Joint Action for Joint Victory

Tuesday, 03 January 2023 16:37 Written by

 EPDP Editorial

Political programmes of the existing Eritrean pro-democracy and change forces reveal that they have more in common than what divides them. The topmost commonly held fundamental agendas that unite them include the following:

1. Identifying the ruling clique as their chief enemy; responsible

2. Preserving Eritrean sovereignty;

3. Removing the repressive regime;

4. Replacing the existing tyranny by a democratic constitutional system of governance that ensures the supremacy of the citizenry.

Upholding these objectives as they are, the political forces will have all the opportunity of raising their different viewpoints among the people while giving a final shape to the country’s constitutional structure.

The differences among Eritrean political formations can in no way prevent joint action against the repressive common enemy at home. The differences can be seen as choices for the people to consider in post-dictatorship setting. However, lack of proper handling and full understanding of the issues by their propagators could make them those differences look harmful and everlasting while they are not. Those of us who have been calling for joint work for joint victory do indeed appreciate that the seemingly big differences between organizations are not really big but easy to overcome. In the meantime, trying to put aside one’s differences and giving priority to the points of common understanding in order to launch joint work is not proving to be that easy, as seen in the case of the Eritrean opposition. We should not forget that putting it into action requires taking bold decisions and persistent determination to make joint work happen.

In other words, realizing our multiple proposals for joint work are facing hurdles  because joint action calls for bringing closer the perceived points of disagreement and creating in a responsible manner a central space that accommodates all stakeholders. The key factors that prevent us from realizing joint work are:

1. General lack of not setting one’s priorities;

2. Failure to have common understanding of the primary enemy;

3. Failure of understanding the roles and freedoms of organizations as separate entities as well as members of the coalition for joint work; and

4. Not giving priority to people and country over ones political formation.

Although difficult, it indeed is possible to resolve these differences and reach common understanding for joint action. But, we in the Eritrean opposition camp struggling for change in Eritrea, have not yet acquired the capabilities to take the right steps.

In the call for joint work, there should not be one who invites and another coming as an invited participant. No. It is important that all known stakeholders be part of the initiative and hold responsibilities from the get-go. The issue of unity or joint work cannot be simplified as ‘a trial and error’ matter. It is a strategy that requires high consideration and careful handling because it is the basic means that can clear the path for the aspired political change.

It was springing from this understanding and importance that the Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) has been issuing proposals at its congresses and doing all what it can to promote the idea. For the EPDP, unity and joint action proposals for regime change and the establishment of democratic governance are much beyond the capabilities of one party or organization.

We fully understand that closing the gap and creating a platform for joint work between organizations with long simmering differences and mistrusts requires sufficient time in addition to effective and responsible capabilities. But it is absolutely unacceptable to see our forces for change losing time by hiding behind indefensible excuses  instead of facing the timely challenges head-on. Waiting for others to respond sometimes proves to be tiresome and frustrating, but there is no choice other than steadfastly trying to realize the right path for change.   

Understandably, success through joint work depends on the capabilities of the forces that come together for a joint work and the outcome is the sum total of their inputs.  If the individual members making up the coalition lack capabilities, their coming together will remain just nominal and incapable of doing the required work.

A framework for joint work should not be understood to mean end of the work by the forces capable in immensely contributing in the struggle. Prioritizing and organizing in a responsible way the specific contributions of the parties, movements and organizations forming the joint platform is very essential. Instead of promoting one issue at a time, it is possible to conduct multiple related tasks alongside each other.  For example, while working on how to remove the tyrant regime in Asmara, it is also important to work at the same time on how to guarantee state sovereignty, unity of the people, the tasks required in the transition period, and the modalities of popular participation in the various tasks.

The current developments in our region do put the PFDJ clique in corner and encourage the forces of change to do more. The unwarranted involvements of the repressive regime in regional matters, and particularly its interferences in Ethiopia, have further exposed its anti-people cruelties and excesses. 

In spite of all the efforts exerted so far, our opposition camp has gravely failed to respond to the question of unity and joint work. This failure demonstrates that we have been handling the issues in a wrong way. Our past shortcomings are deeply regrettable. However, it is now time to learn from past mistakes and do what is right. It will be sad if we do not learn from our past and mend our ways in the future. Therefore, our old motto of “Joint struggle for joint victory” is still alive and without other alternative.

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Martin Plaut posted: " In addition to the reports by Bloomberg and Reuters (below) a friend told me that a contact in Shire had seen at least ten big trucks of Eritrean Defence Force trucks leaving, yesterday [Thursday] Martin Source: Bloomberg Pullout adds to si" Martin Plaut

 

Martin Plaut

Dec 30

In addition to the reports by Bloomberg and Reuters (below) a friend told me that a contact in Shire had seen at least ten big trucks of Eritrean Defence Force trucks leaving, yesterday [Thursday]

Martin

Source: Bloomberg

·    Pullout adds to signs that November peace deal is holding

·    Ethiopia, Tigray authorities signed peace deal last month

By Simon Marks

December 30, 2022, 11:22 AM UTC

Eritrean soldiers are leaving major cities in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, the latest sign that a peace deal aimed at ending two years of conflict is holding.

Over the past 48 hours the troops were seen withdrawing by truck from the Ethiopian city of Shire and the town of Adwa near the northern border with Eritrea, said people who asked not to be identified because they’re not authorized to comment on the matter. 

Ethiopian government spokesperson Selamawit Kassa declined to comment. Eritrean Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel didn’t respond to questions about the withdrawal sent by text message. A spokesman for the Tigray government said he couldn’t confirm Eritrean troops had completely left the region.

Representatives of Ethiopia’s government and the dissident Tigray region signed a peace deal in South Africa on Nov. 2 to end a civil war that erupted in November 2020 and has left thousands of people dead. The truce sparked a more than 1,000-point rally in Ethiopia’s $1 billion of 2024 eurobonds, with the yield falling to 35.55% on Friday from 45.80% the day before the agreement.

During the conflict, Eritrean troops were blamed for committing widespread human-rights abuses including rape, indiscriminate killings of civilians and kidnapping. Eritrea — an ally of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and a foe of the Tigray authorities — had kept its forces in place after the peace deal was signed and they continued to fight on.

The Eritrean pullout comes as Ethiopian authorities restore services to the Tigray region.

Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights to the regional capital, Mekelle, this week and telecommunication services have been reconnected in major urban centers across the region. Earlier this week, Abe Sano, president of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, said in an interview with the state-run Ethiopian Broadcast Corp. that 20 branches of the bank in Tigray would reopen.

Representatives from Ethiopia and Tigray met in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, earlier this month and agreed to allow a team of independent African experts to monitor the implementation of the peace deal, according to a document summarizing the meeting seen by Bloomberg. The deal lays out terms for Tigray forces to disarm and stop recruitment, and for their troops to be sent to designated areas controlled by federal Ethiopian forces.

Eritrean soldiers leave major towns in northern Ethiopia - witnesses

Source: Reuters

By Dawit Endeshaw

Field Marshal of the Ethiopian National Defence Force Birhanu Jula and Tadesse Werede Tesfay of the Tigray forces sign the implementation of the cessation of hostilities in Nairobi

[1/2] Field Marshal of the Ethiopian National Defence Force and Chief of General Staff of Ethiopia Birhanu Jula, and Tadesse Werede Tesfay, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tigray forces, sign the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan forces, laying out the roadmap for implementation of a peace deal, in Nairobi, Kenya November 12, 2022. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya/File PhotoRead more12

·    Peace deal requires withdrawal of foreign troops

·    Eritrean sodliers accused of abuses following ceasefire deal

·    Progress made by Ethiopian govt, Tigray authorities implementing accord

ADDIS ABABA, Dec 30 (Reuters) - Eritrean soldiers, who fought in support of Ethiopia's federal government during its two-year civil war in the northern Tigray region, have pulled out of the major towns of Shire and Axum and headed toward the border, three witnesses told Reuters.

The withdrawals follow a Nov. 2 ceasefire signed by Ethiopia's government and Tigray regional forces that requires the removal of foreign troops from Tigray.

Eritrea, however, was not a party to the deal, and its troops' ongoing presence in major Tigrayan population centres has raised questions about the durability of the accord.

It was not immediately clear if the Eritrean troops were leaving Tigray entirely or just pulling back from certain towns. Eritrea's Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel told Reuters he could neither confirm nor deny the troops were withdrawing.

Getachew Reda, a spokesperson for the Tigrayan forces, and Ethiopian national security adviser Redwan Hussien did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Friday.

Aid workers in Axum and Shire said they saw several trucks and dozens of cars packed with Eritrean soldiers on Thursday leaving toward the border town of Sheraro. One of the aid workers said the soldiers were waving goodbye.

Tigray residents have accused the Eritrean soldiers of continuing to loot and arrest and kill civilians after the ceasefire.

Eritrean authorities have not directly responded to the allegations.

During the war, Eritrean troops were accused by residents and human rights groups of various abuses, including the killing of hundreds of civilians in Axum during a 24-hour period in November 2020. Eritrea rejected the accusations.

Eritrea continues to consider the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which leads Tigrayan forces, its enemy. Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a border war between 1998 and 2000, when the TPLF dominated the federal government.

After a slow start, Ethiopia's government and Tigrayan authorities have taken several steps in the past week to implement the peace deal.

On Thursday, representatives from both sides met in Tigray's capital Mekelle to set up a monitoring team to assess progress on the disarmament of Tigray forces, the restoration of services and humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Federal police also entered Mekelle in accordance with the truce, state-owned Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights and Ethio Telecom reconnected its services to the capital and 27 other towns.

 

Martin Plaut

Dec 20

At first glance the papers seem almost bland, yet what gradually becomes clear are the foundations for the firm friendship that Blair developed with Meles Zenawi, and how Isaias Afwerki failed to win the battle for influence.

The war that Ethiopia and Eritrea fought from 6 May 1998 – 18 June 2000, apparently over the border town of Badme, took the lives of at least 100,000. It was resolved by the Algiers peace agreement, which was mainly brokered by the United States. But it is only now that the British national archive has released papers revealing the role of that the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.

At the start of the war the Blair government was not very engaged in the conflict. As one Foreign Office briefing makes clear, Britain had little interest in either country. London's concern was the safety of its citizens, some of whom were airlifted out of Asmara when the war broke out. Instead, the Blair government supported the efforts of others: the Organisation of African Unity and the US government.

But there are elements of London's interaction with both countries that are interesting.

Isaias Afwerki and Meles Zenawi both did their best to win British support for their cause, sending personal letters to Prime Minister Blair.

Isaias argued against the deportation of thousands of Eritreans who were forced to leave Ethiopia. But his case was undermined by his failure to acknowledge that thousands of Ethiopians had been expelled from Eritrea, even though the British accepted that they were not as numerous as the Eritreans who had been put across the Ethiopian border.

The letters from Meles also called for British support, but the UK refused to take sides. On 5th of June 1998, within days of the war breaking out, the Foreign Office provided this assessment of how the conflict had broken out.

That was the position that Britain maintained throughout the conflict. But being less compromising did not win Isaias international support.

Eritrea gradually lost ground with the Blair government. This was perhaps inevitable; London was always likely to favour Ethiopia, since it was the major power in the region and had greater clout.

But Isaias played his cards badly. He was seen as intransigent, and he also refused to take the call of the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook in June 1998, who had meanwhile spoken to Meles. It was a point Tony Blair highlighted.

Perhaps President Isaias thought it was beneath him to speak to a mere Foreign Secretary (the British term for a Minister) but it did not go down well.

In May 2000 the Foreign Office was sticking to its position of favouring neither side - labelling both as authoritarian regimes in the Marxist mold.

The assessment was not far from the mark. Eritrea's survival was indeed at stake, after Ethiopian forces broke through the Eritrean defences.

But in just three months, the British tone towards Ethiopia changed completely. An opportunity of a visit to London by Meles offered Tony Blair the chance of a real role in ending the war. The Foreign Office suggested it should be seized.

There appears to have been a reversal of British policy. No longer is Ethiopia seen as a state "reminiscent of Eastern Europe in the 1970's". Meles is portrayed as a peacemaker resisting "hard-line Tigrayan" backers, rather than part of an elite with little concern for the majority of his people.

Although the file released by the National Archive gives no further clues about how the change came about, or what happened to the proposed visit to London, it would seem that the Blair-Meles relationship was sealed.

The two men became firm allies.

Meles Zenawi went on to sit on the Blair "Commission for Africa" as a Commissioner.

When Blair finally left office in 2007 Meles praised the former Prime Minister in no uncertain terms. “I doubt whether Africa has had a more sincere friend at 10 Downing Street than Tony Blair,” Meles said. 

The seeds of this relationship seem to have been sown in the unpromising soil of the border war. In time we may come to understand how they were planted and who tended their green shoots. This file provides the first glimpse.

HORN OF AFRICAAFRICAETHIOPIA

 

Source: Washington Post

The deadliest killings occurred at the Mirab Abaya prison camp, where current and retired Tigrayan soldiers were detained

By Katharine Houreld

December 4, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EST

Then the killings began.

By sunset the next day, around 83 prisoners were dead and another score missing,according to six survivors. Some were shot by their guards, others hacked to death by villagers who taunted the soldiers about their Tigrayan ethnicity, prisoners said. Bodies were dumped in a mass grave by the prison gate, according to seven witnesses.

“They were stacked on top of each other like wood,” recounted one detainee who said he saw the aftermath of the slaughter.

The massacre at the camp near Mirab Abaya, which was covered up and has not been previously reported, was the deadliest killing of imprisoned soldiers since the war started, but not the only one. Guards have killed imprisoned soldiers in at least seven other locations, according to witnesses, who were among more than two dozen people interviewed for this story. None of these incidents have been previously reported either.

The dead were all Tigrayans, members of an ethnic group that dominated the Ethiopian government and military for nearly three decades. That changed after Abiy Ahmed was appointed prime minister of Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most-populous nation, in 2018. Relations between Abiy and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) quickly nosedived. War broke out in 2020 after Tigrayan soldiers in the Ethiopian army and other Tigrayan forces seized military bases across the Tigray region.

Fearing further attacks, the government detained thousands of Tigrayan soldiers serving elsewhere in the country. They have been held in prison camps for nearly two years with no access to their families, phones or human rights monitors. Other Tigrayan soldiers were disarmed when war broke out but continued working in office jobs. Many of them were detained in November 2021 as Tigrayan forces advanced toward the capital, Addis Ababa.

Most of the killings, including the massacre at Mirab Abaya, happened then. Prisoners speculated the attacks might have been triggered by fear or revenge. None of the soldiers killed had been combatants fighting against the Ethiopians and thus prisoners of war.

In some prisons, senior Ethiopian military officers either ordered the killings or were present when they occurred, prisoners said. Elsewhere, imprisoned soldiers said they continue to be guarded — and beaten — by those who killed their comrades.

While there is little sign that the killings were centrally coordinated, there is evidence of widespread impunity. Only in Mirab Abaya did officers intervene to stop the killing.

These newly revealed details come as both sides in the conflict are hammering out details of a cease-fire, announced last month, that has been met with suspicion among the population over a range of issues, including whether there will be accountability for war crimes and other atrocities. How the government responds to the revelations of prison killings could suggest how it will treat other abuses allegedly committed by security forces.

The witness accounts also illuminate how the ethnic divisions tearing at Ethiopia’s society are also eroding its military, once widely respected as one of the region’s most professional and still often relied upon by Ethiopia’s neighbors to help keep the peace. Many of those killed in the prisons were among the thousands of Ethiopian troops who have served in international peacekeeping missions under the United Nations or African Union.

This article’s account of the bloodletting is based on 26 interviews with prisoners, medical personnel, officials, local residents and relatives, and on a review of satellite imagery, social media posts and medical records. Two lists of the dead were provided separately to The Washington Post, and both included the same 83 names. The identities of 16 victims were verified during interviews with detainees. All witnesses spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

When asked about these accounts, Col. Getnet Adane, a spokesman for the Ethiopian military, said he was too busy to comment. A government spokesman and the prime minister’s spokeswoman did not respond to requests for comment. The state-appointed head of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Daniel Bekele, said the panel was aware of the incident and had been investigating it.

Bullets and machetes

About 2,000 to 2,500 serving or retired Tigrayan soldiers, both men and women,were being held at the new prison camp about half an hour’s walk north of the town of Mirab Abaya, in a sparsely populated area dotted with banana plantations and near a large, crocodile-infested lake. Some buildings were so new they didn’t even have doors. But the camp hadguard towers and demarcated boundaries. Guards told prisoners they would be shot if they crossed the line.

In mid-November 2021, a new prisoner — a just-married major who worked in the military’s defense construction division — was badly injured by guards when he went outside his cell at night to urinate, six other detainees said. He was beaten badly. Some said he was shot in the stomach. Guards later told prisoners that he died on the way to the hospital.

Over the following days, tensions continued to mount with reports —later confirmed by rights activists — that Tigrayan fighters in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara region were killing and raping as they advanced toward the capital.

But on Nov. 21, the Mirab Abaya camp seemed calm, prisoners said. Many had been basking in the late afternoon sun when between 16 and 18 guards opened fire.

One prisoner said that he had been near two women when they were shot in the toilet.

“One woman died immediately, and the other was calling out, ‘My son, my son!’ Then they fired another bullet, and she died,” hesaid. “They [the guards] wanted to kill everyone there.”

One of the women was a major in the Ethiopian ground forces. She was around 50, had served as a peacekeeper in Sudan and had a son and a daughter, according to the witness. Other detainees said the second woman had worked in the Ministry of Defense.

A senior Tigrayan officer said he was inside his cell when he heard gunshots. He stuffed clothes and belongings into a bag. He decided to run if he could.

“I was thinking: ‘Will I ever see my kids? See them succeed in school and have the good things of life?’ ” he said. If he couldn’t run, he would fight, he said. He and his cellmates looked for a stick or anything else to use as a weapon.

A third prisoner said he began to pray.

Not all guards took part in the killing. A fourth prisoner described one guard taking up a position outside the cells and telling the attackers he would shoot them if they came for the detainees inside. That guard was crying, the prisoner said, and was inconsolable for days afterward. Another prisoner said some guards had tried to disarm the attackers.

Yet another prisoner said he was having coffee outside when shots rang out. Like many others, he ran into the surrounding bush. Ethiopian soldiers pursued his small group, he said. After running more than an hour, he said, they saw some locals. The prisoners blurted out that they’d been shot at and begged for help.

“They said … ‘We will show you what you deserve.’ And then they attacked us,” he said.

A crowd of about 150 to 200 people hacked and bludgeoned the escapees with machetes, sticks and stones, he recalled. Most were killed as they begged for mercy, he said, adding that he was hurt badly and left for dead. During the attack, he said, he saw other prisoners run into the lake to escape the mobs.

Other detainees confirmed that there had been machete attacks on those who escaped the prison. They said residents screamed abuse at the escapees and had incorrectly been told they were prisoners of war and to blame for the deaths of local men in the military. Two prisoners said the attacks continued into the next day.

The shooting at the prison stopped an hour or two after it began when Col. Girma Ayele of the Southern Command arrived. By then, prisoners said, the camp was littered with the bodies of the dead and the earth slick with blood. Girma could not be reached for comment.

The Dejen division

The massacre inside the prison was committed by about 18 guards, including a woman, said the six prisoners at Mirab Abaya who were interviewed. These guards and just over a third of the victims came from the same unit: the Dejen army division, formerly known as the 17th Division. It’s stationed in Addis Ababa.

Many Tigrayan soldiers speculated during interviews that the attack was motivated by revenge. Most of the guards who did the killing were from the Amhara region, which Tigrayan forces had invaded as they pushed toward the capital.

Girma told the prisoners these guards were not under his direct control and had been arrested, detainees said. The guards’ status could not be confirmed. The prisoners never saw them again.

A day after the killing, an excavator dug a mass grave just outside the main watchtower at the entrance gate, perhaps 200 meters from the road, according to the six prisoners.

Among those buried was Maj. Meles Belay Gidey, an engineer passionate about his teaching job at the Defense Engineering College. When Meles was serving as a U.N. peacekeeper in Abyei, a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan, he video-called his two teenage sons and his stepdaughter every evening to talk to them about school, a relative said.

A local resident traveling past the prison camp the next day said the military warned passersby not to take pictures of the grave.

In Mirab Abaya town, officials used loudspeakers mounted on cars to warn the local population that escapees should be killed. The local resident said he saw three or four people attacked near a banana grove and about a dozen bodies bleeding in the streets, some scattered near the church of St. Gabriel. Ethiopian soldiers nearby did not intervene, he said.

The resident also said he saw a man in his mid-20s being beaten by a mob. Both of his hands had been cut off, and his legs were bleeding. The man begged to be killed as he was dragged up and down the street, the resident said. The attackers told the man they would kill him as slowly as possible. Eventually, he was dragged to the camp gate and shot. Another body was being dragged behind a motorbike, the resident said.

“I couldn’t do anything because I feared for my life,” he said.

Ethiopian soldiers take strategic city in Tigray amid civilian exodus

Wounded Tigrayans were taken to three hospitals, survivors said: Arba Minch General Hospital, Soddo Christian Hospital and another hospital in Soddo. Two medical professionals at Arba Minch General Hospital described an influx of patients around 9 p.m. on Nov. 21. One worker shared medical records showing that 19 patients were admitted with bullet wounds and that 15 were discharged the next day. Two died in the hospital and four were dead on arrival, the two medical workers said.

Most of the patients were kept for only a few hours despite life-threatening wounds, the two said. The patients were kept under police guard, both medical professionals said, and they described nurses and other medical staff taunting the wounded about their ethnicity.

Killings in other prisons

Mirab Abaya was not the only prison where imprisoned soldiers were killed. Current and former prisoners said in interviews that they had witnessed guards killing prisoners at Garbassa training center and the headquarters of the 13th Division in the eastern city of Jigjiga; in prisons in Wondotika and Toga near the southern city of Hawassa; in the southern area of Didessa; and at the Bilate training center in the south. Many of the victims had served as peacekeepers in U.N. missions in Sudan, Abyei or South Sudan or as part of an African Union force in Somalia.

At Wondotika, a detainee said guards had killed five prisoners at facility that holds hundreds of soldiers who are mostly special forces or commandos. The victims included Gebremariam Estifanos, a veteran of a peacekeeping mission in Abyei and an African Union mission in Somalia, who was beaten to death Nov. 8, 2021, in the presence of a colonel and lieutenant colonel from the 103rd Division, a prisoner said. Gebremariam’s biggest wish had been to buy his family a house and his father an ox, the prisoner said. Two other detainees confirmed the account, saying guards often taunted the prisoners about the incident.

Both said that guards had often forced prisoners to dig their own graves, telling them they would soon be killed. The four other soldiers were killed later in November, shot so many times that their bodies were torn to pieces by bullets, the first prisoner said.

“We are beaten and threatened. We have served our country with honor and dignity,” that prisoner said. “I regret my service.”

In Toga prison, guards beat and then shot two Tigrayan soldiers on Nov. 4, a detainee there said. A second prisoner held at Toga, a former peacekeeper who served in Somalia, confirmed two killings. In Garbassa, two prisoners said six detainees had been killed and others injured so badly they had lost the use of limbs and eyes.

“I have seen the bodies being dragged from their rooms,” said a detainee there.

Three prisoners — one from the presidential guard and two from the Agazi commandos — were killed in July 2021 in Bilate training center after guards accused them of attempting to escape, said a witness previously held there. He described soldiers shooting at their bodies long after they were dead and throwing the corpses outside for the hyenas. And in a detention center near Didessa, near Nekemte town, at least five soldiers were killed and 30 others taken away and never seen again, a prisoner previously held there said.

He broke down as he listed the names he could remember. “I’m so sorry, they were my friends,” he said.

An airstrike on a kindergarten and the end to Ethiopia’s uneasy peace

Two imprisoned soldiers, accused of having mobile phones, were also killed by guards at a detention center in eastern Ethiopia between Harar and Dire Dawa, a witness said.

The imprisoned Tigrayan soldiers interviewed by The Post say none of them have had access to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Until a few days ago, their families had no idea what had become of them. At the end of October, the families of some soldiers killed in Mirab Abaya were informed about their deaths. Several relatives were told their loved ones had died honorable deaths in the line of duty. No other details were given.

Some of the survivors of the Mirab Abaya massacre who are still held there said they fear another outbreak of violence.

“I have a prayer book,” one prisoner there said. “Every day I pray to Mary to see my family again.”

NAIROBI — The scent of coffee and cigarettes hung in the hot afternoon air in a makeshift Ethiopian prison camp, prisoners said, as detained Tigrayan soldiers celebrated the holy day of Saint Michael in November 2021. Some joked with friends outside the corrugated iron buildings. Others quietly prayed to be reunited with families they had not seen in a year, when conflict erupted in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region.

On 18 September 2001 the Eritrean government banned all independent media outlets and incarcerated all but the most compliant journalists. They have never been tried, but have not been forgotten, even though their whereabouts are not known.

Only the Eritrean government’s own rigidly controlled media is allowed to operate. Now an exhibition is being staged in the British Parliament, to commemorate their work and their suffering.

The exhibition is being mounted by Eritrea Focus, PEN Eritrea and Amnesty International. Here the exhibition is going up, on the floor where the Parliament’s Committee room are located so that all parliamentarians will see them.

Martin Plaut

Nov 23

To keep the fledgling peace process on track, the AU and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a Horn of Africa regional body, need to continue coordinating efforts with African governments and other outside actors like the U.S., UN and European Union (EU). Collectively, they should urge Tigray’s leaders and the federal government to uphold their commitments in the peace deals, working first to ensure Eritrean troops’ withdrawal, lest Tigray use their continued presence as a reason to delay disarmament.

International Crisis Group

Source: International Crisis Group 23 NOVEMBER 2022

On 2 November, Ethiopia’s federal government and leaders of the country’s northern Tigray region agreed to end two years of devastating war. The welcome deal, brokered by the African Union (AU) in the South African capital Pretoria, was a triumph for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, as Tigray’s embattled leaders assented to disarm their forces and restore federal authority in the region. In exchange, the Ethiopian military, and Eritrean troops who had been fighting alongside federal forces, halted their advance toward Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, and Addis Ababa said it would end its de facto siege of the region. In follow-up talks, Tigray authorities secured an additional pledge that Eritrean forces would withdraw. Fighting between the two sides has stopped. Yet the fragile calm could shatter, especially with thorny questions outstanding and Tigrayans already backtracking on commitments. Both sides need to honour their pledges while keeping up momentum in talks. External actors must seize this moment to coax the parties toward consolidating peace and insist on immediate unrestricted aid to Tigray.

The conflict, among the world’s deadliest, erupted in Africa’s second-most populous country in late 2020, as Ethiopia struggled to navigate a complex political transition. Abiy rose to power in 2018, after three years of protests partly against the rule of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had dominated Ethiopia for almost three decades, creating a repressive system that brought development gains but bred discontent. The TPLF believe that Abiy’s government sidelined them, cutting them out of a rapprochement with their former comrade and then archenemy, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and singling out Tigrayans for prosecution for corruption and human rights offences. For their part, Abiy’s allies argue that the TPLF never accepted losing power, blocked reforms and sought to sabotage the new authorities. As the power struggle simmered, Mekelle’s leaders proceeded in 2020 with regional elections in Tigray, in defiance of federal authorities, who had postponed the vote due to COVID-19. The constitutional crisis escalated when the federal and Tigray governments cast each other as illegitimate.

On 3 November 2020, saying they feared an imminent federal military intervention, Tigray’s forces attacked the national army command in the region.

The standoff soon boiled over. On 3 November 2020, saying they feared an imminent federal military intervention, Tigray’s forces attacked the national army command in the region (some Tigrayan federal officers sided with the regional forces). Addis Ababa promptly launched an offensive in Tigray, blocking all roads into the region, starving it of food and other supplies and cutting off telecommunications, electricity and banking services – an approach that left almost all of Tigray’s roughly six million people in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. In the war’s first few months, the neighbouring Amhara region took control of Western Tigray, which it claims as historical Amhara territory, in a campaign that rights groups described as ethnic cleansing. Eritrea also joined the battle on the federal side, with Isaias seemingly hoping to deal his old foe, the TPLF, a decisive blow.

Momentum seesawed over the course of the war. At the outset, Ethiopia’s military, backed by Eritrean troops and foreign drones, captured Mekelle and forced the TPLF into the mountains, only to hastily retreat as Tigray insurgents (motivated in part by atrocities committed by Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers against civilians) retook the regional capital in June. Citing the continuing blockade, Tigray’s forces marched southward to Addis Ababa, occupying towns and committing their own atrocities along the way. With supply lines stretched, they withdrew to Tigray in December 2021, after a federal counteroffensive gained pace, with mass mobilisation and drones purchased from Turkey playing key roles. An uneasy lull in fighting then settled in. In March, the federal government declared a unilateral humanitarian truce, speeding up delivery of food and medicine to Tigray. The TPLF also held its fire. But efforts to start formal peace talks foundered, partly because Mekelle said Addis Ababa must first end its blockade by restoring services to the region and allowing trade.

The war tipped decisively in the federal government’s favour after the truce broke down on 24 August, and full-scale conflict re-erupted. Ethiopia rapidly assembled a large number of troops to attack Tigray on several fronts, moving in with Eritrean forces from the north west and leading an offensive with Amhara allies from the south. By all accounts, there were huge casualties in spectacularly bloody infantry warfare, with sources close to both sides estimating that more than 100,000 died on the battlefield in a two-month span. Though Tigray’s fighters stood their ground at first, the allied forces broke through their lines in October in key locations, capturing the northern cities of Shire (a strategic crossroads), Aksum and Adwa, as well as the southern towns of Alamata and Korem. On the back foot militarily, Tigray’s leaders then called for another truce, lowering their conditions to unfettered aid access and Eritrean forces’ withdrawal, leading the AU to convene the two parties in Pretoria.

Tigray’s negotiators went to South Africa desperate for a pause in fighting, and reaching that goal came at a high price. Indeed, the deal’s terms reflect the heavy military pressure Tigray’s forces were under in the face of Eritrean artillery and superior federal logistics, manpower and firepower, including in the air. In the deal, the TPLF committed to laying down arms within 30 days and allowing federal forces to re-enter Mekelle in order to restore constitutional order and take control of federal institutions. The deal also stipulates that, once Ethiopia’s parliament has lifted its May 2021 designation of the TPLF as a terrorist organisation, the TPLF and the federal government are to appoint an “inclusive” interim administration to govern Tigray until elections. This provision represents a significant concession, as it implies that Tigray’s September 2020 regional polls, which the TPLF won in a landslide and which helped spark the civil war, lacked legitimacy. For its part, the federal government agreed to halt its offensive upon Mekelle, while also promising to restore services to Tigray, as well as allow unfettered aid deliveries.

Tigray’s leaders appear to have eventually realised that ending the conflict is the best way to ease the Tigray population’s suffering.

None of the parties has come out of the war with credit. For Tigray’s negotiators, the extent of concessions offered to secure a truce illustrates the scope of the predicament they found themselves in, besieged on all sides by determined adversaries, including two national armies. While both sides share blame for starting the conflict, the TPLF miscalculated – at a cost of countless lives – first by escalating its feud with Abiy after losing power, next by underestimating its opponents and plunging into war, and then by erecting obstructions to peace talks during the autumn lull in fighting. Tigray’s leaders appear to have eventually realised that ending the conflict is the best way to ease the Tigray population’s suffering. As for Addis Ababa, it has rightly attracted international opprobrium for its methods, including what UN investigators found to be the use of starvation as a tool of war against Tigray’s civilians. In the end, though, Abiy’s government also chose peace, opting to halt an offensive that appeared to be on the brink of forcing the TPLF from power again and instead advance federal objectives through talks.

The parties showed early commitment to the Pretoria pact, a positive sign. Most importantly, the two battle-exhausted sides have stopped fighting, although unconfirmed reports continue to filter through of serious abuses in and around Axum and Shire by Eritrean and Amhara forces. Addis and Mekelle also followed through on a commitment for top military commanders to meet within five days to negotiate how to put the Pretoria accord’s security provisions into effect, producing a follow-up agreement on 12 November in Nairobi. 

That subsequent deal maintained critical momentum but also created more uncertainty and diluted disarmament plans. Instead of the ambitious, perhaps even unrealistic, original 30-day timeline, the Nairobi deal gave Mekelle more breathing space, splitting disarmament into two phases and, crucially, tying it to foreign and other non-federal forces’ withdrawal. For the Tigrayans, the pull out of Eritrean troops – the foreign forces the deal refers to, even if not explicitly – is a core demand that was less clearly addressed in Pretoria (that deal said, for example, the parties would cease “collusion with an external force hostile” to the other). The military commanders agreed Tigray would give up “heavy weapons” (presumably tanks and artillery) as non-federal forces withdraw from the region, while punting the timeline for relinquishing small arms to talks due to conclude on 26 November. The parties also agreed to disengage their front-line forces in four distinct zones by 23 November (thus far this appears incomplete), after which Addis Ababa is to restore basic services to the region, while assuming its federal “responsibilities”.

The Nairobi agreement, however, included no precise terms as to how or when Tigray’s leaders would meet their commitment to facilitate the federal military’s re-entry into Mekelle, suggesting that they also won some reprieve from honouring that pledge. Tigray leaders now insist privately that this step might entail a limited security escort for returning federal officials, which would be a far cry from the triumphal procession that the Pretoria accord seemed to envision. With no progress made so far at re-establishing the federal presence in Tigray’s capital, this issue requires further negotiation.

It is far from clear that Tigray is planning to hand over all its arms even if Addis Ababa meets its obligations.

For all the positive developments, the situation thus remains fragile, demanding extreme vigilance from all actors. There are signs that Tigray’s leaders are wavering on the Pretoria accord’s critical terms. Hesitation on their part would, perhaps, not be surprising, given the deal’s lopsided nature, but it would nonetheless be alarming. It is far from clear that Tigray is planning to hand over all its arms even if Addis Ababa meets its obligations. Further, in a 13 November statement, issued the day after the Nairobi agreement, Tigray’s leaders publicly backtracked on parts of the Pretoria deal, including by explicitly rejecting its effective removal of the existing regional government from power. It is unclear if they are posturing to deflect internal criticism of their initial concessions in Pretoria or to position themselves for future negotiations. But regardless, the statement suggests willingness to renege on a key part of the accord, namely that Tigray’s authorities would step aside for an interim administration negotiated between the TPLF and the federal government.

Despite the odd unhelpful comment from his allies, Prime Minister Abiy has publicly welcomed the deal and stressed that more war would be futile. Such remarks are welcome, as sustained provocations from both sides otherwise risk undermining the frail accord by emboldening hardliners, perpetuating the deep mistrust and making a return to war more likely. For example, should the federal government move slowly on lifting all aspects of the blockade (perhaps in response to Mekelle’s backtracking on some of Pretoria’s terms), Tigray’s leaders could stall on disarmament, especially if the Eritrean army or Amhara forces linger in Tigray. That, in turn, would lead Addis Ababa to refuse to fully reconnect and reopen Tigray, creating conditions in which any spark might ignite yet another round of disastrous large-scale hostilities.

A further concern is that the two sides do not yet appear to share compatible visions for how a settlement will emerge, making clear how delicate the process will be. Tigray’s leaders want Abiy to pivot away from his alliance with Isaias. Yet it seems safer to assume that Addis Ababa will want to avoid ruffling the feathers of either the Eritrean leader or Amhara allies. Both Abiy and Isaias could well choose, at least for now, to keep their forces ready for renewed hostilities, thereby keeping Tigray’s authorities boxed in militarily. Further, Tigray’s leaders hope that, eventually, the federal government will allow much of their military force to join the federal army or re-hat as regional security forces. Whether Abiy will pursue integration is a matter of conjecture, however. Some think he could do so to help rebuild the Ethiopian military, while others suggest he will prefer to keep Tigray forces that have just tried to oust him out of the national army. Continuing to make incremental progress, at the negotiating table but also with tangible measures on the ground, will thus be key to preventing the rickety process from falling apart.

Abiy faces an especially thorny balancing act with regard to Eritrea, a key partner in the war that may be satisfied only by Tigray’s almost complete disarmament. Indeed, it will be difficult if not impossible for Abiy to accommodate both Asmara’s insistence that the TPLF be defanged and, on the other hand, Tigray’s security demands. It remains unclear if Eritrea will fully disengage its forces or withdraw, even if Abiy asks it to do so. Should Abiy move to let the TPLF continue as a dominant force in Mekelle, allow Tigray to retain a strong regional force, or integrate large numbers of Tigray’s perhaps 200,000 fighters into the federal military, Eritrea could react defiantly. More than two decades after the last Ethiopian-Eritrean war, new hostilities remain possible if Abiy and Isaias fall out, an additional factor showcasing just how complex the peace process could prove.

Abiy will also need to tread carefully in relations with Amhara political leaders, his other major ally in the war – and an important domestic constituency. The Nairobi accord appears to require Amhara regional forces and militias (the other “non-federal forces” it cites), which have been fighting alongside the Ethiopian army, to also withdraw from Tigray. Yet Amhara regional authorities will be keen not to lose out in the peace process. The complicating factor is Tigray’s loss of territory to Amhara during the war, as Amhara forces captured Western and Southern Tigray, which many Amhara refer to as Welkait and Raya, respectively, in asserting historical claims to the territories. Addis Ababa and Mekelle are unlikely to see eye to eye on the withdrawal of Amhara forces from what the Pretoria agreement called “contested areas” (without specifying which areas these are), a major dispute that could gum up disarmament negotiations.

Ideally, over time, Tigray and Amhara leaders would recognise the need to resolve their differences through dialogue.

What is clear is that the process for addressing these competing territorial claims will need to be central to further political dialogue, as envisaged in Pretoria. One approach could be for the federal government to assert control over the areas, paving the way for the return of displaced people and political processes to adjudicate the disputes. Such a move would infuriate Amhara leaders and activists while failing to placate Mekelle, which would doubtless argue that returning to the constitutional order means restoring Tigray’s pre-war borders. Still, an initial assertion of federal control, if that can be done peacefully, may be the most pragmatic option for the time being. Ideally, over time, Tigray and Amhara leaders would recognise the need to resolve their differences through dialogue, including through provisions for administering the areas that navigate the competing claims and complex local identities. 

Should the peace agreement hold, the parties will also need to negotiate on the make-up of Tigray’s administration. Addis Ababa is in a strong position to dictate the political terms in Tigray, but that would be risky given the region’s historical attachment to autonomy, which long predates the federal era. To foster stability, federal leaders should strive to ensure that Tigray’s rights to self-rule under the constitution (which offers considerable regional autonomy, even legalising secession) are respected as constitutional order is restored.Thus, Addis Ababa should avoid imposing an interim administration that is likely to breed continued resistance. For its part, the TPLF needs to accept that a new regional government will be formed in line with the Pretoria deal, which will mean dilution of its authority. Some Tigray nationalist opposition parties that will demand a governing role have offered stinging criticism of the TPLF’s Pretoria concessions and aspire to independence, a sign of how difficult it will be to create a balance within the interim government and reintegrate Tigray into Ethiopia after such a divisive war.

To keep the fledgling peace process on track, the AU and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a Horn of Africa regional body, need to continue coordinating efforts with African governments and other outside actors like the U.S., UN and European Union (EU). Collectively, they should urge Tigray’s leaders and the federal government to uphold their commitments in the peace deals, working first to ensure Eritrean troops’ withdrawal, lest Tigray use their continued presence as a reason to delay disarmament. Should verified withdrawals start to occur, they must then stress to Tigray’s leaders the need to begin handing over their tanks and artillery. While remaining clear-eyed about the challenges, the U.S., UN and EU envoys and other partners should constantly remind their Ethiopian interlocutors that they have chosen the path of peace, as there is no route to outright military victory. A return to war would have terrible consequences for civilians and corrode Ethiopia’s stability for years to come.

The AU and regional officials have an especially vital role to play in trying to ensure that the truce does not break down. The AU’s high representative, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and co-mediators former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and former South African Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, as well as key IGAD officials, especially its Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu (a former Ethiopian foreign minister) and Special Envoy Mohamed Ali Guyo (a veteran Kenyan diplomat), now face a tall order. They will need to keep the parties progressing toward fulfilling their promises, while also ensuring that talks, including about a detailed disarmament plan, maintain forward momentum. Given especially the lack of trust between the parties, an AU team of experts should immediately start monitoring the truce, as agreed in the Pretoria deal. Foreign governments should provide as much support as possible to what on paper looks like a severely under-resourced monitoring mission.

All international actors should push in unison for immediate unrestricted humanitarian access to Tigray.

All international actors should push in unison for immediate unrestricted humanitarian access to Tigray, even as initial indications give reason for modest optimism. To further hold the parties accountable, donors, the UN and NGOs should be transparent about whether or not the federal government and its regional allies are still choking humanitarian access, and insist also on services being comprehensively restored. They should also speak out if Tigray’s authorities divert humanitarian supplies to their forces, as occurred just prior to the last round of fighting, when Mekelle seized World Food Programme tankers, saying the agency had not returned fuel Tigray had loaned it.

The U.S., EU and other outside actors also need to carefully weigh how to keep encouraging progress through their actions. To make the dividends of peace more concrete, the U.S. and EU should pledge donor conferences to help rebuild a peaceful Tigray as well as adjacent parts of Afar and Amhara affected by the war. They should take care to balance the need to continue protecting the budding process with the urgency of providing assistance to Ethiopia’s suffering economy. In particular, they should resume substantial non-humanitarian financial support to Addis Ababa only after the peace process has made clear, tangible progress. That means waiting until Eritrean forces withdraw behind the internationally recognised border, the federal government restores services to Tigray, aid flows freely and political talks with Mekelle get under way.

Despite the difficulties of roping Eritrea into a constructive peace process, the AU and other African intermediaries should reach out to Asmara to urge it to withdraw from Tigray, support the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, and pursue any of its demands through dialogue. It is also high time Ethiopia settled its long-running border disputes with Eritrea, which helped spark the catastrophic 1998-2000 war between the two countries and remain central to Asmara’s narrative of grievance. Addis Ababa should reiterate its intention to implement in full the 2002 UN border commission ruling, which identified some key disputed areas as Eritrean. Ideally, even if they appear to be in no position to object at the moment, Tigray’s leaders would play their part in this decision, as their exclusion was a key defect of Abiy and Isaias’ 2018 rapprochement that promised a definitive resolution of the border dispute.

Cementing peace will require courageous political leadership from both Abiy and his Tigrayan counterparts. In particular, Abiy should continue speaking about the benefits of peace and act generously toward his erstwhile foes. Mekelle, meanwhile, should recognise the futility of a renewed armed insurgency, and the extreme peril it holds, both for the TPLF’s own future and for Tigray’s population. That message should also be heeded by Tigrayans who criticise the Pretoria agreement, including both those living in Tigray itself and those in the diaspora, with the latter acknowledging that Tigray’s leaders made painful political concessions in part due to their sober assessment of the fighting’s human toll and their battlefield prospects. In sum, all parties should remain patient. They should focus on making incremental progress that will gradually build the trust needed to find an eventual settlement.

The halt in hostilities and agreement to end the war could help Ethiopia and Ethiopians turn a page on this tragic chapter, provided they are a first step on a long road to recovery. The brutal two-year conflict inflicted vast human suffering. Tigray’s immiseration bears witness to its leadership’s miscalculations, even as the conflict has set a frightening precedent with the tactics employed by Addis Ababa and Asmara against their adversaries. Mekelle should now stick to its responsible decision to stop fighting, while Abiy, choosing magnanimity over vindictiveness, should be pragmatic about the region’s disarmament and gradually seek a sustainable settlement with Tigray that can begin to heal the conflict’s deep wounds. All parties should put their efforts into giving peace the chance it deserves.

AFRICAERITREAETHIOPIAHORN OF AFRICA

Certainly the agreement calls for the withdrawal of, as you pointed out, not only Eritrean forces but Amhara special forces and Afar militia that are currently in Tigray.  I don’t want to get ahead of ourselves in terms of what will happen if these commitments aren’t abided by, because what we’re hearing from the Government of Ethiopia and certainly from the other side in terms of the Tigrayan authorities is that they are committed to ensuring that this happens. The United States always has at its disposal as a policy tool the prospect of sanctions, and we will not hesitate to deploy them if that should become necessary in terms of holding actors accountable for human rights violations or for the purposes of trying to ensure that this agreement is respected and abided.

Source: State Department

Briefing with Senior State Department Official on the Situation in Ethiopia

SPECIAL BRIEFING

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

VIA TELECONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 15, 2022

MODERATOR:  Good afternoon, everybody.  Welcome to today’s call on the situation in Ethiopia.  Today’s call is on background to a senior State Department official and embargoed until its conclusion.  We are joined – for your information and not for reporting, we are joined today by [Senior State Department Official] who will be referred to hereafter as a senior State Department official in our transcript.  We will have some time for questions at the end, but I’d like to start off by turning it over to our senior State Department official to begin with some opening remarks. [Senior State Department Official], please go ahead.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Thank you very much, and thank you, everybody, for taking the time.  I think it’s just afternoon in D.C.  I’m actually calling in from – well, if I reveal where I’m calling in from it’ll be very obvious who the senior State Department official is, but you’ll get the sense for it in a moment.

So I wanted to just frame a little bit of what’s happened over the last six weeks.  I’m not going to go at great length, but you may recall that during the UN General Assembly President Biden said in his UN General Assembly speech that the United States supports an AU-led process to try to bring peace and stability to northern Ethiopia.  And that is, in fact, what we have been doing as the United States, supporting the African Union in a very intense diplomatic effort that has involved not only the Secretary but the Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary Toria Nuland, our Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Molly Phee, our USUN Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, people over at the White House and across the interagency, and of course, the SEHOA team and our embassies – multiple embassies in Addis, Nairobi, and also in Pretoria.

I will say that as we launched on this trip and been up in talks beginning in Pretoria on October 25th, it was very clear from the get-go that the goal as put forward by all parties during these talks in Pretoria was, as the AU has said, to silence the guns, to stop the fighting.  This was reflected by the panel members, who did an outstanding job in leading the facilitation mediation effort.  You know that that was the panel chair who was and is and remains former President Obasanjo, who represents – is a high representative for the Horn of Africa, joined by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, and then as well as Deputy President Phumzile of South Africa.  And we on the part of the United States commend not only the work of the panel, the African Union, but also extremely impressed with the commitments as hosts and in support of this process of both South Africa and the Kenyan Governments.

The clear goal, as I stated, was to stop the fighting.  And as you may recall, within about 48 to 72 hours after November 2nd’s Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed fighting in fact had stopped between the Ethiopian National Defense Force and the Tigrayan Defense Forces.  This is a major, important achievement, showing real willingness and indication on the part of the parties to stop the fighting and to move forward on what was most necessary in terms of supporting not only the Tigrayan people but those Ethiopians affected in the adjoining regions of Amhara and Afar.

As was provided for in the Pretoria agreement, within a couple days there was a hotline established between the top-level military commanders of the ENDF and the TDF.  And then what you saw happened within five days is the launch of the next phase, the follow-on implementation phase of the cessation of hostilities agreement that began in Nairobi on November 7th between the top commanders of both the ENDF, Field Marshal Jula, and then of the TDF, or as it has become known now as the Tigrayan armed combatants, General Tadesse. They were joined by other representatives of their respective militaries as well as the continued political leadership of the TPLF Getachew Reda and then of course the lead Ethiopian Government representative, the national security advisor Redwan Hussein.

Now after another intense week or so you saw then the realization of a follow-on agreement for Nairobi that was signed on the 12th.  And what you saw there is yet another important step towards establishing a longing – a lasting peace.  The Nairobi agreement is significant because it expanded upon and clarified some of the key issues that were addressed and agreed upon and understood in Pretoria, including very specifically, as you may have seen from the text that was released, the commitment to a withdrawal of foreign forces as well as those non-ENDF forces from the region and that that would be done concurrently with the expected Tigrayan disarmament.  This is significant because it was the first acknowledgement in essence that there are Eritrean forces operating inside of Ethiopia, and there is now a clear understanding that they are to withdraw.

Furthermore, the agreement in Nairobi built upon the urgency of Pretoria to expedite humanitarian access and the restoration of services in Tigray and in the adjoining regions.  And what we have seen in the days following is the beginnings of what is extremely urgent in terms of saving lives and addressing the suffering of the Ethiopian people in this region, which is the beginnings of delivery of humanitarian assistance that in essence had stopped when the conflict restarted on August 24th.  I’ll have a few more details on the humanitarian assistance delivery.  There was also a clear commitment to the protection of civilians, to ensuring that there’s human rights accountability, and that there’s continued human rights monitoring to ensure that no further human rights abuses are committed.

As the implementation goes forward, much of that responsibility falls upon the African Union’s monitoring verification mechanism, which is being finalized, and which is meant to support the implementation process.  And our intent as the United States is to continue to support as asked this – the entire facilitation process, the implementation process.  In fact, now there’s a – as you will have seen from Nairobi agreement, also there’s an establishment of a joint commission on disarmament between the Ethiopian and Tigrayan armed forces to work out some of the details.  It’s important that implementation be followed through.

We – or we know that the special envoy for the Horn of Africa was back in Mekelle to return the Tigrayan delegation and had an opportunity to meet with TPLF President Dr. Debretsion as well as then follow on in his trip to Addis Ababa over yesterday and today and had an opportunity to meet with Ethiopian Government leadership, including Prime Minister Abiy and Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen.  And from all, they have reiterated their steadfast commitment to the implementation of this agreement and their strong desire for this to realize in fact the goals intended from the signing of – in Pretoria of a – it is a permanent, very important – permanent cessation of hostilities that then brings a lasting peace.

It is important to note as well that the special envoy for the Horn was able to also meet today with the African Union Chairperson Faki to continue to discuss and review how the United States might be able to continue to support the implementation of this important set of agreements that were reached in Pretoria and Nairobi as well as have – the SEHOA was able to meet with other international partners who are here present in Addis to see how we might continue to cooperate in common cause in support of advancing stability and peace in northern Ethiopia.

Let me just say a couple words on humanitarian access before I turn it over to your questions.  Clearly, this is urgent, given that humanitarian assistance had been discontinued, as I mentioned, since August 24th.  And we have the first reports today of ICRC trucks arriving safely in Mekelle with stocks of medical cargo and additionally other convoys from the World Food Program that are going from Bandar to Mai Tsebri with nearly 300 metric tons of mixed aid commodities.

It is absolutely vital that humanitarian assistance be robustly provided unhindered, as has been agreed to by the parties.  And things are starting to move, but again, it’s the beginning.  But this must be sustained and it must deliver for the people of Tigray and those in the affected regions of Afar and Amhara.

We are very realistic in understanding that these are the early stages, that implementation will require continued effort on the part of not only the African Union, the panel, the governments that are supporting it – specifically South Africa and Kenya – but also the observers, which include the United Nations, IGAD, and the United States.  And we will continue to provide our diplomatic support, provide logistic support, and if there are other requests for assistance to make sure that this process endures, we are prepared and very ready to do so.

With that, I’ve gone a little bit long, but let me just turn it back over to you and take your questions.  Thank you.

MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, sir.  Don, would you mind repeating the instructions for joining the question queue?

OPERATOR:  Absolutely.  If you wish to ask a question, please press 1 then 0 on your telephone keypad.  If you’re using a speakerphone, please pick up the handset before pressing the numbers.  Once again, please press 1 then 0.

MODERATOR:  Excellent.  Could we please go to the line of Daphne from Reuters?

OPERATOR:  One moment.  And your line is open.

QUESTION:  Hi.  Thank you so much for doing this.  I wanted to ask you about the Eritrean troops.  We understand that Eritrean soldiers as well as Amhara militias are still in Tigray and there is no sign they intend to withdraw, especially the Eritreans.  What happens if Eritreans don’t withdraw?  Are more sanctions from the U.S. on the table?  Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Yeah, thank you very much, Daphne.  Appreciate the question.  Certainly the agreement calls for the withdrawal of, as you pointed out, not only Eritrean forces but Amhara special forces and Afar militia that are currently in Tigray.  I don’t want to get ahead of ourselves in terms of what will happen if these commitments aren’t abided by, because what we’re hearing from the Government of Ethiopia and certainly from the other side in terms of the Tigrayan authorities is that they are committed to ensuring that this happens.

The United States always has at its disposal as a policy tool the prospect of sanctions, and we will not hesitate to deploy them if that should become necessary in terms of holding actors accountable for human rights violations or for the purposes of trying to ensure that this agreement is respected and abided.

There are clearly – there is a tremendous focus on both sides understanding that because of the language which ties the withdrawal of foreign forces and other forces that are non-ENDF to the disarmament, that it’s in both parties’ interests that this be realized expeditiously.  They have formed the joint committee to review procedures and implementation.  This is a work in progress.  We are encouraged again by the comments made publicly today by Prime Minister Abiy to the national parliament, assembly, reiterating his commitment for peace.

And therefore the expectation is that while this may take some time that both parties understand that there was in the end no military option for success and that the only success could come through dialogue, and that’s why ultimately this Pretoria process that then has continued on through Nairobi and which will continue on with additional rounds that will be focused on resolving and addressing political issues, that it just – it needs to be through dialogue.

But we’re under no illusions.  This is the early days.  It’s promising in terms of the follow-on action that we’re starting to see happening, but you can rest assured that we won’t rest for a minute and we’ll remain completely focused as the United States in supporting the efforts of both sides to go forward through the African Union process and their verification and monitoring mechanism to continue to make incremental progress until all aspects of both agreements that were signed are realized.

Thank you, Daphne.

MODERATOR:  Thank you so much.  Could we please go to the line of Zeba Warsi from PBS News?

OPERATOR:  One moment.

QUESTION:  Thank you so much for doing this.  My question is about humanitarian aid access.  It is good news indeed that today two trucks carrying medical supplies have reached Mekelle City.  But could you please tell us what are the nitty-gritties of – in the agreement with respect to humanitarian aid access?  Is it conditional on the truth or is it permanent in its duration?  And is there anything specifically about guaranteeing safety to aid workers?  Because we’ve seen the conflict has been particularly deadly even for humanitarian aid workers.  Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Yeah.  No, thank you very much, Zeba.  The commitment is really clear.  It was clear in Pretoria and it was further elucidated and expanded upon in Nairobi.  Humanitarian assistance is to flow unhindered, and that is the commitment.  There should be no restrictions.  There’s always going to be some consideration, and this is something that humanitarians are keenly aware of, and you hinted at that for some security reasons potentially at times some deliveries won’t be possible.  But let’s remember that for five months between March and until August 24th there was a humanitarian truce that was respected by both sides which allowed the flow of humanitarian assistance, and now we actually have an agreement in writing that commits both parties to enable this.

There are, I’m sure, going to be some guidelines as usually happens in a time of conflict, but as this is being worked out, the permits need to be provided and are being provided from what we understand as of today.  And they need to progress.  We have to get urgent assistance – not only food but also medicine and other lifesaving supplies – to the people most in need to alleviate the suffering.

And likewise there is a commitment on the restoration of services, which has been an issue that has not been addressed.  That includes not only telecommunications and banking but also electricity.  And again, the Nairobi agreement makes clear that that is going to be happening within the next couple of weeks.  Some of that needs to occur in conjunction with, as the Tigrayans have accepted, the federal takeover of federal installations.  So we just need to stay very focused on making sure that this is happening.

In terms of protections for humanitarian workers, clearly there is a focus in the Nairobi agreement on protection of civilians, and clearly that also reflects a concern that humanitarian aid workers be able to do their jobs without fear.  This is something that, again, both parties have committed to.  With the stopping in the fighting, it does allow for a conducive environment, and so there’s every expectation that humanitarian aid workers will be able to do their heroic jobs to deliver food, medicine, and other necessary supplies to those in greatest need.

But again, rest assured – on the part of the United States and our partners in the international community, as well as, I think for sure, the African Union’s verification and monitoring mechanism – that every effort is going to be made that if there are issues that they’re resolved quickly and do not in any way impede humanitarian assistance from getting to those who most need it.  Thank you much, Zeba.

MODERATOR:  Thank you so much.  Can we please go to the line of Pearl Matibe from Power FM 98.7?

QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  I really appreciate you doing this, particularly on this topic.  My question – I’d like to probe and just press you a little bit on two aspects, on observation and capacitating African Union players.  So is there – in your role as the United States in observing, could you speak a little bit more specifically about what that means and what that looks like in operationalizing that?

And then to what extent, if any, is Africa Command a part of this in terms of helping to capacitate maintaining the peace or stopping the hostilities?  Are they playing a role at all, and if so, to what extent?  Thanks.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Thank you very much, Pearl, for those good questions.  The United States was invited by Chairperson Faki to be an active – participate and to be part of the observer partners during the process, of course, in Pretoria and Nairobi and continue on.  And Special Envoy for the Horn Mike Hammer met today with Chairperson Faki and we remain very much committed to continue to support that.

That can come in a series of ways.  It’s engaging in and supporting the process as the panel, whether it’s President Obasanjo or President Kenyatta or Dr. Phumzile, might need in terms of assistance where the United States might have influence or be able to provide reassurance to either party on any particular issue.  It has involved logistical support.  I’m sure you’re aware that we have been flying the Tigrayan delegation on military aircraft out and into Mekelle in support of this mission, at the request of the African Union, and of course with the full consent of the Ethiopian Government.  So there’s some logistical support that comes along with our observation partnership, but also we remain open to other requests that may come.

You asked about the Africa Command.  It has only been involved, again, in providing the logistical military support, and there’s no expectation, there’s been no request for anything further than that.  This is an AU process.  The African Union has established, in agreement with both parties, this monitoring and verification mechanism that will bring 10 experts under the leadership of the panel to work out the mechanism.  I know for a fact that there were Kenyan generals as well as South African generals in Nairobi working through some of these issues with the African Union Commission.  There’s intent to also have Nigerian generals participate.  And I would refer you to the African Union on the specifics of how this verification mechanism will carry out in terms of its monitoring.

If there are requests for support from the United States or any other of the partners, whether it’s the UN or IGAD, of course we’ll be looking to see how we can best accommodate those requests.  It is in everyone’s interest to make sure that the monitoring mechanism is robust and effective, to give confidence to the parties that, if there are lags or commitments that are not being met, that they can be addressed in a way that preserves the intent of the agreement.  It is very important to recognize that by calling it a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, as was signed in Pretoria, that this is meant to be everlasting and no return to fighting.

So issues need to be worked through.  No implementation I can imagine will be perfect.  There will be, I’m sure, some issues that come up that need to be resolved.  But through the African Union and with the support of the partners and perhaps others who may be added to the process to help bring this about, I think that there’s a good chance to be successful.

One of the issues we haven’t really discussed is continuing on – not only will there be the need for political dialogue in future rounds, but also for the implementation of a robust demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration.  And that’s, as we know, in most conflicts, a very intense process that requires financial support, it’s critical to the success of this agreement, and there will be further discussions and studying of how that is carried out.  I understand the Government of Ethiopia has already assembled or is assembling a committee to go through how it might go forward with dealing with some of the combatants and how they can be best reintegrated.

And then finally, there’s a matter of reconstruction.  Horrible, horrible damage and destruction has happened over the last two years, and there is an urgent need, again, to rebuild and reconstruct not only Tigray but in some areas of the adjoining regions of Afar and Amhara.  And that’s going to require considerable financial support and it will be a subject for future rounds.  But that is something that is envisioned as part of this process, and again, the United States along with the other observers are prepared to do our part, but it may require, again, broader international support.

What I have experienced from meeting with colleagues and – from other countries and other organizations is this tremendous goodwill to try to support this agreement to ensure that this conflict has ended for good, that all the loss of life is – has been tremendously tragic, but that now the focus needs to be on providing for the people of Ethiopia.  And more broadly than not just northern Ethiopia, I’m sure the focus rightfully will return to many urgent needs.  You know the United States is very involved and the biggest supporter of assistance, humanitarian assistance when it comes to drought relief and also in helping other regions that have difficult issues as well.

So while we’re focused on northern Ethiopia, the United States is involved and engaged throughout Ethiopia in support of the Ethiopian people.  Thank you very much, Pearl.

MODERATOR:  Thank you so much.  I think we have time for one quick final question.  Could we go to the line of Jennifer Hansler from CNN?

QUESTION:  Hi, thank you so much for doing this.  I just wanted to follow up on what you said about accountability for human rights abuses, if you could give us any more details on that and the role the U.S. is going to play or – and has there been any determination of genocide or crimes against humanity that has been made by the U.S. in terms of what happened in Ethiopia?  Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  Great.  Thank you very much, Jennifer.  It was very much a point of focus in the initial talks in Pretoria and continued on in Nairobi and in the discussions that the special envoy to the Horn of Africa has had both with Dr. Debretsion and Prime Minister Abiy and those in the leadership of both Tigray as well as in the Ethiopian Government.  And it has been expressed that there needs to be, absolutely needs to be accountability for gross violations of human rights.  That is a process that is underway in terms of how Ethiopia will come to terms with it.

We of course encourage that there be international monitoring and assistance and investigation in support of those efforts.  It is important that there’s a commitment to transitional justice.  It was discussed both in Pretoria and Nairobi.  Now that the conflict has ended, more, obviously, work needs to be done, because since August 24th there has been virtually no access to media or others to be able to really investigate and find out what has transpired.  But there is a commitment on the part of both parties to ensure that there is accountability.

On the question of a determination on atrocities, one has not been made yet.  I’ll leave that to the Secretary of State.  Let’s just be clear, though, that the United States is absolutely committed to ensuring that those who are responsible for gross violations of human rights are held accountable, and that there be justice for all those families who’ve lost loved ones, all those mothers and children who have perished and civilians who had no reason to be put through what has transpired over the last two years.

This will be an ongoing effort of not only the United States, but of, I think, the international community to support and ensure that, again, human rights accountability is delivered and that there’s a way forward that brings, again, a lasting peace.

So thank you, Jennifer, for that question.  And thank you, all of you, for your time and your interest.  I do hope that the media will soon be able to report to the world what has happened.  This has been a tragic episode.  We hope we’re seeing the beginnings of a true end to this conflict.  The United States remains committed to doing its part in support of the African Union, in support of the Government of Ethiopia, and Tigray, and working together with not only the panel members but also the governments of South Africa and Kenya and others in the region who are very focused in wanting to make sure that this succeeds.

But we’re under no illusion; the work remains.  There will be difficult times ahead, but at least in the early days of at least two back-to-back agreements, we are seeing the parties starting to take the steps that they’ve committed to taking.  And we will continue to do our part, the United States diplomatically, to support those efforts.

I don’t know if that’s a wrap, but probably pretty close to it.  I look forward to seeing some of you in Washington at some point when we get back.

MODERATOR:  Great.  Thank you so much, sir, for being so generous with your time.  Thank you so much to our callers for dialing in this afternoon.  That does conclude today’s call, and as a reminder, today’s call was on background, attributable to a senior State Department official.  It has been embargoed until the conclusion of the call, which of course is now.  So thank you again to everyone for joining us, and have a great rest of your day.