Ambassador to Eritrea Yang Zigang said in an interview with Eritrea’s state-owned media that “China has consistently supported Eritrea’s nation-building endeavors by providing Eritrea with many kinds of assistance.”

The months of diplomatic niceties between China and Eritrea preceded a much more substantive development barely noticed by Western news agencies. In early November, the China Shanghai Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation — known as “China SFECO Group” — began building a 134-kilometer road in coordination with ranking Eritrean officials, an initiative heralded by Yang. He has displayed a keen interest in Eritrean infrastructure, noting on the embassy webpage, “Eritrea is endowed with two great natural harbors, Massawa and Assab.”

Eritrea has long expressed its enthusiasm for the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s bid to expand its sphere of influence by investing in countries across the Global South. A representative from Eritrea’s ruling party traveled to Beijing’s Belt and Road Forum in 2017. The Eritrean Information Ministry, meanwhile, praised China’s effort in 2019, calling it a step toward “open, inclusive, and balanced regional economic cooperation” and “integration of markets.”

At first glance, a little-known one-party state with an ailing economy would seem an odd choice for Chinese investment. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has only succeeded at turning his country into a pariah state during 27 years of brutal rule, and the World Bank Group considers Eritrea “one of the least developed countries in the world.” Even so, Chinese President Xi Jinping likely sees his investment in Afwerki’s regime as an opportunity to secure an ally on the Red Sea.

Chinese tacticians have been eyeing the strategic region for some time. In early 2016, China concluded a deal with Djibouti, one of Eritrea’s neighbors on the Red Sea, to construct a military base – China’s first overseas military facility. The much-discussed Chinese outpost, which itself borders a similar American facility, became operational a year later. China has deployed soldiers throughout East Africa, even sending peacekeepers to secure Chinese-staffed oil wells in South Sudan.

Chinese-Eritrean relations appear focused on economics for the time being, but the possibility of militarization looms on the horizon. China and Eritrea cooperate in a variety of sectors, including energy and public health. The East Asian world power has a long history with its East African partner, arming Eritrea not only during its 30-year war of independence from Ethiopia but also during its second war with Ethiopia in the late 1990s. In more recent years, China has offered to mediate territorial disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a sign of China’s wider ambitions.

In Africa and Eritrea in particular, China’s distinct foreign policy has given it a critical advantage over its Western rivals. Xi is more than willing to ignore Afwerki’s well-known abuses of human rights, such as conscripting tens of thousands of Eritreans and forcing them into what the United Nations terms “slave-like” labor. Though Eritrea has a population of just 6 million, only Syrian applicants for asylum outnumber Eritreans in Europe. Fifty thousand live in Germany alone.

While some Western countries have tried to engage with Eritrea in the last few years, they have faced backlash. European officials suffered significant embarrassment when The New York Times revealed that an Eritrean project funded by the European Union and facilitated by the UN relied on the labor of conscripts. Many European countries view Eritrea as a source of mass migration and a key front in their bid to stop it. Unlike China, which Afwerki has tried to court through his emphasis on Eritrea’s “strategic location,” Europe seems to have few long-term goals there.

The United States, China’s main rival in Africa, has indicated little interest in Eritrea. The State Department has admitted that “[t]ensions related to the ongoing government detention of political dissidents and others, the closure of the independent press, limits on civil liberties, and reports of human rights abuses contributed to decades of strained U.S.–Eritrean relations.”

As long as China keeps overlooking Eritrea’s dismal record on human rights, the two countries’ relationship seems likely to blossom. Despite a remarkable increase in goodwill toward the East African autocracy following Eritrea’s conclusion of a peace treaty with its longtime adversaries in Ethiopia, Afwerki has few friends in the international community. For its part, China has long stated its reluctance to interfere with or even comment on other countries’ internal affairs. That position has endeared Beijing to autocrats around the world.

For now, China only has one opponent in the race to establish a sphere of influence in Eritrea: the United Arab Emirates. The UAE operates an air base and a military port in the East African country in addition to its military base in Somalia. In a sign of China’s growing reach, however, the UAE is participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. Considering that China’s ambassador to the Middle Eastern regional power vaunted their relationship as “at its best period in history” in 2019, the prospect of a confrontation between the two countries over Eritrea seems dim.

 

Source: Villa Somalia

 HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT MEETING BETWEEN ERITREA, ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA

 JOINT COMMUNIQUE

 The Heads of State and Government of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia met in Asmara, Eritrea on 27 January 2020.

 The three leaders held candid and extensive discussions on the situations in their respective countries, their tripartite cooperation, and developments in the Horn of Africa region.

The three leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Tripartite Agreement they signed in September 2018 and reviewed the outcomes and successes of their considerable joint efforts towards its implementation.

The three leaders adopted a Joint Plan of Action for 2020 and beyond focusing on the two main and intertwined objectives of consolidating peace, stability, and security as well as promoting economic and social development. They also agreed to bolster their joint efforts to foster effective regional cooperation.

On the security front, the three leaders formulated a comprehensive plan to combat and neutralize the common threats they face, including terrorism, arms and human trafficking and drug smuggling.

Regarding economic and social development, they agreed to prioritize the mobilization of their bountiful human and natural resources; build, modernize and interface their infrastructure and develop their production and service sectors.

They also expressed their appreciation for, and their readiness to cooperate with, their friends and partners, on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

 The three leaders agreed to closely consult with their brothers, Heads of State for the realization of the aspirations of their people for an effective horn of Africa cooperation.

Issued in Asmara, Eritrea on 27 January 2020

Source=https://eritreahub.org/eritrea-somalia-and-ethiopia-plan-joint-fight-against-terrorism-trafficking-and-drugs

ብዕለት ሰንበት 26/01/2020 ጨንፈር ሰዲህኤ ዓባይ ብሪጣንያ ብምሉእ ተሳትፍ አባላት ዝተሰነየ ካብ ሰዓት 11፡00 ክሳብ ሰዓት 17፡00 ኣብዘሎ ግዜ ስሩዕ አኼባኡ አካይዱ፡፡

አብ አኼባ ካብ ዝተላዕሉን ብዕቱብ ዝተዘተየሎምን ቀንዲ ጉዳያት፡ ምምሕዳራዊ ጉዳያት ጨንፈር፣ ኣድላይነት ሓባራዊ ስራሓት ደምበ ተቓውሞ፣ ምዕቃብ ልኡላውነት ኤርትራን  ዝብሉ ኮይኖም፡

 ድሕሪ ናይ ሌላን እንቋዕ ዳሓን መጻእኩምን መእተዊ ቃል ምስልሳ፡ ሰልፋውን ንኩነታት ደምበ ተቓውሞን ብፍላይ ብኣውርኡ ድማ ኩነታት ሃገርናን ዞናን ብዝምልከት ኣድላዪ ሓበሬታታት ተመሓላሊፉን። ኣብቲ ኣኼባ ብዝወዓለ ኣባል መሪሕነት እውን እቲ ኣኼባ ደሚቑ። ቀጺሉ ኣብ ውሽጣዊ ምምሕዳራዊ ጉዳያት ጨንፈር ብምትኳር ድማ ኣብ ምቁጽጻር መዛግብትን ኣብ ኣኼባ ንዘይተረኽቡ ኣባላት ምኽንያት መትረፊኦም መብርሂ ንኣኼበኛታት ተገሊጹ።

ቀጺሉ ሰልፍና (ሰ.ዲ.ህ.ኤ) ኣብ ሓባራዊ ስራሕ ካብየለዎ ጽኑዕ እምነት ተበጊሱ፣ ምስ ዝተፈላለያ ኤርትራውያን ውድባትን ሰልፍታትን ከምኡ‘ውን ህዝባዊ ምንቅስቃሳትን (ይኣክል) ዓቕሙ ብዘፍቅዶ ዘካይዶ ዘሎ ሓቢርካ ናይ ምስራሕ ምቅርራባትን ዘታትን፣ እምንቶ  ጨንፈር ጥራይ ዘይኮነስ፡ ንባዕሉ ጨንፈር ዓባይ ብሪጣንያ ኣዳዕዲዑ ግዲኡ ዘበርክተሉ ዘሎ መዳይ እኳ እንተኮነ፣ ካብኡ ንላዕሊ ዝያዳ ክሰርሕ ምዃኑ ኣረጋጊጹ። እዚ ካብ ነዊሕ ልዕሊ ምእላይ ኢሰያስን ጉጅልኡን ክኸይድ ከምዝኽእል ንቕሓት ዝወነነ ኣባል ሰልፊ፡ ቀዳማይ ዕማም ሰልፍና ከም ኩሉ ወዲ ሃገር ምእላይ ምልካዊ ሰርዓት ኮይኑ ካልኣይ ድማ ሕጊ ኣብ ዝነገሰላ ኤርትራ ፖለቲካዊ መደባትቱ ኣብ ሃገር ተመራጺ ክኸውን ኮይኑ፡ ነዚ  እተጠቕሰ ዝተኣሳሰረ መትከልን ቅደም ተኸተል ናይ ቃልስን ንምዕዋት ብምሉእ ዓቅሙ ክምክት ግድነት ከም ዘሎዎ ደጊሙ ኣረጋጊጹ። እቲ ምንታይሲ ምልካዊ ሰርዓት ኣብ ዝእለየሉ ህሞት ጥራይ እዩ ፖለቲካዊ መደብ ዕዮ ሰልፍና ኮነ ናይ ካልኦት ፖለቲካዊ ሓይልታት ኣብ ኤርትራ ቦታ ክህልዎ ዝኸእል።

ጨንፈርና ነዚ ሉዑላውነት ሃገርና ዝፈታትን ዘሎ ኣሰካፊ ኩነታት እውን ብዕምቆት ዘትዩሉን፡ ባንዴራ እና ኣምበልበልካ፣ ልኡላዊ ሃገር እየ እንዳበልካ፡ ጉዳይካ ካልኦት እንተወሲኖሞ ልዕዑላውነት ሃገርካ ከም ጉዕዞ ድፍረትን ምብርዓንን ምህላዉ ኤርትራውያን ክንግንዘብ ከምዘለና እውን ኣኼባ ኣዘኻኺሩ።

ናይ መጻኢ መደባቱ ድሕሪ ምስራዕ ጨንፈርና ናይዚ ዓመት ፈላሚ ስሩዕ ኣኼብኡ ዛዚሙ።

           ዓወት ንቓልሲ ውጹዕ ህዝብና

            ክብርን ዝኸርን ንስውኣትና

           ኣ/መ ጨንፈር ሰ.ዲ.ህ.ኤ ዓባይ ብርጣንያ

 

Report

HIGHLIGHTS

Inter-tribal conflict in disputed Abyei area has left 33 people killed, 18 wounded, 15 children missing, 19 houses burned, and approximately 4,800 people displaced

The 2020 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) partners plan to support 6.1 million of the most vulnerable people in Sudan, which will require US$1.3 billion.

Humanitarian partners continue to assist and estimated 46,000 people (9,600 families) who have taken refuge in El Geneina town, West Darfur, following inter-communal conflict.

According to FAO, the desert locust situation in Sudan is serious with breeding in progress on the Red Sea coast as well as along the Sudan/Eritrea border.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

IDPs arrive in Abyei town fleeing conflict in Kolom
Recent tribal attacks by armed Misseriya men on a Dinka Ngok village in Kolom on 22 January, have left 33 people killed, 18 wounded, 15 children missing, and 19 houses burned, reports the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The attack is reportedly a revenge attack for an incident that resulted in the death of three Misseriya in the same area on 19 January. However, according to the Dinka Ngok community leaders, the attackers wanted to drive Dinka Ngok out of the area to improve their access to grazing land. The disputed Abyei area is between Sudan and South Sudan. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

In response, UNISFA deployed troops in the area to contain the situation and prevent an escalation of conflict as armed men from both sides are converging to Kolom. UNISFA warned the conflicting parties against the resumption of clashes and that any presence of armed groups within the Abyei box is viewed by UNISFA as a violation of its mandate and they would not hesitate to place responsibility on those engaged in such violations.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have settled in public and social facilities in Abyei town, mainly schools and community centers. As of 26 January, approximately 4,800 people (about 800 families) from Kolom have taken refuge in Abyei town and the surrounding areas of Noong, Dokura and Ameit villages. More families are on the move and the number of people affected will likely increased in the coming days. In the afternoon on 25 January, a team from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) visiting Abyei town found many other IDPs camped in the Abyei Girl’s Secondary School and Mulmul Primary School. The priority needs of the IDPs are food, nutrition, shelter, non-food items (NFIs), water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), as well as child protection and reunification of missing children with their families. IOM is currently verifying IDPs.

Food
On 26 January, WFP and its partner Abyei Community Action for Development (ACAD) transported food from Agok to Abyei town. The distribution of food was disrupted by a large demonstration in front of the UN / UNISFA main gate in Abyei town on 27 January.

Nutrition / Health
UNICEF is working closely with health and nutrition partners to address the nutrition needs of the IDPs in the seven locations. UNICEF Abyei sent a request to Wau for nutrition supplies. GOAL is deploying a medical team to Abyei on 28 January to assess the general health situation and provide mobile medical services to the IDPs in the eight locations.

Shelter/NFIs
On 25 January, IOM with support from other UN AFPs distributed loose NFIs (blanket, soap, bed sheet, jerry can and plastic tarpaulin) to the 70 IDP households in Abyei Women Center. On 26 January, UNHCR brought 100 full NFI kits from Wau and IOM is bringing in an additional 500 NFI kits also from Wau. The supplies will arrive in Agok by a chartered plan on 29 January and will be transported by trucks to Abyei town.

Protection
A UNHCR protection team arrived from Wau in Abyei on 26 January and will join the inter-agency assessment to Kolom scheduled for 28 January.

WASH
WASH assistance is a major need for the IDPs, and emergency latrines and showers are needed in all seven displacement locations. IOM has mobilized toilet PVC slabs and currently constructing latrines in the IDPs locations. IOM is coordinating WASH activities with the Abyei Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) to identify locations to set up sanitation facilities in each of the seven locations, including in the women center. The IDPs in the Abyei women center received some WASH NFIs, including soap and jerry cans. The borehole in the youth center needs water treatment and the INGO Samaritan purse—a number of NGOs based in Aogk—provided soap and water treatment supplies to the WASH cluster for distribution in the IDP locations.

In addition, UNISFA assigned a digger to dig latrines in the IDP sites. SCI is providing toilet PVC slabs water purification supplies. A SCI PHCC team is planning to provide integrated outreach services to the IDPs in Abyei throughout the. The items transported to Abyei on 27 January.

--The disputed Abyei area is between Sudan and South Sudan. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:
To learn more about OCHA's activities, please visit https://www.unocha.org/.
 
Source=https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-situation-report-27-jan-2020

ርእሰ-ዓንቀጽ፡ ሰዲህኤ

ናይ ለውጢ ቃልስና፡ በቲ ዝደለናዮ ቅልጣፈ ክጐዓዝ ዘይከኣለሉ ምኽንያት፡ ኣብ ርእሲቲ ናይ ሓይልታት ለውጢ ብሓባር ናይ ዘይምስጓም ድኽመትን ከቢቡና ዘሎ ዓለማዊ ኩነታትን ኣዝዩ ዝተሓላለኸ ከፋፋሊ ውዲትን ተንኮልን ጉጅለ ህግዲፍ ዓብይ እጃም ዝሕዝ እዩ። ካብቲ መርኣያታት ናይቲ ውዲት ከኣ እቲ ቀንዲ  ኣብ ውሽጥን ወጻእን ዘሎ ኤርትራዊ ከይራኸብ፡ ብኣንጻሩ ብዓይኒ ጥርጣረ ከም ዝርእአ ምግባሩን እዩ። ብስንኪ እዚ ከኣ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ጸገሙ ሓደ፡ መፍትሒኡ ከኣ ኣብ ኢድ ገዛእ ክነሱ፡ ክሳብ ሎሚ ነዚ ዓቕምኻ ኣወሃሂድካ  ኣብ ልዕሊ ህግዲፍ ቅልጽምካ ምትርናዕ ከይበቐዖ ጸኒሑ።

ህግዲፍ እዚ ድሌቱን ባህጉን ሓደ ዝኾነ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ኣንጻሩ ብሓደ ድምጺ ንከየስምዕን ኢዱ ከየልዕልን  ክጥቀሞ ካብ ዝጸንሐ ሓላኺ ሜላታት፡ ናይ ብሕቲ ሚድያ ከም ዘይህሉ ምግባር፡ ካብ ኣባላት ሓደ ቤተሰብ ጀሚርካ ኣብ ሕድሕድ ኤርትራውያን ናይ ስለያ መርበብ ዘርጊሕካ ከምዘይተኣማመኑ ምግባርን ናብ ኤርትራ ኣትዮም ኩነታት ኣጽኒዖም ከቃልዑ ይኽእሉ እዮም ዝብሎም ጋዜጠኛታትን ናይ ሰብኣዊ መሰል ተሓለቕትን ምእጋድን ንኣብነት ዝጥቀሱ እዮም።

ኣብ ሕድሕድ ኤርትራውያን ምርሕሓቕ ምፍጣር ጥራይ ዘይኮነ፡ ህግዲፍ ኣብ ልዕሊቲ ኣብ ውሽጥን ኣብ ወጻእን ዝነብርን ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ዝፍጽሞ ተጽዕኖን ምድሃልን ብዙሕ ዝርዝር ዘለዎ እዩ። ኣብ ልዕሊቲ ኣብ ውሽጢ ኤርትራ ዝነብር ዘሎ ህዝብና ክፍጽሞ ዝጸንሐን ዘሎን ካብ ሓደ ንሕስያ ዘየብሉ ጨቋኒ ጉጅለ እትጽበዮ እዩ ኢልካ ዝሕለፍ እኳ እንተኾነ፡ መወዳእትኡ ዘይፍለጥ ግዱድ ዕስክርና፡ ብዘይሕገመንግስቲ ምግዛእ፡ ናጽነት ምውዳብን ሓሳብካ ምግላጽን ምእጋድ፡ ምግሃስ ኩሉ ዓይነት መሰላትን ብኩራት ልዕልና ሕግን፡ ኣዝዮም ረቀቕቲ ናይ መቑነን ሜላታት ተጠቒምካ ኣብ ቁጠባ ምህሳዩ፡ ዳርጋ ኩሉ  ስድራቤታት ወላድ መኻን ከም ዝኸውን ምግባር፡ ብሓጺሩ ሃገርን ህዝብን ምብዳም ኣብ ኤርትራ ንዘሎ ሃገር በቆል ጭቆና ካብቲ ናይ ካለኦት ፍሉይ ዝገብሮ እዩ።

እዚ ጉጅለ ናይ ጸይቅን ወጽዓን ኣእዳዉ ኣንዊሑ፡ ምስ ብረብሓ ዘስልሎም ናይ ወጻኢ ኣካላት ከይተረፈ ተመሳጢሩ ኣብ ልዕሊቲ ኣብ ወጻኢ ዝነብር ህዝብና እውን ክንድቲ ኣብ ልዕሊቲ ውሽጢ ሃገር ዝገብር’ኳ እንተዘይኮነ፡ ዝፍጽሞ ግፍዒ ኣሎ። እንተ ጥዒምዎ ጨዊኻ ናብ ኤርትራ ምምላስ፡ ብጉልባብ 2%፡ መሕወይ ግብሪ፡ ሓገዝ ደቂ ስዉኣትን ቦንድን ብዝብሉ  ጉልባባት ገንዘብ ምኽዕባት። ኣብ ዓዲ  ንዝነብሩ ቤተሰቦም ብዝጥዕሞም መንገዲ ከይሕግዙ ምኽልካል፡ ናብ ቤተሰቦም ኣብ ዝገሽሉ ግዜ ኣዝዮም ዓንቀፍት ማሕለካታት ምፍጣር። እቲ ኣዝዩ ዘሕዝን ከኣ ህግዲፍ ሃይማኖታውን ካልእ ድሑር ስምዒታትን እንዳጻሕተረ፡ ኤርትራውያን ኣብ ሕድሕዶም ክናቖቱ ዝሰርሕ ምዃኑ እዩ። እዚ ኣብ ልዕሊ ደጋፊ ህግዲፍ ዝበሃል ከይተረፈ ዝፍጸም ንሕስያ ዘይብሉ ኣተሓሕዛ ኮይኑ፡ ነቲ ኣግሂዱ ዝቃወም ከኣ ብህይወት ከም ዝደልዮ፡ ኣብዚ ቀረባ ኣብ ልዕሊ እንግሊዛዊ ጋዜጠኛን ፖለቲካዊ ተመራማርን ማርቲን ፕላውትን ኤርትራዊ ጋዜጠኛ ኣማኒኤል ኢያሱን ዝፈተኖ ናይ ስዑር ምልክት ምጥቃስ ይከኣል። እዚ ኩሉ ተደሚሩ ዘረደኣና ከኣ ኣብ ውሽጥን ወጻእን ዝነበር ኤርትራዊ ክናበብን ክመላላእን እንተበቂዑ ዕድመ ህግዲፍ ዘሕጽር ምዃኑ እዩ።

ጉጅለ ህግዲፍ ከም ኣካል ናይቲ ክፈፊልካ ግዛእ ሜላኡ ኣብ መንጎ ኣብ ውሽጢ ዝነብርን ኣብ ወጻኢ ዘሎን ኤርትራዊ ክፍጠር ዝደልዮ ምርሕሓቕ ከምቲ ዝደለዮ ከምዘይኮነሉ ሎሚ ንርእዮ ኣለና። ኤርትራ ንዝተወሰነ እምበር፡ ንሓዋሩ ኣይኮነንዶ ካብ ህዝባ ካብ ዓለም እውን ብህግዲፍ ተሓዚኣ ተነጺላ ክትነብር ስለ ዘይትኽእል፤ ሎሚ ህግዲፍ ዝነደቖ ናይ ምፍልላይ ሓጹር ይፈርስ ከም ዘሎ ንዕዘብ ኣለና። ከም ውጽኢት ናይዚ ከኣ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ ዋላኳ ኣብ ውሽጥን ወጻእን ይንበር፡ ውሽጡን ድሌቱን ሓደ ብምዃኑ ክሰማማዕ ጀሚሩ ኣሎ። እዚ ከኣ ንህግዲፍ ካብቲ ብዙሕ ህልውናኡ ናይ ምርግጋጽ ጸገማቱ እቲ ዝኸበደ ኮይንዎ እነሆ።

ምስ ናይ ቅድሚ ሕጂ ክረኤ እንከሎ፡ ሎሚ ህግዲፍ ዝዓጸዎ ማዕጾ ካብ ድሌቱ ወጻኢ ይኽፈት ኣሎ። ብዙሓት ናይ ወጻኢ ማዕከናት ነቲ ጉጅለ ዘቃልዕ ዜናታት ክዝርገሓ ልሙድ ኮይኑ ኣሎ። ብዙሓት ኤርትራዊ ናይ ለውጢ ማሕበራዊ ሚድያታት እውን ናብ ኤርትራ ምልሓኰን ኣይተረፈን። ብዓብይኡ ከኣ መደበራት ተለቪዥን ኣሰናን ኤሪ-ሳትን ነቲ ዘይድፈር ዝመስል ዝነበረ ዕርዲ ህግዲፍ ድሂነን ኣብ እንዳ ኩሉ ኤርትራዊ ገዛ ይጓዝማ ኣለዋ። ህግዲፍ ከኣ ናይ “ነዘን ተለቪዥናት እዚኤን ኣይትርኣይወን” ጉልበቱ ደኺሙ፡ ርእዩ ከም ዘይረኣየ ክኸውን ተገዲዱ ኣሎ። ወዮ ሓቀኛ ምስሊ ህግዲፍ ምርኣይን ምስማዕን ተሓቢእካ ዝካየድ ናይ ተቓወምቱ ተግባር ጥራይ ጌርካ ዝረአ ዝነበረ፡ ሎሚ ደገፍቱን ሓለፍቱን እውን ኣብዘን መደበራት ይትከሉ ኣለዉ። ኣብ ኣደባባያት ከይተረፈ ምሕማዩ’ውን ንቡር ኮይኑ ከም ዘሎ እዩ ዝሕበር። እዚ ኣዝዩ ዓብይ ምልክት ስዕረት ህግዲፍ እዩ።

ሎሚ ብሓፈሻ ካብ ኩሉ ኩርነዓት ዓለም፡ ብፍላይ ከኣ ካብ ጐረቤት ኢትዮጵያ ብዙሓት ሰባት ናብ ኤርትራ ኣትዮም፡ ወጽዓ ህግዲፍ ኣብ ልዕሊ ህዝቢ ጥራይ ዘይኮነ፡ ኣብ ልዕሊ ትሕተ-ቅርጺ ሃገርና ክሳብ ክንደይ ኣብ ዘሕፍር ደረጃ በጺሑ ከም ዘሎ ርእዮም ይምስክሩ ኣለዉ። ብዙሓት ኣብ ከተማታት፡ ኣስመራ፡ ከረን፡ ዓዲ ቀይሕ፡ ምጽዋዕ፡ መንደፈራ፡ ናቕፋ፡ ኣቑርደት፡ ባረንቱን ካለኦትን  ዝበጽሑ ዝህብዎ ሚዛን ከኣ “ኤርትራ ዋና ዘይብላ እምበር፡ ኣብ ትሕቲ መንግስቲ ጸኒሓን ኣላን ምባላ ዘጸግም እዩ” ዝብል እዩ። ጐደናታት ኣስመራ ሰብ ሓሪምወን ክሳብ ክንደይ ከም ዝጸመዋ ክነግሩኻ እንከለዉ ከኣ መመሊሱ መዓንጣ ከብድኻ ዝቖርጽ እዩ።

እንተኾነ ምስዚ ኩሉ ምህግዲፍ ዝወረዶን ዘውርዶ ዘሎን ናይ ምክፍፋል ውዲት፡ ህዝብና ኣብ ውሽጥን ወጻእ ብግቡእ ክናበብን ከመላላእን ጀሚሩ ኣሎ።  እዚ ምንባብ ንዓወቱን ራህዋኡን ወሳኒ ምዃኑ ከኣ ኣጸቢቑ ይፈልጥ እዩ። ከምኡ ስለ ዝኾነ ከኣ፡ ፈንቅል ብውሽጢ ይክል ከኣ ብወጻኢ ክናቐዉ ጀሚሮም ኣለዉ። እቲ ኣብ ታሪኽ ብረታዊ ቃልሲ ህዝቢ ንጸላኢ ዝፈንቀለ ፈንቅል፡ እነሆ ሎሚ እውን ምስ ይኣክል ኣሳንዩ ናይ ዳግማይ ፈንቅል ህዝባዊ ሓላፍነት ይርከብ ኣሎ። ፈንቅልን ይኣክልን ካብ በበይኑ ኩርናዕ ዝስምዑ ትርጉሞም ግና ሓደ ንሱ ከኣ ንህግዲፍ ምጽራግ እዩ።

January 26, 2020 Ethiopia, News

Source: CGTN

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (R), Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (C) and Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo pose for a picture in Asmara, Eritrea on January 26, 2020./ PHOTO Courtesy: Abiy Ahmed – Twitter

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo are in Eritrea for talks with President Isaias Afwerki aimed at strengthening ties in the Horn of African region.

The three are due to hold talks in Asmara on a “wide range of issues.”

“I will be meeting with my brothers, the leaders of Eritrea and Somalia. President Isaias Afwerki, President Mohammed Abdullahi and I will discuss on a wide range of issues. As always, I am certain our dear and welcoming city of Asmara will make our stay delightful,” PM Abiy said on Twitter.

Abiy Ahmed Ali ??

✔@AbiyAhmedAli

I will be meeting with my brothers, the leaders of Eritrea and Somalia. President Isaias Afwerki, President Mohammed Abdullahi and I will discuss on a wide range of issues. As always, I am certain our dear and welcoming city of Asmara will make our stay delightful.

View image on Twitter
2:27 PM – Jan 26, 2020
 
Relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea have continued to grow since PM Abiy rose to power in March 2018.

Since taking over the Prime Minister’s position, Abiy made peace with Eritrea to end years of conflict, a feat that earned him worldwide praise and contributed to his Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019.

The Ethiopian leader has met with President Afwerki severally both in Addis Ababa and in Asmara.

Source=https://eritreahub.org/presidents-of-eritrea-ethiopia-and-somalia-meeting-in-asmara

January 26, 2020 Ethiopia, News

Source: Ethiopia Insight

The time is ripe for Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to set aside narrow national interests and address climate change by building flexibility into the forthcoming GERD treaty

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt have laid the framework for resolving their disputes over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).Earlier in August 2019, Ethiopia rejected Egypt’s proposal on the filling and operation of the GERD. In a growing diplomatic spat, Egypt warned Ethiopia not to move forward with filling and operation, saying that it “will have negative consequences for the stability in the region.”

In November, the GERD negotiations reached another deadlock, and Egypt called for international interventions to overcome the impasse. The U.S. invited Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan to Washington, DC, and on November 6, delegates of the three countries met with the US Secretary of the Treasury and the World Bank president. They also agreed to resume talks that would be supported and attended by the U.S. and the World Bank as observers.

Since then, they have held four technical meetings in Africa and two more meetings in Washington DC. Last week, after three days of rigorous discussions in Washington DC, the countries issued a joint statement that laid the framework for the final agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD. The joint statement, which seems to have been followed by productive technical discussions nailing down some key details, underscores the need for an adaptive agreement, thus it is expected that the three countries will consider climate change while developing the final terms. 

Climate change impact

Climate change is projected to have catastrophic impacts on the hydrological cycle. Water availability, quantity, and demand will be affected. Existing studies and climate change models commonly predict increases in average annual temperature in the Nile Basin, leading to greater water loss due to evaporation. There is much less certainty in projections concerning future rainfall, river flows, and water availability in the Nile Basin. Studies concerning the latter find contradictory results; one predicts floods and increased runoff, and the other predicts water scarcity and possible droughts.

It seems evident that proper governance of the filling and operation of the GERD in the face of these uncertainties demands a response to two contradictory scenarios: either an increase in water availability and flooding, or water scarcity and drought; each of which requires opposite adaptation strategies.

Building flexible and resilient legal and institutional arrangements in the forthcoming GERD treaty will no doubt be at the heart of such adaptation strategies. If climate change reduces the available water in the Nile Basin, competition for water between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt will intensify, possibly leading to conflict. If the available water resources increase due to climate change, this will create a need for new legal response to flooding. In either case, flexibility is crucial in adapting to climate change.

Accordingly, while developing the GERD treaty, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt should use the following five mechanisms: (1) Drought provisions (2) flexible allocation strategies; (3) amendment and review procedures; (4) termination clauses; and (5) River Basin Organizations (RBOs).

Drought provisions

Drought provisions are the most common mechanism for enhancing treaty flexibility. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt can allocate fixed quantities of waters and build flexibility into the GERD treaty by including special provisions that govern exceptional circumstances, like droughts.

The 1944 agreement between the U.S and Mexico on the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers have provisions governing possible problems resulting from drought. The agreement allows Mexico to deliver less than the minimum quantity of water to the U.S during an “extraordinary drought” of up to five years. If deficiencies occur during this period, Mexico is to repay by increasing flows during the next five-year cycle. In the case of the Colorado River, the agreement guarantees that Mexico receives a certain annual quantity of the Colorado River’s water from the U.S. “In the event of extraordinary drought” though, the water allotted to Mexico is to “be reduced in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the United States are reduced.”

Both in the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers, the upstream countries can deliver below the minimum quantity of the water during severe drought seasons and repay the water during the normal seasons. But, given Egypt’s dependency on the Nile, it is unreasonable to allow upstream Ethiopia to deliver below the minimum quantity of water during drought seasons.

Therefore, unlike these international experiences, Ethiopia seems set to promise to release 37 billion cubic meters (BCM) during the drought period, and more waters from its reservoir when the flow of the Nile is below 31 BCM.  This approach is a fixed quantitative allocation strategy that does not offer the flexibility needed to address the anticipated impact of climate change. Therefore, it is must be supplemented in the treaty by clauses that provide sufficient opportunity to modify releases depending on changing hydrological circumstances.

Flexible water allocation

Instead of allocating the Nile waters based on the assumption of a fixed, and often too optimistic, perpetual water supply, or fixed volumetric allocation strategy, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt should allocate the Nile water resources in accordance with the social, economic, or climatic changing conditions existing in the Nile Basin.

There are a couple of ways this can be achieved. According to a 2015 UNESCO paper titled ‘Transboundary water governance and climate change adaptation: international law, policy guidelines and best practice application’, a rather simple method is to include a provision that requires Ethiopia to deliver a minimum flow to Sudan and Egypt in order “to maintain human health and basic ecological functions.” The other, and perhaps the best option is to include a percentage allocation strategy in the draft and share the possible water deficiencies, and surplus, proportionally among the three countries. The latter option is advisable as it “allows flow regimes to respond to both wet and dry conditions,” the paper suggests.

Amendment and review

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt can also build flexibility into the GERD treaty by including amendment and periodic review processes provisions. These provisions are very important as they give the three countries the ability to address unforeseen circumstances, while “resynchroniz[ing] national and basin-wide strategies with new knowledge and changing circumstance,” according to an article in the International Journal of Water Resources Development. They are crucial for the sustainability of the GERD treaty because, through time, the hydrological and climatic conditions on which the treaty is based will change significantly. This is particularly true in the era of climate change.

Based on the current hydrological and climatic conditions, Ethiopia promised to fill the GERD “during the wet season, generally from July to August and will continue in September.” The wet and dry seasons could change because of climate change. Thus, unless the final agreement incorporates this, Ethiopia will not have the flexibility to fill the dam if the wet season happens in months other than those stated in the agreement.

Several mechanisms can be used to amend the GERD treaty. In the Colorado River Basin, for instance, modifications of the 1944 Colorado Treaty are made through the “minutes” of meetings of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), a joint commission charged with the application of the Treaty and composed of an Engineer Commissioner from both parties (U.S. and Mexico,). The Mekong River Basin Agreement between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam also allows the alteration of the Agreement through amendment proposals agreed to by all the parties.

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt may currently consider the 37 BCM drought threshold as equitable. However, with the anticipated impact of climate change, this threshold could very well be inequitable in the future. So, unless the agreement acknowledges this, the three countries’ ability to adapt to climate change will be seriously undermined.

Besides amendment, periodic review is also important to ensure equitability in the face of climate uncertainty. The GERD treaty needs to include explicit provisions concerning the adjustment and review of the agreement in general, and in particular, regarding the fairness of the filling and operation the GERD, High Aswan Dam (HAD), and Sudan’s reservoirs to adapt to the ramifications of climate change. Moreover, it should define what constitutes climate change and specify when adjustments would be necessary.

The latter can be done by setting down “triggers” (magnitude of climate change) that would activate treaty adjustments or by merely providing specific periods when the agreement should be reviewed.  In the Syr Darya River Basin, for instance, Stephen McCaffrey writes that the Framework Agreement requires periodic review of Agreements “on water releases, production and transit of electricity, and compensations for energy losses” and calls for the conclusion of new Agreements annually. Another example is the Treaty between India and Nepal governing Mahakali River, which requires a review every ten years or “earlier as required by either party.”

Termination clauses

The fourth mechanism for enhancing treaty flexibility is to simply include a termination clause in the treaty allowing any riparian state to terminate it upon a given period of notice. In the Syr Darya Basin, for instance, the Framework Agreement restricts its validity to five years, allowing automatic renewal for another five years provided that no termination notice is submitted “six months in advance from any party.” In so doing, the Framework Agreement provides sufficient flexibility for parties adversely affected by changed circumstances, permitting them to withdraw from what could otherwise be an oppressive treaty.

It is, however, to be noted that a termination clause that has such an abbreviated period of notice would not always be appropriate for all types of treaties. As pointed out by professor and water laurate Stephen McCaffrey, it would best fit only treaties that do “not involve permanent structures but provide for allocations of water…”  The coming GERD treaty involves permanent structures, dams, and reservoirs, and is therefore unsuitable for termination within a short period of time.

Although allowing either of the three countries to withdraw from the GERD treaty upon a one-year period of notice is important for treaty flexibility, it will be in strict contrast with the predictability and certainty required for the effective management of the Nile watercourse, especially where infrastructure is involved. The flexibility required for adapting to climate change and the certainty required for smooth operations of dams would be reconciled if a long period of notice, say 10-15 years, is required to withdraw from the treaty, while at the same time empowering the Nile Basin Commission (NBC) to review the equitable allocation of the Nile waters periodically.

River Basin Organizations

Sustainable transboundary water management is inextricably linked with River Basin Organizations. RBOs play a significant role in building flexibility into watercourse treaties. RBOs’ ability to adapt, amend, and extend the institutional arrangement between riparian states is at the center of developing greater resilience and adaptability to the changing environment.

Of the 260 transboundary river basins, about 119 of them have water institutions. While the roles and authorities of such institutions vary significantly, institutions capable of adapting to the challenges of climate change should “have a broad scope, include all riparian nations, and have management and enforcement authority,” according to Pacific Institute and UN Environment Programme research in 2009.

In relation to RBOs, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt have two options. The first is to establish a joint body in the GERD treaty that will manage the operations of dams in their respective countries. The problem of this option is that other eight Nile Basin States are not part of the GERD negotiations, and thus will be excluded from the joint body. Other Nile Basin States are not integrated into the GERD treaty means that their actions as to the utilization of the Nile waters and climate change adaptation will be outside the joint body. This will impede effective adaptation.

The other, and arguably the best, option is to manage all dams, including the GERD, through the NBC, a joint body be envisaged in the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The CFA is a result of an attempt by riparian states to prepare a basin-wide framework to regulate the inter-state use and management of the Nile River. All the Nile basin states except Egypt and Sudan agreed to it.

The CFA gives the NBC a wide range of powers, which include the ability to examine and determine how water is best used in and distributed among the Nile Basin countries. The NBC has a broad scope, is entrusted with rule-making authority and involve all upstream countries. Egypt and Sudan should accede to the framework agreement. And the forthcoming treaty should empower this body to manage the filling and operation of the dams and reservoirs in the three countries.

For many years, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have been trying to protect their narrow national interests. But now, with the ever-increasing threats of climate change, the time seems ripe to set aside such egoistic national interests, negotiate in good faith, and address the ramifications of climate change by building flexibility into the forthcoming GERD treaty.

Source=https://eritreahub.org/sharing-the-nile-flexibility-must-be-foremost-in-gerd-treaty

January 25, 2020 News

Source: FAO

The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO] has issued a warning that the whole of the Horn of Africa is threatened by “unprecedented”  locust swarms.

“We must act immediately and at scale to combat and contain this invasion,” David Phiri, the FAO‘s sub-regional coordinator for eastern Africa, said Friday. “

The insects are breeding across the Horn, including Eritrea, but in the next few months – says the FAO – the threat to Eritrea will only escalate. Full report below.

Desert Locust MovementsDetail of FAO Desert Locust Movements, Aug 2019 – Feb 2020

Source: FAO

Large and numerous swarms continue to threaten the Horn of Africa

The current Desert Locust situation is extremely alarming and represents an unprecedented threat to food security and livelihoods in the Horn of Africa. In addition, important locust situations continue to develop along both sides of the Red Sea, in Oman and in southern Iran.

Kenya. Immature and maturing swarms continue to arrive in the northeast from Ethiopia and Somalia and are moving throughout northern areas in Mandera, Wajir and Marsabit counties and have reached central areas of Isiolo, Meru North and northern Laikipia. Some swarms in the north have moved back into southern Ethiopia while others are now mature and laying eggs that will hatch after about two weeks, giving rise to hopper bands in February and March. Today, a swarm reached the southern Rift Valley near Kapedo on the border of Baringo and Turkana counties. Aerial and ground control operations are in progress in some areas. Further movements are expected, especially in Turkana and Marsabit counties.

Ethiopia. Ground and aerial control operations continue against immature swarms in Somali and South Oromiya regions. Some swarms are maturing while others are moving south and west into the southern parts of the country with at least one swarm reaching the edge of the Rift Valley in Southern Nations Nationalities and People Region (SNNPR). Some 6 000 ha were treated by air so far this month.

Somalia. Control operations are in progress in the northeast (Puntland) while maturing swarms continued to move southwards in central and southern areas. Some swarms were seen laying eggs in the south adjacent to northeast Kenya. Survey and control operations are limited by insecurity.

South Sudan. There remains a high risk of a few swarms appearing at any time in the southeast (Kapoeta East and Ilemi Triangle) coming from adjacent areas of NW Kenya, flying north through the Rift Valley or northwest from Marsabit county. They may transit through the area to the Rift Valley in southwest Ethiopia.

Uganda. There remains a moderate risk of a few swarms appearing at any time in the northeast from adjacent areas of NW Kenya until about the end of January.

Red Sea. Breeding is in progress and hopper groups and bands are present on the northern coast in Sudan, southern coast in Saudi Arabia, and on the coast of Eritrea and Yemen. Mature swarms are laying eggs on the Sudan/Eritrea border while adult groups have formed in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, some of which are laying eggs. So far this month, ground and aerial control operations treated nearly 23 000 ha in Saudi Arabia and almost 7 000 ha in Sudan.

Locusts 20 Jan 20

Oman. Breeding is in progress on the northeast coast where hopper bands have formed. Ground teams treated more than 1 300 ha so far this month. Several immature and maturing swarms are moving south along the coast and reached Salalah. These may continue to Yemen and perhaps reach the Horn of Africa.

Southwest Asia. A few residual immature swarms persist along both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border where control operations are in progress. Adults and swarms were reported to be breeding along parts of the southern coast where heavy rains and flooding occurred earlier this month.

Desert Locust Movements

Bloomberg adds:

The worst desert-locust plague in Kenya in 70 years is threatening to spread further into East Africa, jeopardizing food security.

Swarms of the insects are already devouring crops and pasture in Ethiopia and Somalia, and they’re breeding in Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan — all areas that are prone to drought and food shortages. There’s a high risk they may soon enter northeast Uganda and southeast South Sudan, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization said Friday.

“We must act immediately and at scale to combat and contain this invasion,” David Phiri, the FAO‘s sub-regional coordinator for eastern Africa, said Friday. “As the rains start in March there will be a new wave of locust breeding. Now is therefore the best time to control the swarms and safeguard people’s livelihoods and food security.”

Saturday, 25 January 2020 19:02

Radio Dimtsi Harnnet Sweden 25.01.2020

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