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Martin Plaut posted: " The demand by Prime Minister Abiy can be found here. President Isaias's official response is below. Discourses – both actual and presumed – on water, access to the sea, and related topics floated in the recent times are numerous and excessive inde" Martin Plaut


Martin Plaut

Oct 16

The demand by Prime Minister Abiy can be found user_email=This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.">here.

President Isaias's user_email=This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.">official response is below.

Discourses – both actual and presumed – on water, access to the sea, and related topics floated in the recent times are numerous and excessive indeed.  The affair has perplexed all concerned observers.

In the event, the Government of Eritrea repeatedly reiterates that it will not, as ever, be drawn into such alleys and platforms.  The GOE further urges all concerned not to be provoked by these events.

Ministry of Information


16 October 2023


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Martin Plaut posted: " Comment: Odd that this article does not discuss the Ethiopian government's interest in finding a new naval base for the Ethiopian Navy. Martin Source: Addis Standard September 7, 2023 By Abdi Biyenssa @ABiyenssa Addis Abeba –" Martin Plaut


Martin Plaut

Sep 27

Comment: Odd that this article does not discuss the Ethiopian government's interest in finding a new naval base for the Ethiopian Navy.


Source: Addis Standard

September 7, 2023

By Abdi Biyenssa @ABiyenssa

Addis Abeba – A few months ago, rumors began swirling about Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to secure a crucial port for the country. It has since been revealed that during a gathering of investors and businessmen, Prime Minister Abiy emphasized the urgent need for Ethiopia to have its own port. He highlighted the astronomical costs associated with depending on neighboring countries’ ports. According to these rumors, the Ethiopian government is considering all options, from negotiation to the use of force, in order to achieve this strategic objective.

The rumor suggests that the Ethiopian government has already started negotiations with key regional players. A proposal has allegedly been presented to Eritrea, offering a 30% stake in the renowned Ethiopian Airlines as a bargaining chip for access to the desired port. These rumors gained traction when Al Jazeera English covered the issue in its recent Inside Story segment. According to Al Jazeera, the Prime Minister stated, “Ethiopia will secure direct access to a port, either peacefully or, if necessary, by force.”

However, the notion of the Ethiopian government demonstrating such intentions seems highly improbable, given that Ethiopia came remarkably close to utilizing Eritrean ports, namely Massawa and Assab, just five years ago when the Prime Minister came to power and sought to mend the hostile relationship between the two nations. In September 2018, the Ethiopian commercial ship named “Mekelle” even docked at the Red Sea port of Massawa, marking the first time in two decades.

The Eritrean Ports Authority was also preparing Assab port to handle Ethiopia’s cargo. In 2019, repairs and maintenance were undertaken at Assab port at a cost of $57 million. The two ports in Eritrea can handle 2.5 million tons of cargo in total.

Nonetheless, the rumors and Al Jazeera’s reporting gained further credibility following recent back-to-back visits by an Ethiopian delegation, led by Alemu Sime, Minister of Transport and Logistics, to neighboring countries such as Kenya and Somaliland.

On 03 August, 2023, Alemu and Ethiopia’s delegation arrived in Hargeisa, Somaliland, to explore additional port options for Ethiopia. They engaged in discussions with Somaliland authorities regarding the possibility of Berbera port serving as an additional avenue for Ethiopian foreign trade. A week after the Hargeisa visit, Alemu and his team proceeded to Kenya to search for alternative ports that would facilitate Ethiopia’s ever-expanding import-export trade.

Despite the recent visits of Alemu and the Ethiopian delegates to neighboring countries, it is the Prime Minister’s alleged declaration of “by any means necessary” that has caught the attention of media pundits, activists, and regional commentators.

Merera Gudina, a professor of political science and international relations at Addis Ababa University, has warned that if negotiations fail to secure a port, war could be the alternative means to gain access. He emphasized that such a strategy would undoubtedly be destructive for the region, which is already known for its instability caused by both state and non-state actors.

Eyasu Hailemichael, a researcher on the Horn of Africa and an expert in international affairs, argues that political leaders are unlikely to publicly declare war to get access to ports due to deliberate state deception and strategic cover-up. However, Eyasu believes that the Ethiopian government’s need for access to the Red Sea could be accepted by Western powers, considering the hostile relationship that exists between Asmara and the West.

There are various speculations about the motives behind the PM’s alleged use of force to gain access to port. Merera raises questions about whether it is to restore his Amhara supporting base or test Western’s support for his regime. He also highlights recent changes in Ethiopia’s foreign policy, which have become more unpredictable, individualistic, and fragmented, adding to the uncertainty.

Merera, who is a leading opposition figure in Ethiopia, also suggests that the war might be a result of Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict as well as Ethiopia’s shifting foreign policy. Reports indicate that tension is brewing between the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments after the signing of the Pretoria agreement in November 2022, which ended the Tigray war.

Eyasu suggests that it might be a diversion of conflict from domestic to regional issues. “Any effort to forcefully address the question of access to ports will not be easy,” he stated. “Any war with Eritrea could also lead to a violation of the 2018 rapprochements, which will have its own repercussions in the region.”

Expanding port options to accommodate growing trade

Diversifying access to ports is a key element of the Ethiopian government’s 30-year integrated transport master plan, adopted in 2021. Officials argue that expanding port options is economically justified in light of the country’s growing volume of foreign trade. Alemu, speaking in Hargeisa, explained the purpose of his visit, stating, “Ethiopia is one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies, and as such, the country requires an alternative to Djibouti’s main seaport.”

Ethiopia’s annual foreign trade has been steadily increasing over the past decade, with estimates of around 15 million tons of solid cargo and four billion metric tons of petroleum products. Currently, Djibouti’s ports can handle this cargo. However, it is projected that the volume of foreign trade will more than double in the next decade.

Highlighting Ethiopia’s heavy reliance on Djibouti’s ports, a senior diplomat at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking anonymously to Addis Standard, justified the need for port diversification. Prior to the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, Massawa and Assab ports accounted for over 75% of Ethiopia’s foreign trade cargo. However, following the war, almost all imported and exported goods were redirected to Djibouti. Currently, close to 95% of Ethiopia’s import-export cargo goes through Djibouti’s ports, with the remainder shipped through Port Sudan and Berbera.

The senior diplomat also emphasizes the mounting costs Ethiopia incurs from Djibouti in the form of port fees and demurrage charges as a valid economic reason for seeking alternative sea access. Currently, Ethiopia pays $2 billion annually in port fees.

Eyasu, a researcher on the Horn of Africa, further explains the challenges faced by landlocked countries, such as long distances, expensive transportation, high transaction costs, isolation, limited access to global markets, and complicated border crossing procedures. He adds, “Additionally, landlocked states with few natural resources rely heavily on transit countries with poor socioeconomic conditions for transportation, making it difficult for them to thrive.”

The logistics sector in Ethiopia currently faces various challenges, resulting in inefficiency in the transportation of goods from the mainland to ports in Djibouti. One significant issue is the extended time it takes to transport goods to the ports, which hinders trade and economic growth. It can take several weeks to transport goods from landlocked Ethiopia to Djibouti’s ports, mainly due to poor infrastructure.

Moreover, high transportation costs pose a major challenge to the logistics sector. The long distance between Ethiopia and Djibouti, combined with inadequate infrastructure, leads to increased expenses. Consequently, cargo delays and long waiting times are common at Djibouti and Modjo dry ports.

The Ethiopian government says it recognizes the importance of improving the logistics sector and is implementing various infrastructure development projects, including enhancing the Ethio-Djibouti railway line and constructing new roads and highways.

While in Kenya, Alemu made a promise that Ethiopia would fulfill its responsibility by constructing infrastructure, such as the express road to Moyale. Alemu and his team took the opportunity to inspect the inland waterway port of Kisumu, located in Mombasa, which has the capability to handle up to 300,000 metric tons of cargo annually.

The delegation also reviewed the progress of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, a crucial infrastructure project expected to play a significant role in integrating Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. Alemu stressed the urgent need for the completion of supportive infrastructure to fully capitalize on the potential of the port.

The geopolitical shift in the Horn of Africa

In addition to economic justifications, experts say that the changing geopolitics in the Horn of Africa play a significant role in Ethiopia’s pursuit of alternative ports. Eyasu stated that the presence of foreign actors in the region has resulted in foreign geopolitical divisions, shaped intra-horn geopolitics, and prompted port diversification. He believes that commercial motivations, proxy wars, transactional diplomacy, and security agreements have all played a role in this process.

Ethiopia’s recent search for alternative ports coincides with the increasing foreign interference in the Horn of Africa, particularly the growing number of foreign military installations in Djibouti. Strategically located on the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has been attracting the attention of several foreign countries in recent years. Currently, 13 countries, including the United States, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey, have a military presence or naval facilities in Djibouti.

The Chinese government has heavily invested in Djibouti’s infrastructure, including the construction of ports, roads, and a railway system. The United States also maintains a significant military presence in Djibouti, with Camp Lemonnier serving as the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa. Djibouti also houses military bases operated by other foreign countries, such as France, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.

“The influx of foreign actors securing the ports of the Horn has led to foreign geopolitical divisions and shaped intra-horn geopolitics through commercial motivations, proxy wars, transactional diplomacy, and security agreements,” explained Eyasu.

The Horn of Africa has witnessed an increase in the presence of Middle Eastern countries in recent years. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been actively engaged in the region, investing in infrastructure projects and providing financial aid. The UAE has also increased its involvement, established military bases, and invested in ports like Djibouti and Somaliland. Qatar has also been actively involved in the region.

The senior diplomat recounted Djibouti’s actions in 2013, where they obstructed the transportation of goods to Ethiopia, revealing the issue of limited port diversification in Ethiopia. However, he stressed that this event is now unrelated to the small nation and instead part of larger foreign policy endeavors aimed at achieving greater integration in a region plagued by political conflicts and the realpolitik of foreign powers. In light of this, Ethiopia is cautious not to rely solely on Djibouti, opting to avoid concentrating all its resources in one place, as stated by the senior diplomat.

While the presence of foreign countries has brought some economic benefits to Djibouti, it has also raised concerns among countries like Ethiopia regarding their national security. Eyasu emphasizes that neighboring countries can restrict ports and impose measures that hinder communication during military or diplomatic crises. This adds further complexity to the challenges faced by landlocked countries like Ethiopia.

The socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and geographical differences between these countries can significantly impact the efficient use of transport facilities, as noted by Eyasu. “Unrestricted access to the sea is equally essential for the defense and security of landlocked countries.”

Eyasu further elaborates on the challenges faced by landlocked countries, stating that “the challenges faced by landlocked countries are compounded when they are bordered by countries with challenging socioeconomic circumstances.”

Despite the justifications for the search for alternative ports, experts stress that going to war is not viable for Ethiopia. Merera emphasizes the need to enhance cross-border trade among countries in the Horn of Africa. By improving transportation routes and regional economic policies specifically tailored to the coastal regions, positive spillover effects can be expected. Additionally, building stronger people-to-people relations across diverse cultures within the region is crucial for the shared utilization of ports.

The senior diplomat from Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests negotiating with Eritrea and exploring the possibility of a land swap arrangement. Under this proposal, Ethiopia would gain access to the port, while Eritrea would receive agricultural land. Another option entails a joint ownership arrangement of the port between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Echoing the thoughts of both Merera and the diplomat, Eyasu underscores the importance of diversifying port access through multiple avenues. Diplomatic negotiations represent one possible path, while military involvement remains a daunting but viable alternative. However, Eyasu cautions against resorting to military action as it could potentially escalate tensions in an already-conflicted region. Such escalation may lead to a proxy war involving competing Middle Eastern powers, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, as well as traditional powers like the United States and Russia. 

Eritrean Asylum Seeker Stabbed to Death in Israel

Thursday, 28 September 2023 22:07 Written by

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Martin Plaut posted: " Police are looking into the possibility that the victim was an opponent of the Eritrean government and the killer a supporter of the regime Source: Ha'aretz The funeral of the murdered Eritrean asylum seeker in Tel Aviv on Monday. Sep 27, " Martin Plaut


Martin Plaut

Sep 27

Police are looking into the possibility that the victim was an opponent of the Eritrean government and the killer a supporter of the regime

Source: Ha'aretz

The funeral of the murdered Eritrean asylum seeker in Tel Aviv on Monday.

The funeral of the murdered Eritrean asylum seeker in Tel Aviv on Monday.

Sep 27, 2023 1:46 am IDT

An Eritrean asylum seeker was stabbed to death in south Tel Aviv Monday night, and police are looking into the possibility that the victim was an opponent of the Eritrean government and the killer a supporter.

Under this hypothesis, the killing happened during a fight between the two. No suspects have yet been arrested.

Members of the Eritrean community in Israel said the victim was a father of two who wasn’t involved in crime and had been on his way home from work. His funeral was held at a Tel Aviv church on Tuesday.

Juji, one of the leaders of the Eritrean community, said after the funeral that the community demands a thorough police investigation. He added that ever since a massive brawl erupted between supporters and opponents of the Eritrean government in Tel Aviv earlier this month, the community has been living in fear.

“There’s enormous anger among our public, and we’re requesting help from the government and protection from regime supporters,” he said. “We feel afraid and insecure.”

Community members said there have been several incidents involving violence between regime supporters and opponents in Tel Aviv since the mass brawl, and people on both sides said they’re afraid to venture into certain parts of the city lest they be attacked. There have also been many violent incidents between the sides in the past, including a brawl in 2020 that ended with three regime opponents stabbing a regime supporter to death.

Almost 200 people were wounded in the mass brawl, in which the sides clashed not only with each other but with the police. Those clashes began when regime opponents vandalized a hall in Tel Aviv where the Eritrean Embassy had been planning to hold an event.

Dozens of Eritreans were arrested and then placed in administrative detention, meaning detention without trial – some without having been brought for a bail hearing first, and many without having legal representation in court. However, most were later released due to a lack of evidence against them.

Israel has granted collective protection to the 18,000 Eritreans living here, recognizing that even though it maintains diplomatic relations with Eritrea, the asylum seekers can’t be sent home due to their country’s dictatorial government. President Isaias Afwerki has ruled Eritrea since it acquired independence from Ethiopia in 1993.

Human rights organizations say that only a small percentage of these asylum seekers are regime supporters.

Martin Plaut

Sep 27

Source: Zeit

Updated September 23, 2023, 6:05 p.m 139 comments

Violence at Eritrea festivals: Eritrean soldiers march during Independence Day celebrations in the capital Asmara in May.

Eritrean soldiers march during Independence Day celebrations in the capital Asmara in May. © J. Countess/​Getty Images

No violence! He repeatedly impressed upon his group this, says Amanuel Zeru. When the situation escalated, he fell to his knees, his arms spread out like a cross, and some of his fellow soldiers did the same. They wanted to demonstrate peacefully against the regime that forced them to flee their homeland of Eritrea . And against those compatriots who continue to remain loyal to the dictatorship from Germany.

On July 8, thousands of supporters of the dictator Isayas Afewerki traveled to Giessen for the “Eritrea Festival,” an annual event that pays homage to the regime of the small East African country and raises money. Zeru and other opposition members wanted to prevent the event - not all of them only by peaceful means. Zeru later told ZEIT that no one in his group was armed But others had stones and bottles in their hands.

At the end of that day, the police in Giessen recorded several clashes in the city, over 100 arrests and 26 injured police officers. Amanuel Zeru also ended up in police custody.

In August there was violence at Eritrea festivals in Stockholm and Toronto, at the beginning of September in Tel Aviv, and a few days ago, on September 16th, there were again riots in Stuttgart on the occasion of an event close to the regime. Amanuel Zeru was not there. But again, numerous police officers were injured. “Foreign conflicts must not be fought in our country,” said Federal Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD). The violent perpetrators must “feel the full severity of criminal law and immigration law,” said Baden-Württemberg’s Interior Minister Thomas Strobl (CDU). Statements that are intended to calm a rightly outraged public. The only question is: who brought this conflict to European and German soil?Newsletter

Eritrea is a small country in the Horn of Africa, its area is approximately the same as that of East Germany. In 1993, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia after decades of war. The leader was Isayas Afewerki. The freedom hero soon turned out to be a despot. Afewerki, now 77 years old, has been president for 30 years without ever giving his people the opportunity to vote again. He turned Eritrea into a police state and introduced a "national service". It lasts six years or half a lifetime; Men and women can be drafted again at any time to perform forced labor or go to war. The fear of being attacked by larger countries has long since turned into a policy of permanent aggression.This article comes from ZEIT No. 40/2023. You can read the entire issue here.

Around a million Eritreans now live outside their home country. That's almost one in five. In Germany there are around 80,000. And almost everywhere in the diaspora there are two groups: on the one hand, those who left the country before it became independent. For them, Afewerki remains the hero of the freedom struggle; they celebrate their homeland in clubs, for example organizing themselves in the "Central Council of Eritreans in Germany", which organizes the Eritrea Festival in Giessen and is also connected to the event in Stuttgart. Similar events take place all over the world.

On the other hand, there is the growing number of young exiles like Amanuel Zeru, who now make up the majority in the Eritrean foreign community. For them, Afewerki is the dictator who forced them out of the country along the long sub-Saharan route, first to Sudan, then to Libya, then across the Mediterranean to Europe. To avoid national service, Amanuel Zeru came to Germany via this route at the age of 14. Many die while fleeing or are kidnapped and mistreated by smugglers in order to extort more money. In Germany, most Eritreans receive subsidiary protection; the recognition rate was recently 84 percent.

The conflict between the two camps has been escalating for years. Not only, but especially around the Eritrea Festival in Giessen. The event has been taking place in the Hessenhallen since 2011, accompanied by peaceful protests from the opposing side - until these escalated for the first time in 2022. Around 100 people broke away from the counter-demonstration and attacked helpers and festival guests as well as police officers with iron bars, knives and stones. 33 people were injured, the police spoke of an "excess of violence" and the festival did not take place.

Stuttgart: Police officers surround a group of participants during riots at an Eritrea event on September 16th. © Jason Chepljakov/​pa/​dpa

In mid-May, two months before this year's riots, Amanuel Zeru sits in the train station café in a medium-sized city and tells how his cell phone rang one night at the end of April. Amanuel Zeru bounces his legs, constantly plays with his car keys, and looks at passers-by. A few weeks earlier, he had tried to prevent the concert of an Eritrean pop star who is said to be close to the regime. He wanted to persuade the operator of the concert hall to cancel. Amanuel Zeru believes that word has got around in circles loyal to the regime. Hence the late night call. On the other end: the man known in the exile community as "Bob."

Zeru documented the call, so the conversation went like this:

Bob: "Look, I know where you live. You have two kids, think about them."

Amanuel Zeru: "Don't talk about my children!"

Bob: "One bullet from an Albanian is enough. I'll make sure you end up in a wheelchair."

Since then, says Amanuel Zeru, he has avoided leaving the house in the evenings.

If you talk to opposition Eritreans in Germany, the name "Bob" is always mentioned when they report threats and gangs of thugs. Also in ZEIT 's conversation with an opposition Eritrean in exile in Kassel, who stated that men asked him on the street a few days after the 2022 Eritrea Festival whether he had been involved in the protest against the festival. They then tried to pull him into a minibus. The man filed a complaint, as did another exile who was apparently threatened by the same group shortly afterwards. He also stated that he had previously received a threatening call from “Bob”. After two months, the Kassel public prosecutor's office stopped the investigation: "A perpetrator could not be identified," she wrote.

The name "Bob" is also mentioned when exiles talk about a group that allegedly acts in the service of the regime abroad: Eri-Blood.

The organization is not registered in any association register, there is no clubhouse, no board of directors. But there are many alleged attacks on dissidents. A 2017 study, commissioned by the Dutch Foreign Ministry, mentions arson in Sweden and spying attempts in the Netherlands. Suspected Eri Blood members also drove cars into groups of people in Norway and Italy. The study describes Eri-Blood as the "militant wing" of the only authorized party in Eritrea, Afewerki's "Popular Front for Democracy and Justice."

Members of the Central Council of Eritreans in Germany, a kind of umbrella organization for pro-regime associations, referred to Eri-Blood as "our security guards" at an internal event last year, a recording of which is available to ZEIT. The association's board did not want to comment on this to ZEIT.

During the Eritrea Festival in Giessen in July 2023, the Hessian YouTuber Joachim Schaefer approached men at the gate to the exhibition center who acted like security forces but were clearly not part of the official security company. In the video, Schaefer asks the men if they belonged to Eri-Blood. On their black T-shirts there is a red "52", which could stand for the fifth and second letters in the Latin alphabet, for "E" and "B", possibly a code for Eri-Blood. The men avoided Schaefer's questions.

A man in his 50s also appears in his video, with a silvery beard, a stern look, a bright voice, and he is missing one front tooth. He appears dominant; you get the impression that the men in the black T-shirts are listening to him. “What’s the problem with celebrating a dictator?” he asks in the video. When Schaefer released his film two days later, he received a call from the man complaining. The number is the same as the threatening call to Amanuel Zeru. The man in the video is apparently "Bob". By the time of going to press, ZEIT had attempted to contact “Bob” several times at this cell phone number. Without success.

“Bob's” real name is known in the diaspora: Neamin Bereket M. ZEIT asked various Hessian security authorities about possible investigations and their level of knowledge about Eri-Blood and “Bob's” role. The tenor of the answers: Nobody knows anything about the structures of the regime in Germany. So far, there are no “specific facts known in which there were threats or physical attacks by supporters of the Eritrean regime against opposition members,” says the Hesse State Criminal Police Office.

Why does a poor country in the Horn of Africa need a thugs in Europe? Why is it so intent on controlling its diaspora? Because it's worth it. The CIA estimates that almost a third of Eritrean gross domestic product comes from diaspora remittances.

Israel: Girls play in an Eritrean community center in Eilat. Thousands of Eritreans live in Israel. There were riots in Tel Aviv in September. © Laetitia Vancon/​NYT/​Redux/​laif

The central flow of this foreign currency, which is valuable for the dictatorship, is the “diaspora tax”: two percent of the annual net income of Eritreans abroad – for life. Those loyal to the regime pay them voluntarily, while opponents of the regime have to pay them if they want to use embassy or consulate services. The diaspora tax has been officially banned in Germany since 2011.

Amanuel Zeru refuses to help finance the regime he fled. That's why he applied for German citizenship after 16 years in Germany. Because the immigration authorities required proof of Eritrean identity, he would have had to go to the consulate general or the embassy. Zeru refused, and the authority requested a written statement. He presented it in 2019. Nothing has happened since then, he says.

“Eritrea is doing a lot to control its diaspora,” says Marcel Kasprzyk. "And German authorities are doing little to counter this." The Frankfurt lawyer with a focus on migration law represents numerous refugees from Eritrea. As a rule, according to Kasprzyk, refugees arrive in Germany without papers. Some never had them, others had them taken from them while they were fleeing, others lost them or destroyed them to avoid being sent back to Eritrea. By requiring official Eritrean identity proof for naturalization, permanent residence permits, family reunification or marriage, the German authorities are forcing refugees back into the arms of the regime. And that, says Kasprzyk, requires not only money, but also penance.

"Taesa" is the name of the declaration of repentance that opposition Eritreans have to sign at the embassy or consulate general. ZEIT has the original and an English translation of the document. In it, the refugees have to reveal private data and explain in detail how they escaped. And they must sign that they regret violating their “national duties” and will accept “appropriate measures.” They will only find out what happens to them if they return to Eritrea at some point. "The Taesa hangs over them like the sword of Damocles," says Marcel Kasprzyk, the lawyer.

In October 2022, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that it was unreasonable to put those seeking protection in such a situation. An important judgment, says Kasprzyk. But the responsible authorities are slow to change their practices.

Other countries are taking more decisive action. For example, in 2018, the Netherlands expelled a high-ranking Eritrean diplomat because refugees continued to be forced to pay the diaspora tax.

Amanuel Zeru is now waiting for further news from the police. A week before the festival in Gießen, he received a “threat speech” because he was already there in 2022 when the protests against the festival escalated for the first time. The official note said he should stay away from the demonstration this time: “Avoid any further potentially criminal behavior!”

After his arrest in July 2023, he sat in a cell for 24 hours. He cried, he says, because the regime was drinking and dancing outside - and because he feared for his residence permit. He has not yet heard anything from the Giessen police, who are now investigating 125 cases on suspicion of bodily harm and breach of the peace.

In response to a request from ZEIT, the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Hesse said it was currently examining in detail "the extent to which anti-constitutional efforts are emanating from individual people and/or groups of people with a connection to Eritrea." It remains unclear whether this refers to the opposition members who network across Europe or groups close to the regime such as Eri-Blood.

Two weeks after the Eritrea Festival in Giessen, Amanuel Zeru took part in a meeting of hundreds of opponents of the Eritrean dictatorship in Hanau, some of whom came from the USA and Australia. For Zeru it was an important event; he hopes that the younger generation, the dictator's opponents, will soon set the tone in the diaspora. On the eve of the meeting in Hanau, around 20 men attacked a meeting point of the Eritrean opposition in Frankfurt. They broke windows and car windows. The police are investigating.



Martin Plaut

Sep 23

Source: Swedish Radio

The government wants to stop Eritrea's "diaspora tax"

Published Saturday 9 September at 16:37

·        The Eritrean dictatorship tries to control exiled Eritreans in Sweden, among other things by forcing them to pay a so-called "diaspora tax", approximately two percent of one's annual income.

·        Now both the government and the Social Democrats want to see an end to this, Foreign Minister Tobias Billström and the Social Democrats' Morgan Johansson inform Ekot.

·        The tax, which Eritrea claims is "voluntary", has been criticized by several Eritreans in exile and is believed to be part of the explanation for violent riots that broke out in early August in connection with an Eritrean cultural festival in Stockholm.

Erik Norman
This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.


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Martin Plaut posted: " Abraham Teklu Lemma, 50, of Silver Spring, Md., was charged with three counts of conspiracy, gathering or delivering national defense information to aid a foreign government Source: Washington Post A Maryland man of Ethiopian descent, Abraham Tek" Martin Plaut


Martin Plaut

Sep 22

Abraham Teklu Lemma, 50, of Silver Spring, Md., was charged with three counts of conspiracy, gathering or delivering national defense information to aid a foreign government

Source: Washington Post

A Maryland man of Ethiopian descent, Abraham Teklu Lemma, is accused of passing on classified national defense information about a region where soldiers battled rebels

By Spencer S. Hsu

September 21, 2023 at 4:23 p.m. EDT

A contract employee for the State and Justice departments has been charged with espionage, U.S. prosecutors announced Thursday, accused of passing on classified information since August 2022 to an official associated with Ethiopia’s intelligence service.

Abraham Teklu Lemma, 50, of Silver Spring, Md., was charged in an Aug. 23 complaint unsealed Thursday on three counts of conspiracy, gathering or delivering national defense information to aid a foreign government, and unauthorized possession and willful retention of national defense information, Justice Department and FBI officials said. The first two counts are punishable by up to life in prison and the last count by up to 10 years.

An attorney for Lemma could not immediately be identified.

In a statement announcing the charges, the U.S. attorney’s office and FBI field office in Washington said Lemma is a naturalized U.S. citizen from Ethiopia who had Top Secret/SCI clearance and access to classified systems as an IT administrator for the Department of State and as a management analyst for the Justice Department. He was arrested Aug. 24, but a scheduled bond hearing Thursday before a federal judge in Washington was not held, and no information was immediately available on the court’s public docket system.

A charging affidavit released by the Justice Department alleges that since February 2022, Lemma copied classified secret and top secret information from more than 100 intelligence reports and removed information from secure facilities without authorization. In August and September that year, Lemma allegedly transmitted classified national defense information to the official associated with Ethiopia’s intelligence service, including satellite imagery and information related to Eritrean activities in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.

Charging papers did not name Ethiopia, but accused Lemma of spying for a country where he was previously a citizen, had family ties and recently visited. An FBI affidavit also described military activities consistent with those of armed rebels battling allied Ethiopian and Eritrean government soldiers at the time.

According to the FBI, Lemma communicated with the foreign official by encrypted chat, where they discussed rebel military activity and Lemma sent photos of a “military compound.” The official advised Lemma, in those chats, “[i]t is great to identify the forward deployed command centers and logistic centers.”

In another communication, the foreign official stated, “[i]t’s time to continue ur support,” and Lemma responded, “Roger that!” according to the compliant. The foreign official allegedly praised Lemma’s efforts, stating “[a]lways this beautiful country have [sic] some special people who scarify [sic] their life to protect our proud history. You always remembered. It doesn’t matter the results.”

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The FBI said an authorized search of Lemma’s electronic accounts on non-secure networks confirmed that he possessed classified national defense information including digital photographic copies, notes and maps that he sent to the foreign official.

On four days in August, Lemma was observed at work reviewing classified intelligence reports outside of his authorized access using the State Department’s classified computer system and accessing non-department classified portals, either writing information on sheets of paper he folded and carried out of the department in his pockets or copying and pasting information into documents he burned into a CD/DVD disc and was observed taking home with him, according to the FBI.

Most recently, on Aug. 18, State Department records indicate Lemma completed approximately 10 downloads, most of which were classified at the “TOP SECRET” or “SECRET” level.

The FBI said Lemma was also seen angrily discouraging a Maryland bank branch employee from filing a currency transaction report when he attempted to deposit more than $11,700 on July 15, shortly after he had copied without authorization at least 16 intelligence reports. The transaction was part of more than $55,000 in deposits dating to the beginning of 2022 that a case agent deemed suspicious.

Lemma previously worked for another government agency identified in court papersonly as “U.S. Agency 1” from November 2020 to December 2021, in addition to working during evening hours as a State Department bureau of intelligence and research help desk technician and IT administrator, and as a daytime contract management analyst since May 2022 for the Justice Department.


Martin Plaut

Sep 21

Source: SWR September 20 , 2023 , 10:10 p.m


The Eritrea event next Saturday in Stuttgart will not take place. The city of Stuttgart announced this on Wednesday evening. The state capital and the Association of Eritrean Clubs have mutually agreed to cancel the rental agreement for a municipal gym and meeting hall in Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen. This means the event is off the table.

City: “Decision in the interest of public safety”

The decision was made in the interest of public safety and order, the city of Stuttgart said in a written statement. There were intensive discussions between the clubs and the mayor of Stuttgart, Clemens Maier (Free Voters).Start audio

After riots at Eritrea eventSecurity measures: SPD interior expert directs questions to the city of Stuttgart

ban on the Eritrea event next Saturday had been discussed for days. Politicians in Baden-Württemberg debated ways to ban the event.

Association of Eritrean clubs was cooperative

“We only did this to take greater account of the concerns of citizens and the public,” said Johannes Russom from the umbrella organization of Eritrean associations in Stuttgart to the German Press Agency. The association also wants to show its willingness to cooperate.

But this is not a capitulation to violence; the cancellation should not send the wrong signal. Events will continue to be held in Stuttgart and they want to rent rooms from the city again in the future. Saturday's meeting has only been postponed - "indefinitely," said Russom. They want to help de-escalate the situation.

Stuttgart's mayor Frank Nopper (CDU) welcomed the fact that the rental agreement for the event next Saturday had been terminated. On Wednesday evening he reiterated his demand that last weekend's violent perpetrators be punished harshly and quickly.

Police warn violent criminals not to travel to Stuttgart

Stuttgart Police Vice President Carsten Höfler was relieved by the decision to cancel the rental agreement. “This is a strong signal towards a future non-violent political conflict between the two conflict parties of Eritrean origin,” said Höfler on Wednesday evening.

We can only hope that the repeal has an impact and reaches everyone who had planned to travel to Stuttgart again at the weekend.

Police Vice President of Stuttgart, Carsten Höfler

Höfler announced that the police would still be very attentive next weekend. "We will have emergency services both on duty and on standby in order to be able to react consistently and in a low-threshold manner when possible troublemakers arrive. "I stand by this: Scenes like last Saturday must not be allowed to repeat themselves in Stuttgart!"

Last Saturday there were massive riots on the sidelines of an event organized by Eritrean clubs in Stuttgart. 32 police officers were injured. More than 200 people were arrested at short notice. Investigations are underway for, among other things, dangerous bodily harm and serious breach of the peace. The background to the clashes is an internal Eritrean conflict. The suspects are believed to be opponents of the dictatorship in Eritrea. The association that organized the event is considered to be close to the government.


Eritrea: President Isaias’s aims in Sudan

Wednesday, 20 September 2023 20:44 Written by

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Martin Plaut posted: " President Isaias has recently held talks with representatives of both sides in Sudan's 'war of the generals' that erupted in April this year. He met Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, generally referred to as Hemedti, in Asmara in January 2023. Then, a week ago, " Martin Plaut


Martin Plaut

Sep 19

President Isaias has recently held talks with representatives of both sides in Sudan's 'war of the generals' that erupted in April this year.

He met Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, generally referred to as Hemedti, in Asmara in January 2023. Then, a week ago, he met the Sudanese Democratic Bloc and other political parties allied with General Al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Sudanese Democratic Bloc

Isaias clearly wants to portray himself as a mediator; a diplomat. But this ignores his long-term ambitions inside Sudan.

At one level the Eritrean role in Sudan is well known. Eritrean security forces operate across the country and are particularly strong in Khartoum and in Kassala. They are capable of not only spying on the large Eritrean exile community in Sudan, but can seize them and abduct them, if the need arises.

But the Eritrean President's relationship with Sudan goes much deeper than that.

Isaias's early Sudanese links

In his seminal work, Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners, Dan Connell explains how Isaias arrived in Sudan in September 1966 after leaving his university studies in Addis Ababa, to join the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Haile 'Dure' Wond'ensae (today a political prisoner in Eritrea) came to meet him in the Sudanese town Kassala in December 1966.

Isaias immediately took Haile aside, telling him not to say a word to the ELF leadership about what they wanted to do. "This thing is completely opposed to what we were thinking, and we cannot talk about it here," he said. So the two men went to a local restaurant and started plotting: their aim was a clandestine organisation within the ELF. "And we said, this is a very dangerous endeavor."

From that tiny cell, of just three people (the third was Mussie Tesfamikael, who was killed in 1973) the Eritrean People's Liberation Front was officially founded in 1977. Although Isaias was the real leader, he took control via the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Party, which was the Marxist organisation directing the EPLF.

During its long years of fighting the Ethiopian government (as well as fighting a civil war with other Eritrean movements, including the ELF) Isaias ensured that it had a rear base from which to operate.

The EPLF had a safe house in Port Sudan and a massive supply depot in Port Sudan, which I visited when I went into the EPLF held areas of Eritrea in the 1980's. Having strong relations with Sudan, and with Sudanese political leaders, has been part of Isaias's strategy for the past fifty years.

Isaias and Sudan's National Democratic Alliance

The National Democratic Alliance was formed in 1989 to oppose the regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir after he seized power in a military coup on June 6, 1989.

It brought together a range of political parties (from the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma party to the Sudanese Communist Party), ethnic parties like the Beja Congress and the trade unions.

It was formed to lead the popular struggle against the new dictatorship in Sudan and the fundamentalist regime of the National Islamic Front (NIF) that was the power behind the throne on which Omar al-Bashir sat.

The National Democratic Alliance was to resist, and then openly fight, the Omar al-Bashir government, and the Eritrean role in this struggle was described in detail by Ahmed Hassan in two lengthy articles in African Affairs, which can be found in full here and here.

Drawing on visits to Eritrea, in the period 1996–2003, Ahmed Hassan explained how President Isaias attempted to become involved in Sudanese affairs and finally tried to overthrow the Sudanese government.

Isaias accused the Sudanese Islamists of backing a Eritrean movement - Islamic Jihad. On 5 December 1994, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan and subsequently invited the NDA to move its headquarters into the former Sudanese embassy in Asmara. 

As Ahmed Hassan explains, Omar al-Bashir was "viewed at that time by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the U.S. as a destabilizing factor within the region posing serious threats with its adoption of a political Islamic agenda and the subsequent support to Islamic militants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. That period also marked honeymoon of the relations between the U.S. and the 'new breed’ of African leaders represented by Isaias Afewerki, Meles Zenawi and Yoweri Museveni."

In 1996 this led to a dramatic re-orientation of forces and the formation of the Sudan Alliances forces, which brought in elements of the Sudanese military, under Brigadier Abdel Aziz Khalid, former commander of the air defence force in Khartoum. A new alliances of forces came about including the southern Sudanese movement, the SPLA and the United States.

Abdel Aziz was able to see the new opportunities for introducing a new qualitative change to the political formula of the NDA. This was a direct result of contacts at three levels, with the Eritrean leadership, with SPLA/M, as well as from hints that were brought to him through the direct contacts of Dr. Taisier M. Ali with John Prendergast related to the potential support of the U.S to armed interventions by Northern Sudanese factions that could lead to the destabilization of the government in Khartoum.

Although the Sudanese military were now involved, according to Ahmed Hassan they had little appetite for an armed revolt against Omar al-Bashir and the Islamists.

“As far as the Northerners are concerned, they don’t have a mentality of rebels”, One Eritrean official was quoted as saying in, in frustration. “For a long time they were against armed struggle, saying that the regime would be overthrown by a popular uprising. Now they have changed, but they don’t know how to take up weapons”. That was definitely the role Eritrea decided to take in the mid-1990s. Teach them to fight and support them in their fight...The setup was complete, the Eritrean regional aspiration of having an allied movement in Khartoum, and the plans of the U.S. to escalate the efforts to destabilize and topple the NIF regime in Khartoum by opening new military fronts in the north, and the personal aspirations and agenda of the SAF leadership, all came together.

It was reported that the Americans came behind this alliance in an attempt to end Omar al-Bashir's grip on the Sudanese state.

In 1996 the US government decided to send nearly $20 million of military equipment through the 'front-line' states of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to help the Sudanese opposition overthrow the Khartoum regime. US officials denied that the military aid for the SPLA and the Sudanese Allied Forces (SAF), described as 'non-lethal' -- including radios, uniforms, boots and tents -- was targeted at Sudan. The Pentagon and CIA considered Sudan to be second only to Iran as a staging ground for international terrorism.

The Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir was under a full-scale assault, according to Ahmed Hassan.

[T]he invasion of Sudan was set in motion, with direct involvement of the Ugandan forces in the South, the Ethiopian forces at the Blue Nile and in the South, and the Eritrean forces at the eastern front, in full support to the SPLA, SAF and the smaller NDA armed groups.

The Ethiopian army support for the SPLA and SAF involved cross border military assistance that permitted the SPLA to capture the border town of Kurmuk and Qessan, a town in Sudan’s Blue Nile region just across the border from Ethiopia in a surprise attack on Sunday January, 12 1997.

Simultaneously, SAF and the Tana Brigade of the SPLA, managed to capture the army garrisons at Yakuru, Babsheer and Menza in the northern Blue Nile area. In less than a week, the SPLA/SAF joint forces had advanced to within 30 km of the key eastern town of Damazin, site of the main hydroelectric dam which supplies Khartoum with most of its power. ...

With the increased support of the U.S. and its allies within the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, the advance of the SPLA and SAF seemed unstoppable.

The SAF leadership was intoxicated by its success, believing it was near victory. In March 1997 the leadership of SAF was giving the regime in Khartoum a maximum lifespan of 6-12 months before it collapsed as the forces led by General Abdel Aziz Khalid, threatened the city. (Dan Connell, “Sudan: In the Eye of the African Storm,’ Contributions in Black Studies, Vol. 15 (1997).)

Reprieve for al-Bashir and Sudan's Islamists

But the overthrow of the al-Bashir regime was not to be. Divisions emerged within the Sudanese opposition and then - in May 1998 - a border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted.

The delicate alliance of forces that had united Asmara, Addis Ababa, Kampala and Washington fell apart. President Isaias has more pressing concerns as his forces faced repeated Ethiopian offensives.

Out of fears to have to deal with new military front with Sudan while it was involved in the 1998-2000 conflict with Ethiopia, the Eritrean authorities immediately gave a clear signal to the NDA forces to slow down their operations. The roles drastically changed, from attacks and advance on the Sudan territories, to a new role of merely providing protection to the Eritrean borders against incursions from the Eritrean Islamic Jihad that was supported by the NIF as well as from any threats that could directly be posed by the Sudan government forces.

Then, on 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda attacked New York and brought down the twin towers, as well as crashing an aircraft into the Pentagon.

The world spun on its axis. The United States put aside all else and concentrated on eliminating Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader, who had lived in Sudan until being expelled in 1996.

The implications for the Sudanese opposition was predictable: the US ended its dispute with Omar al-Bashir and reached out to the Sudanese government that it had been attempting to overthrow.

The collaboration between the CIA and the Sudanese Intelligence apparatus, that started in 2001, was culminated by a CIA decision, later on, to fly the chief of the Sudan Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Sallah Abdallah Gosh, for a secret meeting in Washington aimed at cementing cooperation against terrorism as was brought in the Los Angeles Post, on June 17, 2005. Khartoum had become “an indispensable part of CIA’s counterterrorism strategy.” That turn of events after the 9/11 of course resulted in devastating implications on the NDA in general and on SAF in particular.

The combination of 9/11 and the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war had blown apart the movement to overthrow the Sudanese regime. Omar al-Bashir and his Islamist government was safe - at least for the time being.

President Isaias left fuming

He had emerged on the wrong side of both conflicts. Isaias was forced to do a U turn.

In January 2000 Eritrea and Sudan officially restored diplomatic relations. The Sudanese embassy in the Eritrean capital was been handed back to the Khartoum government, having previously been occupied by the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance.

The only element that did not change was Isaias's determination to plot and - when it was in his interest - to intervene in Sudan. As his meetings with Sudanese politicians in recent weeks indicate, it is an ambition that he has not abandoned.


Mesfin Hagos’s English Book on Eritrea:

 Useful Facts Tainted by Omissions & Biases 

By Woldeyesus Ammar

 (Posted in on 16.09.23)

This article about the book in English by compatriot Mesfin Hagos cannot claim to be a standard book review but is, primarily, a write-up to sincerely commend the author to have published something, even belatedly. Secondly, the article aims to flag out what I see as flaws in it. The hope is to get a genuine review that would eventually include missing parts of contentious but half-told stories in the book so that the upcoming Tigrigna/Arabic versions could be more complete to Eritrean readers like me. In fact, I would not have been tempted to write this piece if it were not to the assertion described on pages 99-101 under the subtitle: “Failed Ethiopian Campaign that Birthed the Derg.”

Forgetful of all the sacrifices our people paid in sweat and blood in previous decades and, in particular, between September 1961 and December 1973, the author (or should one say the authors?) dared to tell us that a single two-week battle fought in the second half of December 1973 between the then small units of the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF/ህዝባዊ ሓይልታት) and the occupation army gave birth to the 1974 mutiny and changes in Ethiopia. Brother Mesfin’s book also claims that the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which he said started almost all the armed hostilities in the field till its defeat, was bent at disrupting EPLF operations against the enemy, and that the ELF was not desirous of unity till 1981 while the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) always wanted unity.

 Regrettably, and in spite of many interesting and useful facts in it, the book in many sections loses balance by injecting half-truths and harmful biases. One of the misleadingly wrong and negative messages in it - and especially for fresh or uninitiated readers - is the following:- Eritrea had two archenemies called the ELF and Ethiopia, and both had to be gotten rid of at any material and human cost. (In actual fact, the so-called prophecy of Isaias that the ELF shall melt out (ጀብሃ ክትሓቅቕ እያ) existed a decade before the 1980-81 civil war that was started by a decision of EPLF leadership (or may be only by Isaias). Mesfin wrote that: “To win the big battle [against the first enemy, Ethiopia]… it was necessary to solve one problem at a time … and [we] decided to push the ELF out of Eritrea.” (See page 207).

Well, these and similar insinuations and allegations in the book cry for correction and comment, although more convincing responses may have disappeared with the key political leaders and military commanders of both fronts. Most of those figures are not around now to provide helpful rebuttals for our history records, in which case the ELF is a perpetual orphan - at least in the literature so far produced in the West by Eritreans and non-Eritreans alike.

Nonetheless, I must say I am pleased to see the usually unforthcoming Mesfin, whose excessive reticence is known to many, finally sharing pieces of little known facts and clarifying some vaguely heard events in our prolonged struggle. It is also great that he broke out of his old thinking that our history should not be written by individuals but be worked out as a joint project, which is difficult to do in our situation. Yet, those individuals who kindly take the pain to write down what they knew, as Mesfin finally did, should try to tell both sides of a given event, good and bad, and not tell only the part that they wanted to tell, as brother Mesfin conceded to have done in his book while talking to Samuel ‘Aka-Aka’ of Dehay Eritrea not long ago.

 In the paragraphs below, I am highlighting under a few subheadings some of the issues in the book that I found to be of interest to take note of.


Merits of Mesfin and His Book

What Mesfin told us about himself in the book is part of our recent history. Many Eritreans of his generation did share the misery in absolute poverty that young Mesfin and his family went through. Post-World War II generations of Eritreans also had the unquenchable thirst for learning that Mesfin ran after. In other words, many Eritreans of the past 82 years can very well relate to Mesfin’s unfulfilled dream cut short because of multiple problems - problems that are still haunting younger generations.   

The main author of the book and those, who assisted him to include compassionate feelings in it, must be thanked for expressing the lingering pain in the author because of the fate of his mother who endured life-time struggle against poverty and finally, as Mesfin put it: “[she] did not live enough to see our victory, the singular reason [of her untimely death being that] I was not there for her.”

This sad and emotionally sharp expression is also part of our recent history and can be shared and replicated by so many Eritrean families and readers of the book, old and young. Yet, many of us forget that Mesfin’s mother and a huge number of her likes, women and men, were indeed also ‘martyrs’ of the prolonged and unfinished national struggle. But they were forgotten when the quality of martyrdom and the identity of martyrs was limited mostly to those who held guns.

With its somewhat misleading title of “An African Revolution Reclaimed,” Mesfin’s memoir about his experience and our ups and downs satisfactorily narrates some of the bold decisions and brave actions Mesfin took to keep the struggle going - come what - amidst extremely rough days. For instance, only Mesfin and Fissehaye Abraha”Karachi” returned to the field in June 1968 after their training  in China while seven others (what Mesfin called highland/Kebessa Christians) refused to do so. Similarly in Dankalia in 1970, only Mesfin and Measho Embaye chose to stay with the new PLF while the rest of their Christian colleagues refused to stay.

As cited in my friend Semere Habtemariam’s articulate review of the book last July, Mesfin Hagos deserves accolades for being honest, and to be accepted as one, most of the time -- but for sure not all the time. To his credit, Mesfin does not share the opinion of some of our compatriots who used to allege that Christian highlanders at that time, and while they were few, were excluded from leadership posts even as of August 1969 at Adobaha Conference. Mesfin retorts: “I do not believe there were enough Christian highlanders who were fit to become leaders, given our limited experience and duration in the struggle at the time.” He meant this was to the exception of Isaias Afwerki and Abera Mekonnen who were elected to the 38-member General Command/ቅያዳ ዓማ that was from its start demonized far beyond its awkwardly taken actions and shortcomings by those who still do not accept it was “a product of its time.”

Mesfin also boldly and honestly tells readers one of the harmful weaknesses of key ELF leaders of the time by putting it in these words: “The larger we, as Christian highlanders, grew in number within the ELF, the more we were made to feel we did not belong.” (See page 23). Very true, I agree. This was the same malady with multiple other factors that led to the decline and defeat of that once mighty and determined force, popularly called ሰራዊት ሓርነት/جيش التحرير (liberation army) by almost every Eritrean citizen till the 1981 debacle.

Also belatedly following in the footsteps of my old friend Mussie Tesfamichael and his Menka’e group of 1973, in whose condemnation to death he joined three others,

  • Mesfin continued to be a defiant but little-heard whistleblower between 1978 and 2001 of the growing one-man dictatorship within their circle.
  • Also in addition to his shining military roles in the historic Battles of Afabet and Dekemhare, among others, we now learn that Mesfin saved Asmara from re-occupation in the 1998-2000 border war by his professional acumen presented in the form of advice that led to a disastrous end to an Ethiopian army contingent in the Battle of Adi Beghi’o (see page 362).
  •  Nor should one forget how Mesfin, and only Mesfin, reacted at what Isaias said in a February 1991 meeting to selected EPLF leadership members about a dangerous intention to make EPLF joint in the formation of a post-Derg government in Ethiopia. (I am inclined to believe that Isaias and his co-conspirators, who kept silent at the meeting, could have fulfilled the treacherous plan in June-July 1991 by liquidating Mesfin. It also appears to me that Mesfin was saved from that possible liquidation by the reported TPLF refusal to Eritrea’s participation in the post-Derg provisional government in Ethiopia. And of course, TPLF leaders were doing what they did in defense of their own political calculations and interests.)
  • For these and other audacious actions and reactions, Mesfin Hagos shall be celebrated and long remembered as one of Eritrea’s leading patriotic heroes in the annals of our national liberation struggle. No doubt about this well deserved record!


Mesfin’s Persistent Biases in the Book

In his own words, young Mesfin was “rebellious, sensitive and wallowing in self-pity.” The first two traits plus other positive and negative characteristics might have continued to be part of him, but the last one – self-pity/victimhood - was infectious and effectively transmitted to his friends, as Isaias did infected many in his organization by his own negative characteristics. In fact, Mesfin’s self-pity was well reflected in Nehnan Elamanan, a manifesto that he partly co-authored with Isaias to express an extremely exaggerated victimhood of a section of our people (the Christian Kebessa) in order to create an organization, unfortunately adding more fuel to the harmful “we” and “they” divide that we could not stop to this day. Mesfin still believes that, Nehnan Elamanan, while he calling it “a product of its time”, was perfect and well intended. He says it only aimed “to move us beyond our cultural differences and rally us around a national cause.” But, to my reading and to the understanding of a good part of the Eritrean society, that was not what the document did. However, I am not here to repeat the lasting venom in it.

While at it, let me add the following:  Mesfin wrote (page 64): “Much has been said about Nehnan Elamanan, including that isaias had written it in Addis Ababa and took it with him to implement it in the field. This has been said even by those who claim to have been his classmates in Addis Ababa.” (Emphasis added). The writer in Mesfin’s mind can only be Yours Truly because Mesfin knows it, and because no other person but me from Isaias’s school group wrote criticizing that document. Yet, I never wrote saying that Isaias prepared the document in Addis Ababa. On the other hand, what I repeatedly said and wrote as of the late 1970s, including in a book published in 1992, was that in the spring of 1966, Isaias alleged in our ELF cell meeting in Addis Ababa that the ELF was conducting “Jihad” in Eritrea. Also as I repeatedly affirmed, the attendants of that meeting together with Isaias and me included today’s Ela-Ero prisoner Haile Weldetinsae/Deru’e; PFDJ cabinet minister Tesfay Ghebreselassie “China”, Bereket ‘Aket’ of Paris, and twin brothers Andom/Habtom Ghebremichael – all of them former EPLF members, and may be some of them still accessible for Mesfin to inquire. And was it necessary for Mesfin to address me as “those who claim” to being Isaias’s former classmates? And for what honor, brother Mesfin?   

Mesfin’s Book About Isaias

I found the following sentence as one of the most fitting and powerful testimonies by Mesfin about his old colleague: “Power did not make Isaias Afwerki what he was not; it only unveiled him.” Very, very true! Through many parts of his book, Mesfin tells how resentful, greedy, intrusive and self-centered Isaias was with his “poisonous character” and consistent failings to consult those around him. To Mesfin, that coldhearted Isaias remained a “malady and incurable one at that.” Yet, many also blame Mesfin of sharing the characteristics of Isaias like resentfulness, ingratitude and a continuing, but sometimes unsuccessfully concealed, mistrust, hatred and contempt of everything (and everyone) associated with their former second archenemy called ELF/‘Jabha’.  

After exhaustively explaining how Isaias sidelined him and Ibrahim ‘Afa from their military roles, Mesfin stated that Isaias always “treated the military as his private domain.” This testimony by Mesfin reminded me of what I also wrote in the January 1982 issue No. 45 of the Eritrean Newsletter under the title of “Profile of Adventurism in Eritrea” opining that the EPLF was already turned into “a private company…driven by the insatiable ambition to power of one person.”  (Go back and read old ELF documents for similar conclusions recorded over a decade before 1991.)

On the EPLF side, at least one person, Mesfin, had known early on the wickedness of the man now destroying Eritrea, if he has not already finished that job. At one point in 1980s, Mesfin confesses to have contemplated of taking drastic action against Isaias -ያረድ ውዒልካያ….ክክክ! Yet, he did not go ahead doing that because he could not convince himself that the EPLF would find “a replacement half as good as [Isaias[.” And unfortunately for Eritrea and its people, this utterly wrong and dangerous belief in the capacities of one person lingered in the EPLF and still lingers in the hearts and minds of not very few Eritreans infected by the Old Thought.

More About the ELF in the Book

As they say, history is written by those who win because people can believe them very easily because they were winners – and of course serve and served as generals of a winning army, ministers, ambassadors and what have you. The book expressively describes battle-field successes and, when necessary, orderly withdrawals of the PLF/EPLF fighters. But, when it comes to the other front, you will read mostly about defeat after defeat and disorderly withdrawals of the ELF army. Well, if that was the case all the time, let the few surviving ELF army commanders and political commissioners say and comment for the sake of records for future researchers. Leaving things unclear did not help us in the past and cannot be helpful in the future. In short, the book is replete with selective narrations about the now defunct ELF which belongs to our common history. And to cite only a few of the half-told stories in the book:-

  1. Mesfin, as alluded to in the opening paragraphs of this article, gives to PLF’s December 1973 battle in Sahel a big credit in causing changes in Ethiopia. This claim, I repeat, robs our people’s previous struggles and achievements. It can be seen as part of the persistent historical denial of recognition to others. For sure it equates to getting astray from placing credit where it belongs. The battle in question can undoubtedly be one of the brilliant engagements of Eritrea’s heroic freedom fighters on both sides. The lengthy coverage given to the battle as cause for the “birth” of the Derg is being “justified” by its mere mention among the list of grievances by the Ethiopian army’s mutiny leaders in Asmara in February 1974. Obviously, the Ethiopian army mutineers can list recent events like their failure in the December 1973 battle. But to say that that single failed operation “birthed the Derg” is too much of a distortion and utter neglect of history. (If we were to trust and rely for our history on such Ethiopian documents, one report prepared by the Derg and leaked to the ELF leadership in 1977 claimed that the EPLF will be easy prey to be liquidated by the Ethiopian army because it loses so many casualties in every battle. The document added that the real danger to Ethiopia in retaining Eritrea was the ELF which, they believed, was very careful not to lose many fighters in every engagement with the Ethiopian army.)
  2. Due to multiple factors, for sure well known to Mesfin, the year 1967 was one of the worst periods in the life the Eritrean revolution. It was full of wanton destruction of villages, livestock, and massacre of civilians by the Ethiopians. Intensified campaigns to divide Eritreans on religious grounds also shook the society to its roots. The outcome included desertions by fighters, and unfortunate killing of a few of them - not hundreds as the venomous PLF documents claimed - by frightened, confused and less capable ELF unit leaders. One of those deserters was Welday Kahsai, the leader of the Fifth Division, who led it only for 3-4 months before his desertion. He was probably the one who caused the uncontrollable panic within the Fifth Division that had 400 members, only 80 of them Christian highlanders, according to an unpublished manuscript by Ibrahim Toteel, now a PFDJ prisoner in Eritrea. Mesfin said he met Welday in 2021 to ask him the reasons for his desertion in 1967. Weldai Kahsai replied to Mesfin saying that he had to hand himself over to the Ethiopian embassy in Khartoum because the ELF leadership was planning to assassinate him. That allegation may be true or untrue, readers cannot tell. But why did Mesfin fail to tell the other side of the story in Weldai’s case? On the other hand, Ibrahim Toteel’s manuscript, widely available in PDF form both in Arabic and Tigrigna, quoted former colleagues of Weldai in Asmara who confirmed that Weldai Kahsai definitely met at least two times with Ethiopian (Asrate Kassa’s) General Amnesty Committee at Durfo and then Filfil before his travel and desertion in Khartoum together with some 20 others etc. The year 1967 was a year of success to Ethiopia in its determined fight to kill and bury the still young and weak revolt in Eritrea.
  3. Writing about the mid-1967 desertion of a group of 19 fighters to the Ethiopian consulate in Kassala, Mesfin did one right thing: he asked Haile Deru’e, who told him the reason of their desertion to had been fear of Sudan’s expulsion to Ethiopia. He also asked another fighter, Gime Ahmed, who was with them and even urged Derue and the others not to give in to the Ethiopian consulate because the Sudan would eventually release them. So far so good. But that dreadful situation of ‘Gifa’ and fear in Kassala of that terrible summer of 1967 indeed deserved a mention in the size of Mesfin’s book for the benefit of the readers. To say it in a few words:  that summer, ELF in Kassala was terrorized by works of a certain Saleh Mahmoud, a traitor who was working as double agent for Ethiopia and the Sudan. On 12 August 1967, an aggrieved ELF member knifed that Saleh in broad daylight in city center. Following this and other incidents, probably most of them initiated by the Ethiopian consulate itself, the Sudan imprisoned key leaders in the ELF Revolutionary Command/ቅያዳ ሰውሪያ and ordered all other ELF leaders and fighters to go back to their Eritrea. To be fair, this situation deserved some place in the book alongside the testimonies from Deru’e and Gime.  
  4. Mesfin’s deep regret, of course in hindsight, of his decision to condemn to death the Menka’e group of 1973 is to be appreciated. He wrote: “Our collective myopia convinced us to take firm action” adding that the four decision makers (including Mesfin) had no deliberate and evil intent to kill them but had “lack of capacity” and deficit in judgment. (God forbid the Menka’e group were not considered ‘guilty as accused until they prove their innocence themselves’, a reversed legal principle and logic that shamefully transpired in recent years in the Eritrean opposition). Anyhow, the myopic decision made against 9 highly regarded freedom fighters ended with their murder for having asked fair treatment for ordinary fighters and democracy in the front. As listed in the book, the victims included Mussie Tesfamiichael, Yohannes Sebhatu, Afewerki Teklu, Aberash Milke, Dehab Tesfazion. Habteselassie Ghebremedhin, Tewelde Eyob, Russom Zerai, and Tareke  Yihdego. Similarly, there occurred meaningless killings of high caliber freedom fighters within the EPLF in the 1980s (like Wedi Kudus, my former associate as ELF cell-member) with the charge of being Yemin/rightists. In regard to the killing of ‘Yemin’, Mesfin wrote: “Given that these were most difficult times, I did not take it appropriate to inquire about individuals.”  Also on the ELF side, we had a number tragic killings of reform seekers and others including Kidane Kiflu and Weldai Ghidey, murdered in 1970 in Kassala, a shocking event that added more fuel to division and splits in the struggle. But did Mesfin’s book treat and present the tragic and utterly wrong happenings in the ELF in the same way? Did he describe them as decisions made by people convinced by “collective myopia” to take firm action for the supposedly nobler national cause and, not with deliberate evil intent to kill? Judgment is left to the reader.
  5. Writing about the first ELF congress of 1971, the book erroneously informs readers that “any outlying fighters and organizations were given an ultimatum to join or face forceful reunification.” It is true that that ultimatum was given to fighters taking sides with Osman Saleh Sabbe’s and another miniscule pan-Islamist/Arabist group, but NOT to the dozen or so fighters at ‘Ala that Isaias Afwerki represented. The congress, which was under relative influence of the then new left-wing secret party formed within the ELF in 1968, discussed the religious sensitivity in the case of the Isaias group (ኢሳያስን ብጾቱን) and preferred continued dialogue on the matter. But, the inherently war-monger/war-lover Isaias led his Selfi-Natsinet/PLF2 to join those forces given ultimatum and fight on their side against ELF units. Thus, one is obliged to feel that telling also this part of the story could have helped in making the book a fair reading.
  6. To an extremely sad episode in 1967 that Ibrahim Toteel called a “never healing wound” in the society, Mesfin’s book makes only a passing mention in a sensitive phrase, “Christian farmers and herders whom ELF units had killed in the environs of Shlalo in western Eritrea.” As it is put, the phrase gives the impression that the killing was an outright rampage to kill Christians. That tragic occurrence at Shimbare near Shlalo was one of the sensitive topics that Self-Natsenet/EPLF used very effectively to build itself into an entity in the early 70s. Those 43 victims at Shimbare included 8 Moslems, and were given land and arms by the enemy to act as a militia resisting ELF activities in that region. Readers can assume Mesfin knew a lot more about such sad incidents but his book’s glossing over the issue without a little effort to say what that killing of “Christian farmers and herders” was about etc is not a helpful omission. 
  7. Briefly, it is difficult to pinpoint in an article all the events told only half-way in the book by an author who lived it all. The ever contention subjects like:
  • The still alive talk about the so-called Seriyet Addis, its origin and the questionable number of its victims;
  • The alleged non-stop disruptions of the ELF to EPLF operations and killings/kidnappings of its members till 1981;
  • Justifications for the involvement or non-involvement of the TPLF on EPLF’s side in the fight against the ELF in 1980-81;
  • The actors of assassinations of ELF cadres in the Sudan, e.g. .that of Saeed Saleh, Weldedawit Temesghen ….in the Sudan

Etc etc are among the issues that still wait for balanced writings by telling all sides of every given story for the benefit of future researchers.

Nonetheless, aside from the omissions and apparent biases in the book, which are reflections of the author’s fierce defense of his ‘sacred legacies’ as EPLF, Mesfin’s book, I reiterate, can remain a rich source in further exposing some of the hidden truths about Isaias, about their joint winner front and government till the birth of the historic G-15 in which Mesfin again played a commendable role.


Mesfin on Diaspora Politics

The book summarizes the major hurdles facing the Eritrean opposition camp in exile. He now advises that the opposition must devise correct mechanisms of struggle. Mesfin also pledges to work towards forging an inclusive movement that would finally guarantee to do what the victors of 1991 failed to do: creating in post-Isaias era an “inclusive, fair, equitable and rules based” system of governance. May that dream come true within Mesfin’s and his unlucky generation’s fading years.

Before concluding this piece, I must apologize to Dr. Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, because I presented Mesfin Hagos as the sole author while we are told that the writers were two. One can for sure see the huge contributions in the project of our young and promising history professor. Yet, readers like me can also expect Mesfin to take almost all the responsibility for possible mistakes, biases and omissions. Professor Awet may be blamed only for a few unnecessary repeat of already told stories and a repeat of at least one whole paragraph in the book. But responsibility for mistakes like writing Debri Sala (Monastery of Sala) instead of the correct Debr Sala (Mount Sala in Tigre) can only go back to Mesfin who knows the Tigre language better.

And finally, I thank you both Mesfin and Professor Awet for having produced the book to be part of the still poor Eritrean archives about the national liberation war.

Martin Plaut

Sep 17


Source: Der Spiegel

September 16, 2023, 9:31 p.m

Confrontation in Stuttgart: There were violent riots at a meeting of Eritrean clubs

Confrontation in Stuttgart: There were violent riots at a meeting of Eritrean clubs Photo: Jason Cheplyakov / dpa

There were violent riots at an Eritrea event in Stuttgart . Up to 200 people attacked participants in the event and police officers with stones, bottles and wooden slats, a police spokesman told the German Press Agency on Saturday. 24 police officers were injured, two of them seriously. A police spokesman reported this on Saturday evening. Four people have been arrested so far. Videos on social media show men attacking police officers with wooden boards and bottles.

A police spokesman reported that 200 people gathered in the Roman fort on Saturday afternoon for an event organized by the Association of Eritrean Clubs in Stuttgart and the surrounding area. It is an information event. According to the police spokesman, the clubs sympathized with the dictatorial government in Eritrea. According to the police, opponents of the regime met in small groups at Bad Cannstatt train station and Stuttgart main station and made their way to the venue. The situation there quickly escalated.

The police are flying in additional emergency services

The officers defended themselves against the attackers with batons and pepper spray and tried to separate the groups and keep the attackers out while the event was still ongoing in the building. The streets around the Roman fort were closed. Emergency services were flown in by helicopter and called in from surrounding headquarters. For hours, the police reported skirmishes and a confusing situation. In the evening it was said that the situation was largely stable. The police surrounded 170 men to record their personal details. They are all accused of serious breach of the peace.

From the perspective of the organizers of the Eritrea meeting in Stuttgart, the police underestimated the situation. "We asked for police protection and said what these people are capable of," said Salomon T., who organized the event and did not want to be quoted with his full name. The event was a “seminar with information about Eritrea”. 70 people had to wait in the hall during the attacks, said Salomon T.

"It was very dangerous."

A police spokesman replied that there had always been disruptions at such events in the past, but there was no knowledge that they would be so massive and intense.

Valentino Tosto runs an ice cream parlor right on the corner of the action. He was shocked that evening. "This is very bad for us," he said. The rioters took away chairs and stands. He said, "It was very dangerous."

Eritrea, with a population of around three million, is located in northeast Africa on the Red Sea and is largely isolated internationally. Since independence from Ethiopia was won in a decades-long war 30 years ago, President Isaias Afewerki has ruled the country in a one-party dictatorship. Other parties are banned and freedom of expression and freedom of the press are severely restricted. There is neither a parliament nor independent courts or civil society organizations. There is also a strict military service and forced labor system, from which many people flee abroad. There are always conflicts between supporters and opponents of the regime.

In July there were riots at an Eritrea festival in Gießen, Hesse, with at least 26 injured police officers when opponents of the event attacked security forces by throwing stones and bottles and setting off smoke bombs. Among other things, the officers used batons against them. The organizers of the event in Giessen were close to the controversial leadership of the East African country. In August, violent riots broke out at an Eritrean festival in Stockholm , leaving more than 50 people injured.

There are already initial political reactions to the incidents in Stuttgart. For example, Federal Agriculture Minister Cem Ödzemir (Greens) wrote on Platform X that the perpetrators of violence must be brought to justice quickly.