To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland)
20 May 2022

Excellencies,

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council’s 50th session (13 June-8 July 2022), we, the undersigned non-governmental organisations, are writing to urge your delegation to support the adoption of a resolution that extends the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea. Moreover, we highlight the need for the Council to move beyond merely procedural reso- lutions and to enshrine the “benchmarks for progress in improving the situation of human rights” by incorporating them into Eritrea-focused resolutions.

In July 2021, the UN Human Rights Council maintained its scrutiny of Eritrea’s human rights situation. Considering that monitoring of and reporting on the situation was still needed, the Council extended the Special Rapporteur’s mandate. This was vital to address both Eritrea’s domestic human rights violations and atrocities Eritrean forces have committed in the neighbouring Tigray region of Ethiopia.

In October 2021, Eritrea was re-elected for a second term as a Member of the Council (2022-2024). Yet the Government shows no willingness to address the grave human rights violations and abuses UN bodies and mechanisms have documented or to engage in a serious dialogue with the international community, including on the basis of the benchmarks for progress the Special Rapporteur identified in 2019. Despite its obligations as a Council Member to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights” and to “fully cooperate with the Council,” the Government refuses to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur or other special procedure mandate holders. As of 2022, Eritrea remains among the very few countries that have never received any visit by a special procedure.1

Furthermore, Eritrean forces have been credibly accused of grave violations of international law in Tig- ray, some of which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, since the conflict started in November 2020.
The concerns expressed in joint civil society letters released in 2020 and 2021 remain valid. Key human rights issues in Eritrea include2:

• Widespread impunity for past and ongoing human rights violations;
• Arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention;
• Violations of the rights to a fair trial, access to justice, and due process;
• Enforced disappearances and lack of information on disappeared persons;
• Conscription into the country’s abusive national service system, including indefinite national ser-
  vice, involving torture, sexual violence against women and girls, and forced labour; and
  1 See https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&Lang=en. The Special Rapporteur on Eritrea has conducted official visits to neighbouring countries, namely Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well as to other countries, and met with members of the Eritrean diaspora, including refugees, in these countries. All visit requests to Eritrea have been denied. Other special procedure mandate holders have requested, but were systematically denied, visits to Eritrea. They include special procedures on extrajudicial executions, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to education, the right to health, arbitrary detention, torture, freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, freedom of religion or belief, and the right to food (data as of 7 April 2022).
  2 See DefendDefenders et al., “Eritrea: maintain Human Rights Council scrutiny and engagement,” 5 May 2020, https://defenddefenders.org/eritrea-maintain-human-rights-council-scrutiny-and-engagement/; DefendDefenders et al., “Eritrea: renew vital mandate of UN Special Rapporteur,” 10 May 2021, https://defenddefenders.org/eritrea-renew- vital-mandate-of-un-special-rapporteur/; CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide), “Eritrea: General Briefing,” 22 March 2022, https://www.csw.org.uk/2022/03/22/report/5629/article.htm (accessed on 7 April 2022).
  1
• Restrictions on the media and media workers, as well as severe restrictions on civic space.
  In 2019, when the former sponsors of Eritrea-focused resolutions, Djibouti and Somalia, discontinued their leadership, civil society welcomed the initiative a group of six States took to maintain multilateral scrutiny of Eritrea’s human rights situation. However, while welcoming the adoption of Human Rights Council resolutions 41/1 (2019), 44/1 (2020), and 47/2 (2021),3 many civil society organisations cau- tioned that any shifts in the Council’s approach should reflect corresponding changes in the human rights situation on the ground. Civil society also emphasised the need for the new core group, and for the Euro- pean Union (which subsequently took over sponsorship of these resolutions), to be ambitious.
  We believe that it is time for the Council to move beyond merely procedural resolutions that extend the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, and to clearly describe and condemn violations Eritrean authorities com- mit at home and abroad.
  We also believe that the benchmarks for progress in improving the situation of human rights,4 which form a comprehensive road map for human rights reforms, should be incorporated into this year’s resolution. These benchmarks5 include:
• Benchmark 1: Improvement in the promotion of the rule of law and strengthening of national justice and law enforcement institutions;
• Benchmark 2: Demonstrated commitment to introducing reforms to the national/military service;
• Benchmark 3: Extended efforts to guarantee freedoms of religion, association, expression and
  the press, and extended efforts to end religious and ethnic discrimination;
• Benchmark 4: Demonstrated commitment to addressing all forms of gender-based violence and
  to promoting the rights of women and gender equality; and
• Benchmark 5: Strengthened cooperation with the United Nations country team.
• Associated indicators outlined in paragraphs 78-82 of UN Doc. A/HRC/41/53, as well as all recommendations pertaining to the benchmarks formulated in successive reports of the Special Rapporteur, should also be referenced in the resolution.
  The Human Rights Council should allow the Special Rapporteur to pursue his work and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to deepen its engagement with Eritrea.
  At its upcoming 50th session, the Council should adopt a resolution:
  (a) Extending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea;
  (b) Urging Eritrea to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur by granting him access to
  the country, in accordance with its obligations as a Council Member;
  (c) Welcoming the benchmarks for progress in improving the situation of human rights and associated indicators and recommendations, and emphasising the need for Eritrea to in- corporate these benchmarks in its institutional, legal, and policy framework. The resolution
  should enshrine the five benchmarks and associated indicators;
  (d) Calling on Eritrea to develop an implementation plan to meet the benchmarks for progress,
  in consultation with the Special Rapporteur and OHCHR; and
  (e) Requesting the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur to present updates on the
  human rights situation in Eritrea at the Council’s 52nd session in an enhanced interactive dialogue, and requesting the Special Rapporteur to present a comprehensive written report at the Council’s 53rd session and to the General Assembly at its 77th session.
  3 Resolutions available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/RES/41/1; https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/RES/44/1 and https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/RES/47/2
  4 See Human Rights Council resolution 38/15, available at:
  https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/38/15
  5 See reports of the Special Rapporteur to the Council, UN Docs. A/HRC/41/53, A/HRC/44/23, and A/HRC/47/21.
  2 We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as needed.
  Sincerely,

1. African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS)
2. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
3. Amnesty International
4. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
5. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
6. Cercle des Droits de l’Homme et de Développement – DRC
7. CIVICUS
8. Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform – Liberia
9. Coalition Burundaise des Défenseurs des Droits de l’Homme (CBDDH)
10. Coalition des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (CDDH-Bénin)
11. Coalition Ivoirienne des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (CIDDH)
12. Coalition Togolaise des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (CTDDH)
13. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI)
14. CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)
15. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
16. Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)
17. Eritrea Focus
18. Eritrean Law Society
19. Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR)
20. Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change (ENCDC)
21. Eritrean Political Forces Coordination Committee (EPFCC)
22. Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile (FORSC) – Burundi
23. Freedom United
24. Geneva for Human Rights / Genève pour les Droits de l’Homme (GHR)
25. Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (HRCE)
26. Human Rights Defenders Network – Sierra Leone (HRDN-SL)
27. Human Rights Defenders Solidarity Network – HRDS-NET
28. Human Rights Watch
29. Independent Human Rights Investigators – Liberia
30. Information Forum for Eritrea (IFE)
31. Institut des Médias pour la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme (IM2DH)
32. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
33. Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada
34. Network of Human Rights Journalists – The Gambia
35. Network of the Independent Commission for Human Rights in North Africa (CIDH AFRICA) 36. One Day Seyoum
36. Protection International Africa
37. Réseau des Citoyens Probes (RCP) – Burundi
38. Réseau Nigérien des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (RNDDH)
39. Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (Southern Defenders) 41. West African Human Rights Defenders Network (ROADDH/WAHRDN) 42. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)
    3

Today North Korea has finally admitted that its policy of a strict lockdown without a vaccination programme against Covid-19 has failed.

Source: Eritrean Press Agency

[Details of drone at end]

Eritrea receives 8 Russian-made Zala K.Y.B drones!

Russia gave the drones in the form a support to Eritrea which it considered its friend in need for Eritrea is a key for the region’s peace and as an input for the military base which Russia is going to built in the future in Afabet, 40km away from Massaw.

Eritrea which provided drone today has also warmly welcomed 26 drone technicians at Bebats drone station who had been receiving training in Russian for the last three months

What makes the Zala K.Y.B Russian drones unique?

The triangular drone can carry out its mission in secret attacks. Apparently this is why it is also known as “the killer” or “the destroyer”.

The wing length of the drone is 1.2 meters wide from end to end; The width is said to be 0.95 meters and 0.165 meters height.

It is also said that the drone is equipped with a small electric motor and can fly at speeds of 80 to 130km per hour.

The drone is said to last up to 30 minutes in the air and can easily hit targets both in the water or on land at up to a distance of 40 km.

The Russian army is reported to have used the KYB-UAV drone system with an explosive device during its military operation in Ukraine in March 2022. Credit: Ukrainian Military Center.

Zala Aero’s KYB-UAV is a new loitering munition system that can effectively destroy small-sized targets on the ground and sea. Credit: Kalashnikov Concern JSC, part of the Kalashnikov Group.

KYB-UAV’s updated naval version can be operated as part of a guided swarm. Credit: Zala Aero Group.

The drone can be launched from a pneumatic catapult or a naval platform. Credit: Ukrainian Military Center.

The Russian army is reported to have used the KYB-UAV drone system with an explosive device during its military operation in Ukraine in March 2022. Credit: Ukrainian Military Center.

Zala Aero’s KYB-UAV is a new loitering munition system that can effectively destroy small-sized targets on the ground and sea. Credit: Kalashnikov Concern JSC, part of the Kalashnikov Group.

Zala KYB-UAV, also known as KUB-BLA (Cube), is a new loitering munition system developed and manufactured by Russian defence company Zala Aero, a subsidiary of Kalashnikov Group.

It was built based on the combat experience of Russian armed forces in Syria between 2015 and 2018.

Launched at the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX), held in Abu Dhabi in February 2019, the loitering drone is operated by the Russian Army.

The military-grade drone can deliver a variety of weapon payloads with high precision during military operations based on manually set target coordinates or image-based target guidance payload. It can be used as a suicide drone or kamikaze drone to effectively destroy small-sized targets on the ground and sea.

Ukraine claimed to have shot down a Zala KYB drone equipped with an explosive device in the Podilskyi district of Kyiv in March 2022, during the Russianinvasion of Ukrainethat began in February 2022.

Zala KYB drone design and features

The wide triangular-winged unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is designed for hidden launch and silent operation during missions. It can attack ground and sea-based enemy infrastructure as well as lightly armoured targets.

The kamikaze drone has a wingspan of 1.21m, length of 0.95m and height of 0.165m. It can be used for missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as target engagement.

The Zala KYB-UAV incorporates artificial intelligence visual identification (AIVI) technology for real-time recognition and classification of targets. The AIVI technology increases the area covered during a single flight by 60 times and improves the drone’s real-time lethality and autonomy.

Launch and strike mechanism

The standard version of the kamikaze drone can be launched from a catapult. It hovers in the air after launch to identify a target.

The drone crashes into the target from the upper atmosphere through a vertical trajectory, with precision. It can strike battle tanks and detonate anexplosive, piercing the turret.

Propulsion and performance

The tail part of the UAV houses the propeller in a pusher configuration. Powered by an electric motor unit, the drone can travel at a speed between 80km/h and 130km/h.

The loitering munition can carry a maximum payload of up to 3kg of sensors and explosive warheads.

It can stay in the air for 30 minutes and hit targets at a range of up to approximately 40km.

Export and modified variants of KUB-BLA

The export variant, which is known as KUB-E, passed the state tests successfully in November 2021. Equipped with guided munition, it was approved by the Russian authorities for export in January 2022.

The serial supply of KUB-E to the Russian armed forces is planned for 2022. Kalashnikov Group partnered with Rosoboronexport, a state-owned defence products exporter, to promote theloitering munitionin the international market.

A modification to the drone, which was demonstrated at the ‘ARMY 2021’ international military and technical forum in Moscow in August 2021, allows it to be operated as part of a guided swarm. The sea-based drone can be launched from high-speed boats and special-purpose ships.

The updated naval version can be launched from a special launcher installed on high-speed boats, such as Kalashnikov’s BK-016 high-speed landing craft, as well as special-purpose ships and other naval platforms.

A deck container launcher is planned for future development to allow the launch of guided swarms.

Source: Al-Monitor

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mariam al-Mahdi is warning Ethiopia against any unilateral measures to fill the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Here, Mahdi talks with an AFP journalist on Jan. 3, 2016, in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, when she was in the opposition.

Ayah Aman

Water Issues

April 7, 2021

CAIRO — The round of negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam between the Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian ministers of water and irrigation concluded April 6 without agreement in Kinshasa, Congo. No consensus was even reached to continue the diplomatic process to settle the unresolved disputes over the filling and operation of the dam.

Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ahmed Hafez said in a press statement after the meetings ended, “The meeting has not achieved any progress and will not result in an agreement on relaunching the negotiations. Ethiopia refused the Egyptian and Sudanese proposal to form an international quartet led by the Democratic Republic of Congo as mediator between the three countries.” He also said, “Ethiopia also refused a proposition that Egypt made during the closing session and Sudan supported to resume negotiations under the wing of the Congolese president and with the participation of observers.”

He added, “The Ethiopian stance once again proves the lack of Ethiopia’s well-intentioned political willingness to negotiate. It is stalling and procrastinating, and it is clinging to a formal and ineffective negotiation mechanism.”

The round of talks was held in Congo because the country now heads the African Union Commission. The three-day talks between the ministers of water and irrigation of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia began April 4 after Ethiopia insisted on proceeding with the second stage of filling the dam reservoir during the flood season in July and retaining around 13.5 billion cubic meters of water.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed Sudan and Egypt for the failure of the talks and seeking to “undermine the AU-led process and take the matter out of the African platform,” adding that the scheduled second filling of the dam will proceed as scheduled.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi released statements that directly threatened and warned against any measures that infringe upon Egyptian interests in Nile water.

The talks aimed at determining the approach, process and timing of negotiations, in addition to mechanisms ensuring commitment to them to secure constructive negotiations and overcome the stalemate that has cast a shadow over the talks since the sponsorship of the African Union began in June 2020. The objective was to reach a comprehensive and legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam in a way that would ensure the interests of the three countries and maintain the rights of the two downstream countries, avoiding the creation of risks or damages for Egypt and Sudan when the dam stores water.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said during the first session of the Kinshasa talks April 4 that the negotiations “are the last chance to reach an agreement on the operation and filling of the dam before the next flood season.”

An Egyptian technical source who participated in the Kinshasa meetings told Al-Monitor, “The Egyptian delegation attended the Kinshasa meetings based on instructions from the political leadership to offer several alternative solutions to the remaining points of contention through serious dialogue and diplomatic means. The Egyptian suggestions were backed by Sudan and observers participating in the meetings.”

The source added on condition of anonymity, “A detailed report about the meetings and their outcomes will be presented, and the situation will be assessed, given the failure to reach an agreement and the Egyptian political leadership’s halt of negotiations. Moving forward, Egypt has several scenarios to deter any attempts to impose a fait accompli and sabotage the Nile water.”

During the talks, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mariam al-Mahdi had warned against unilateral measures that Ethiopia might take in filling the dam reservoir. In statements cited by the Sudan News Agency, she said Ethiopia’s first filling of the dam “unilaterally resulted in a week of thirst, and it negatively affected irrigation and the animal wealth needs. By proceeding with the second filling despite Sudan’s warnings, Ethiopia would be achieving short-term political gains.” She said, “Sudan refuses any unilateral filling of the dam because a conflict over resources would mean an unwanted future for Africa.”

Mohamed Nasreddin Allam, a former Egyptian minister of water resources, told Al-Monitor, “If Ethiopia proceeds with the second filling without Egypt and Sudan’s approval, it would be somewhat declaring war.”

Hani Raslan, an expert at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, told Al-Monitor, “Ethiopia has made its own bed by proceeding with the second filling in any case. Egypt is unlikely to accept that another state controls the fate and lives of 100 million Egyptians. The Ethiopian leadership is responsible for dragging the region into an unjustified conflict.”

Raslan said, “There were many opportunities to reach consensual solutions to cooperate in the eastern Nile and achieve the interests of all parties by generating electricity to Ethiopia and not harming the water supplies of Egypt and Sudan, thus avoiding a conflict that would be costly for all. However, Ethiopia has dealt with the GERD issue as a zero-sum game, without caring about peaceful coexistence with its neighbors.” The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is also known by its initials, GERD.

He said any decision to launch a military attack on the dam could strengthen Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration “amid the conflicts and divisions inside Ethiopia, particularly with the nearing elections.”

With the failure of the negotiations, international law expert Musaed Abdel Aty told Al-Monitor, “Egypt and Sudan have a legal commitment to return to the Security Council, under Article 7, and brief it by giving a unified speech that includes a legal and technical narration of what happened during the negotiation rounds under African Union auspices. Their briefing must describe the current situation in the region and Ethiopia’s clear and direct threats to peace and security, and it must urge the council to fulfill its role and issue a decision to stop the second filling until a satisfactory agreement that guarantees the interests and rights of the downstream countries is reached.”

He added, “The Kinshasa talks revealed the Ethiopian recklessness and foiling of any chance at peaceful settlement of the conflict by refusing international mediation. This is a violation of the rules of international law.”

Before the meetings, Sisi had addressed the Congolese president in a letter in which he said Egypt was striving for an agreement to be reached fairly quickly, before the flood season.

Abdel Aty said, “Sisi’s discourse carried several connotations about Egypt’s respect for the African Union’s efforts and quest to solve the dispute through diplomatic and peaceful means.”

Coincidentally with the meetings of the ministers of water and irrigation in Kinshasa, the chief of staff of Egypt’s armed forces, Mohamed Hegazi, was in Sudan attending the end of air maneuvers of the Nile Eagles 2 exercise, in which top Egyptian fighter jets participated, at Merowe air base. The exercise follows the Nile Eagles 1 maneuvers held in November. Hegazi said, “Egypt stands by the Sudanese army. We are in the same boat, and we look forward to a promising and secure future.”

By Habte Hagos

In February 2018, demonstrations were held by Jewish and African activists around the world, including one in front of the Rwandan High Commission in London to protest against the deportation of African refugees from Israel to Rwanda.

At the London demonstration, the Rwandan High Commission issued a statement stating[1] “Rwanda’s position on migrants, wherever they may originate from, was informed and shaped by a sentiment of compassion towards African brothers and sisters who are today perishing at high seas, sold in the market like cattle or expelled from the countries in which they sought shelter. Rwanda is happy to help in a limited way it could by welcoming anyone arriving at its borders in need of a home, voluntarily and without any constraints.” The letter dated 7 February 2018 adds “ .. Rwanda’s policy vis-à-vis Africans in need for a home, temporary or permanent, within the country’s means, remains open.”

It is surprising that the UK now plans, and indeed signed an agreement with the Rwandan authorities, to send refugees to the country in breach of international law. This is particularly true given the UK Government’s condemnations of Rwandan human rights record at the UN and other forums.

The UNHCR has expressed “strong opposition and concerns about the United Kingdom’s plan.” In the words of the Rwandan High Commission such act would be tantamount to people being “sold in the market like cattle”.

Putting ethics aside, one asks whether UK paying Rwanda an initial sum of £120m [with an estimated £30,000 per deportee once the scheme is up and running] delivers value for money for the tax payer, especially coming at a time when the living standard for people in Britain is in freefall. The true cost will be “eyewatering” according to Conservative MP, Andrew Mitchell.

The UK, a country renown for decades as a shining example for its rule of law and adherence to international norms, is sadly now seen as a country led by a government that repeatedly flouts, not only its domestic laws, but international laws too.

No wonder some 160 civic societies and others have so far raised concerns about the UK/Rwanda unhealthy alliance over vulnerable refugees. I have no doubt the campaign against the plan will accelerate over the coming days and weeks. In the end the UK citizens humanity, fair play, underpinned by the rule of law, will triumph and this government will eventually back down on its unworkable plan.

Habte Hagos is chair of Eritrea Focus

[1] Statement from Rwanda on Israeli deportations of African refugees | Eritrea Focus (eritrea-focus.org)