Articles

Europe External Programme with Africa is a Belgium-based Centre of Expertise with in-depth knowledge, publications, and networks, specialised in issues of peace building, refugee protection and resilience in the Horn of Africa. EEPA has published extensively on issues related to movement and/or human trafficking of refugees in the Horn of Africa and on the Central Mediterranean Route. It cooperates with a wide network of Universities, research organisations, civil society and experts from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and across Africa. Key in-depth publications can be accessed on the website.

Reported war situation (as confirmed per 13 January)

The chief commander of one of the Eritrean divisions fighting in the Eastern front in Tigray has been captured alive by Tigray regional forces.
ENDF states it has killed three members of the leadership of TPLF who held high office in Ethiopia: Seyoum Mesfin, foreign minister of Ethiopia from 1991 until 2010; Abay Tsehaye, former Federal Affairs Minister and Asmelash Woldesellassie, ex-parliamentary chief whip of the Ethiopian Parliament.
The Ethiopian Government is arresting former retired Tigrayan officials and their spouses. Many of those are said to be arrested from their houses in Mekelle. Official reports make it appear as if they were captured in battle. It is reported that this is not true.
It is reported from Eritrea that Sebhat Nega, the retired co-founder of TPLF, was arrested in his house in Mekelle, then taken to the Mai Idaga prison near Dekemhare in Eritrea.
It is understood that Sebhat Nega was not captured in battle and was not captured in hiding, and that such reports are incorrect, but that he was arrested from his home, and brought to Eritrea where he was held until he was handed to the Ethiopian authorities.
Eritrean refugees in Hitsats camp in Tigray are ordered to return to Eritrea and were forced to walk to Sheraro. From Sheraro buses and trucks take them to Eritrea.
The ancient Monastery of Debre Damo in Tigray was bombarded by Eritrean soldiers using heavy artillery. Debre Damo, is the name of a flat-topped mountain, or amba, and a 6th-century monastery in Tigray, Ethiopia. The mountain is a steeply rising plateau about 1000 by 400 m in dimension.
The monasteries’ church artifacts and materials were looted by Eritrean forces.
Middle East Eye (MEE) investigates reports of the destruction of the Al-Nejashi Mosque, possibly the oldest Mosque of Africa and casualties first reported on 18 December by EEPA. The attack on the mosque would have occurred on 26th of November. Recently, pictures of the damage emerged.
According to MEE, a representative of the regional International Association of Muslims in Tigray, Ahmed Siraj, stated several civilians were killed by Eritrean soldiers as they protested the pillaging.
It is believed that artefacts have been stolen from the Al-Nejashi Mosque, including religious manuscripts, books and letters dating as far back as the seventh century.
A shrine holding the remains of followers of the Prophet Muhammad in the Mosque is also damaged.
HRW releases reports that civilians living in western Tigray, especially Humera, were unexpectedly shelled, followed by an invasion of paramilitary troops known as “Liyu Hail” from the Amhara region and ENDF forces, and young members of Amhara youth militia groups “Fano.”
HRW reports that refugees from Humera said that “they witnessed extrajudicial executions by federal forces and their allies during the fighting or after they took over towns.”
HRW found that witnesses said that “some of the victims were suspected TPLF members, fighters, or supporters and retired soldiers. However, businesspeople and farmers were also targeted, as were others whom the soldiers happened to have stopped, including families and children trying to flee.”
This confirms reports received that “Several large artillery bombardments were allegedly carried out in Humera between November 9-11 2020. Witnesses report that shells were launched from Eritrea, devastating residential areas and destroying a hospital. The Ethiopian army and regional Amhara forces also allegedly then took control of Humera, where they killed civilians and looted buildings.”
Arte shows refugees speaking about their ordeal when they fled Mai Kadra, on 9 Nov 2020. The town of Mai Kadra had Tigray and Amhara residents (farmers). The civilians speak of horrific killings, roads covered with dead bodies and bodies shoved in mass graves by tractors, with over 600 people killed. The horrific attack was carried out by Amhara, according to the witnesses interviewed by Arte.
HRW reports that in Mai-Kadra, “a number of refugees reported seeing hundreds of dead bodies which had been shot, stabbed, or hacked with knives, machetes, and axes, including those of ethnic Amharas but also of Tigrayans. Family members from several towns said they saw loved ones killed but could not offer them a proper and dignified burial.”
HRW finds that “People who remained in their homes or went back to their towns after the heavy fighting had subsided said they saw Amhara “special forces” and Fanos, as well as unidentified gunmen, detain those who remained, and loot abandoned and inhabited homes, shops, and hospitals. People said gold, animals, recently harvested produce, as well as goods from electronics shops were stolen. Many expressed concerns and fears about what they may face if they returned home.“
Arte speaks to a soldier of Tigray defense forces who fled from Western Tigray as troops were overwhelmed by the mechanized divisions who entered with tanks. According to Human Rights Watch “Some residents described being caught in the crossfire between federal government and allied and TPLF forces in the farmland on the outskirts of towns as they attempted to flee or hide.”
UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Bachelet, has stated that such killings would be classified as war crimes if “civilians were deliberately killed by a party or parties to the conflict.” She has called for an “immediate, impartial, and thorough investigation into the killings.”

Reported situation in Ethiopia (as confirmed per 13 January)

The war is causing an economic crisis in Ethiopia. The federal Ethiopian government has not paid salaries in many sub cities of Addis Ababa and southern regional states.
Opposition leader Yilkal Getnet has requested the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Metekel.
US Senators Chris Murphy, Patrick Leahy and Ben Cardin have sent a letter to Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed stating that “over the last few months, the Ethiopian government has increasingly engaged in a pattern of intimidation against journalists” and demanding for the immediate release of the journalists.

Reported International situation (as confirmed per 13 January)

Eritrea has expelled the Ambassador of Egypt, end of December. He travelled to Egypt via an Ethiopian Airlines chartered flight. Eritrea accused the Ambassador of Egypt of working with the TPLF.
Refugee Council USA expresses its concern over “ the conflict’s mounting humanitarian toll. There have been reports of civilians being targeted and killed, including aid workers, and refugees abducted.”

Disclaimer: All information in this situation report is presented as a fluid update report, as to the best knowledge and understanding of the authors at the moment of publication. EEPA does not claim that the information is correct but verifies to the best of ability within the circumstances. Publication is weighed on the basis of interest to understand potential impacts of events (or perceptions of these) on the situation. Check all information against updates and other media. EEPA does not take responsibility for the use of the information or impact thereof. All information reported originates from third parties and the content of all reported and linked information remains the sole responsibility of these third parties. Report to This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. any additional information and corrections.

Links of interest

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/13/ethiopia-says-former-foreign-minister-killed-by-military

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict/ethiopia-says-ex-foreign-minister-killed-by-military-after-refusing-to-surrender-idUSKBN29I2GB

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ethiopia-tigray-nejashi-mosque-conflict-damage

https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/23/interview-uncovering-crimes-committed-ethiopias-tigray-region

https://www.arte.tv/de/videos/101072-000-A/sudan-die-tigray-fliehen-aus-aethiopien

JANUARY 13, 2021 ERITREA HUB NEWS

Events of 2020

Two years on from the peace deal with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s leadership has increased its regional and international diplomatic engagement, but without improving the plight of Eritreans through critical human rights reforms.

Eritrea’s government remains one of the world’s most repressive, subjecting its population to widespread forced labor and conscription, imposing restrictions on freedom of expression, opinion, and faith, and restricting independent scrutiny by international monitors.

Eritrea remains a one-man dictatorship under President Isaias Afewerki, with no legislature, no independent civil society organizations or media outlets, and no independent judiciary. Elections have never been held in the country since it gained independence in 1993, and the government has never implemented the 1997 constitution guaranteeing civil rights and limiting executive power.

In response to Covid-19, Eritrean authorities increased pervasive controls and movement restrictions on its population. From March, the government prohibited citizens, except those engaged in “essential developmental and security” tasks, from leaving their homes, unless for procuring food and medical emergencies.

The coastal Danakali region, predominantly inhabited by Afar communities—cross-border pastoralists—was especially affected by border closures. Media reported that the government intercepted camel convoys bringing foodstuffs from Djibouti and Ethiopia, a key food supply for local Afar communities. The government has also confiscated Afari fishing boats, thereby preventing access to food and income.

In September, the government ignored its own restrictions on movement, its ban on public transport, and its school closures, by channeling thousands of school students to the infamous Sawa military camp where all secondary school students must complete their schooling and simultaneously undergo military training.

Positively, Eritrea took part in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) review. Although a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), it refused to cooperate with or grant access to the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea and publicly attacked her mandate.

Unlawful, Abusive Detentions

Mass roundups and prolonged arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial or appeal remain common.

Many detainees, including government officials and journalists arrested in 2001 after they questioned Isaias’s leadership, are held incommunicado. In June, a daughter of journalist Dawit Isaak told media he was alive, but without substantiating the assertion. Ciham Ali Abdu, daughter of a former information minister, has been held for seven years since her arrest age 15. Former finance minister and critic of the president, Berhane Abrehe, remains in incommunicado detention since September 2018.

Prisoners often do not know why they are being detained. Relatives are seldom informed of prisoners’ whereabouts, sometimes learning of their fate only when a body is returned.

Authorities hold detainees in inhumane conditions. Facilities are overcrowded and unsanitary, made worse by Covid-19 restrictions that denied many detainees vital food parcels and sanitary products their families would have provided. For months, the government ignored calls by international rights actors to release those unlawfully detained to decongest detention facilities in response to Covid-19.

Eritrea has long criminalized consensual homosexual conduct; the 2015 penal code mandates imprisonment for five to seven years.

Indefinite Military Conscription and Forced Labor

The government took no steps to reform the country’s national service system. It continued to conscript Eritreans, most men and unmarried women, indefinitely into military or civil service for low pay and with no say in their profession or work location. Conscripts are often subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment, including torture, without recourse. Conscientious objection is not recognized; it is punished. Discharge from national service is arbitrary and procedures opaque.

For secondary students, some under 18, conscription begins at Sawa. Students are under military command, are subjected to harsh military punishments and discipline, and female students have reported sexual harassment and exploitation. Dormitories are crowded and health facilities very limited.

The government continued to conscript youth, some perceived as seeking to evade conscription during mass round-ups.

No conscripts, including students, were released from Sawa during 2020, despite the risk of exposure to Covid-19. And, despite calls for reforms, including the separation of schooling from compulsory military training, in September the government again bused students to Sawa, forcibly channeling thousands of young people into national service.

The government assigns conscripts to military duties but many are assigned to civil service jobs or work on agricultural or construction projects. In February, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Canadian mining company, Nevsun, accused of using conscript forced labor at its Bisha mine could be sued in Canada for human rights abuses in Eritrea. In October, the parties announced they had agreed to a settlement in the case but the terms remained confidential.

The government continued to rely on poorly trained national service teachers, which affects quality of primary and secondary education, and teacher retention. Conscripted teachers have no say about where they will be assigned, the subjects they will teach, or the length of their assignment.

Some conscript pay was increased but it remains inadequate to support a family.

Freedom of Religion

The government “recognized” only four religious denominations: Sunni Islam, Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, and Evangelical (Lutheran) churches.

Eritreans affiliated with “unrecognized” faiths have faced imprisonment and have often been forced to renounce their religion, including by being tortured. In September and October, two nongovernmental organizations reported the release of as many as 69 “non-recognized” Christians, some detained for over a decade—possibly due to fears of Covid-19 infection—on condition they signed property deeds to hold them liable for future behavior. But the government still arrested people because of religious practices, including during wedding celebrations.

None of the 52 Jehovah’s Witnesses long incarcerated in Mai Serwa have been released, including three jailed since 1994 because of their conscientious objections to military service.

Even “recognized” religions faced restrictions. A Catholic Church delegation led by the archbishop of Addis Ababa was refused entry at the Asmara airport and deported. The Orthodox patriarch deposed by the government in 2007 and expelled from the church in 2019 because of “heresy” remained under house arrest.

In November 2019, 21 Muslims were reportedly arrested in Mendafera and Adi Quala, including a local imam; the whereabouts of many remains unknown. Media reported that peaceful demonstrators arrested in 2017 and early 2018 for protesting the government takeover of Al Diaa Islamic school were released in August; officials of the school remain incarcerated.

In January, Finn Church Aid, one of the very few nongovernmental organizations based in Eritrea, ended its activities after the government suddenly stopped its teacher training project, which aimed to recruit teachers outside the national service system.

Refugees

Eritrea’s ongoing rights crisis continues to drive thousands of Eritreans into exile, with many children and youth escaping conscription.

In the first three months of 2020, 9,436 Eritreans fled to Ethiopia alone, a third of whom were children. In January, the Ethiopian government unofficially changed its asylum policy, which for years granted all Eritrean asylum seekers refugee status as a group, only registering some categories of new arrivals at the Eritrea border, excluding others, notably unaccompanied children.

Among those fleeing Eritrea were four football players participating in a tournament in Uganda in November 2019. Some footballers defected at tournaments in 2015 and 2009.

Israeli authorities continued to systematically deny the asylum claims of the roughly 32,000 Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers in the country. However, in April, Israel’s Supreme Court struck down a law that permitted the confiscation of a portion of their salaries.

Key International Actors

More than two years after the Eritrea and Ethiopia declared peace, their border remains demarcated and Ethiopia has not withdrawn from Badme, the Eritrean village that triggered the 1998 war. In 2019, Eritrea unilaterally closed the border. In March 2020, Ethiopia shut the border because of pandemic-related fears.

After having been sued by a European human rights organization and criticized by the European Parliament for funding the procurement of material for the construction of a road in Eritrea that employs conscript forced labor, the European Union announced it would fund “no more roads.” It also announced it would be conducting a review of its “dual-track” approach in Eritrea, which de-linked political and development policy with its development arm focused on job creation activities, and its political arm reportedly raising human rights issues. In contrast, a subsidiary of a state-owned Chinese company remains involved in building a 134-kilometer road.

In 2013, Human Rights Watch documented how a state-owned construction company, which regularly used forced conscript workers built part of the Bisha mine’s infrastructure.

Two mining companies that provide 20 percent of the country’s income are 60 percent owned by Chinese firms, and 40 percent by the government.

The development of a massive 50 percent Australian company-owned potash development project, the Colluli potash project in the Danakali region, moved ahead. In May, the special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Eritrea reported allegations that the military had been clearing local Afar communities off their land around Colluli since 2017.

The Global Partnership for Education, a global education donor, awarded a US$17.2 million grant to Eritrea, despite ongoing human rights abuses in the country’s education sector.

JANUARY 13, 2021 ERITREA HUB ETHIOPIA, NEWS

“Ethiopia’s fragmentation could portend displacement on a scale not seen in modern times.”

Source: Al-Monitor

Ethiopia’s worsening crisis threatens regional, Mideast security

With the Horn of Africa increasingly becoming an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, the fallout from Ethiopia’s current crisis will have a significant impact on states of the region.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (C-L) meets with members of Sudan’s ruling military council after his arrival at Khartoum International Airport, Sudan, June 7, 2019. Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images.

Payton Knopf

Jeffrey Feltman

Jan 12, 2021

The Gulf Arabs recognize a strategic reality that has eluded the stove-piped US foreign and security policy bureaucracy for too long: The Horn of Africa is an integral part of the Middle East’s security landscape, and increasingly so. No country demonstrates this more clearly than Ethiopia. That country’s escalating internal crises pose an increasingly grave threat not only to the country’s citizens but to international peace and security and to the interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, principally Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As a recent bipartisan study group convened by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) concluded, developments in the Horn of Africa are not only shaped by the states of the Middle East “but also have a direct impact on [these states’] political, economic, and security environments.” Ethiopia’s internal and external borders are being changed violently, and the centrifugal forces of nationalism that now dominate Ethiopian politics are indicative of the weakness of the central state, not the strength of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed or the federal government. These intrastate fissures are undermining the country’s territorial integrity and morphing into interstate conflicts involving, to date, Eritrea and Sudan.

The armed confrontation that erupted Nov. 3 between the federal government and the regional government in Tigray state precipitated what Abiy characterized as a “domestic law enforcement operation.” The involvement of Eritrean combat forces, however, as well as the federal government’s use of airstrikes, mechanized ground units and ethnic militias undermines the credibility of that characterization. Similarly, assertions that the operation has succeeded in stabilizing Tigray is belied by the persistent violence in the region; a worsening humanitarian emergency; the government’s unwillingness to allow adequate access for a humanitarian response; and reports of severe human rights abuses, including of Eritrean refugees in Tigray being killed or forcibly returned to Eritrea.

The war in Tigray is symptomatic of a national political crisis in Ethiopia, which preceded Nov. 3 but has been exacerbated by the nationalist rivalries that have been unleashed since then. Much of western Tigray may now be occupied by Amhara regional state forces, and a border war has erupted between Amhara militias and the Sudanese military. Ethnically motivated killings of Amhara, Oromo and others in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state have precipitated the intervention of Amhara security forces, an unprecedented military deployment by one of Ethiopia’s states into another. In addition, the federal government has been engaged in an intensifying campaign against insurgents in Oromia regional state for months. While each of these conflicts involve historic and complex claims over territory, resources, identity and political representation, the pursuit of those claims by force of arms has set the country on a trajectory toward fragmentation.

The fallout for the states of the Middle East is significant.

First, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both made considerable political and economic investments in the leadership in Addis Ababa, Cairo and Khartoum, investments that will be undermined by bourgeoning conflict among the three. Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have long been strained by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Ethiopian-Sudanese relations have become increasingly toxic due not only to the GERD but to the border conflict. The recent spike in violence in Benishangul-Gumuz, where the dam is located, could also pose a threat to the control and function of the dam itself. The Nile is an emotive and sensitive issue in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and the crisis facing Abiy’s government makes any realistic compromise even more difficult.

Second, Ethiopia’s fragmentation could portend displacement on a scale not seen in modern times. In 2018-19, approximately 300,000 people — the vast majority of whom were Ethiopian and Eritrean — fled the Horn of Africa for Yemen, in spite of that country’s civil war. As the USIP senior study group report warned, the breakdown of Ethiopia — a country of over 110 million people — would “result in a refugee crisis that could easily dwarf that figure.” Over 56,000 refugees have already fled from Tigray into Sudan since November. Large-scale refugee outflows could destabilize Sudan’s delicate transition, and the consequences of state collapse in Ethiopia would also certainly extend across the Red Sea.

Third, calls for the secession of one or more of Ethiopia’s states are gaining steam, which would put additional strain on the already fraying state system in the Middle East, wracked as it is by the ongoing wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Somewhat unique among world regions, the Horn of Africa has several recent experiences with secession — Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 and the self-declared independence of Somaliland from Somalia in 2001. The prospects and ramifications of further changes to the regional order should not be underestimated.

Fourth, the risk of radicalization is real should extremist groups exploit the political and security crises inside Ethiopia, particularly if Abiy and his supporters continue to reject dialogue as a means of channeling political grievance. For example, al-Shabab, the Islamic State or al-Qaeda could play for advantage inside Ethiopia’s Somali region or among disaffected and disenfranchised Muslim communities in Oromia and elsewhere.

Brute force is no more likely to be successful in Ethiopia than it has been in Syria in preserving the integrity of the state or in mitigating threats to its neighbors or to the states of the Middle East. Nor can elections that Abiy has announced for June be credible, free or fair in the current political and security climate and therefore able to reconcile the competing visions for the country’s future. The political transitions that have unfolded in Ethiopia and Sudan in the last two years in fact illustrate that the restive and youthful body politics of the Horn of Africa are too diverse, pluralistic and eager for political change for authoritarian repression to result in stability.

Ethiopia’s recent history provides a sobering precedent. In 2015-16, large-scale protests against Ethiopia’s federal government, which was then dominated by Tigray’s ruling party, was met by a military crackdown that both failed to quell the unrest and led to expanding violence. The widening political and security catastrophe only abated with the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the promise of a new political dispensation heralded by Abiy’s accession to the premiership and his articulation of a reform agenda that included a loosening of restrictions on civic space and the prospect of a more inclusive political discourse.

Similarly, when a junta deposed Omar al-Bashir following months of nationwide protests in Sudan, there were those within the security services and among their supporters abroad who argued that stability could be achieved through military rule. This proved elusive, however, amid the massacre of protesters at a sit-in in Khartoum and continued mass demonstrations demanding civilian rule. Following talks between the junta and the umbrella group representing the protesters, an agreement was reached to form a transitional government based on a cohabitation arrangement between a civilian-led Cabinet and a council chaired by the military until elections in 2022 — an agreement due, in part, to diplomatic coordination between the United States and the Gulf. While fragile, this negotiated arrangement has so far averted fears of a slide into civil war akin to that of Libya, and Sudan is now a more responsible member of the international community than it has been at any time in the last three decades.

The Gulf states’ policies toward the Horn of Africa are undoubtedly rooted in their own strategic and political calculations. They understand that the two sides of the Red Sea comprise an integrated region that transcends the geographic distinctions between Africa and the Middle East. The close bilateral relationships that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cultivated with Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, alongside Abu Dhabi’s historic ties with Asmara, can be strong assets in stabilizing the Horn of Africa in the long term. The long-awaited reconciliation among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries could also alleviate competitive pressures in Somalia, where Qatar has supported the federal government and the UAE has backed the federal member states.

US-Gulf coordination is needed most urgently, however, in the case of Ethiopia. The Gulf states’ explicit or implicit support for Abiy’s shortsighted approach or for Eritrean military intervention not only risks implicating the Gulf in the humanitarian emergency in Tigray but damaging their own strategic interests as the Ethiopian state deteriorates. While Abiy and the federal government continue to prejudice military action over dialogue — not just with Tigrayan leaders but across the political spectrum — there is an urgent need for a process that provides an opportunity to build a new national consensus in Ethiopia, including an understanding of the electoral calendar. The United States and its Gulf partners must cooperate in promoting and supporting such an effort.

JANUARY 10, 2021 MARTIN PLAUT ETHIOPIA, NEWS

Sources in Addis Ababa report that Eritrean special forces are operating in and around the city. Two groups – each as many as 100 strong – are reported to be in the capital. A third – smaller group – is said to be providing some close protection for PM Abiy.

The role of the two forces is said to be to monitor and act against the substantial Eritrean refugee presence in the capital. They are close to the military airport, allowing swift and easy transport back to Eritrea for those who are captured, or else to the Tigrayan frontline.

Some of the Eritrean refugees are long-term residents in Addis. Others were among the 96,000 who were in refugees in camps in Tigray, who fled to the capital after the camps were attacked by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

The suggestion that Eritrean forces are operating in Addis Ababa is not as far-fetched as it sounds. Eritreans have lived in the city since the time of the Empire and form a strong community. Members of the Eritrean opposition in Addis have expressed concern about their presence since 2018.

Eritrean government agents are present in every Eritrean diaspora community around the world, and Ethiopia is no exception. They work directly to President Isaias and are controlled by his closest associates.

In western capitals they do little more than monitor and at times harass opposition groups and extract taxation for the Eritrean government. In neighbouring countries – like Sudan (North and South) and Kenya – they are have indulged in kidnapping and murder.

JANUARY 6, 2021 ERITREA HUB ETHIOPIA, NEWS

Source: Reuters

NAIROBI (Reuters) – About 2.2 million people have been displaced within Ethiopia’s Tigray region since fighting erupted there in November with about half fleeing after their homes were burned down, a local government official said.

Gebremeskel Kassa, a senior official in the interim administration in Tigray appointed by the federal government, made the comments in an interview broadcast by state-run ETV’s Tigriniya language channel late on Tuesday.

The figure given by the official was more than double a previous estimate for the number of people displaced of 950,000, which included 50,000 who had fled to neighbouring countries.

Ethiopia’s federal government restricted access to Tigray after fighting began on Nov. 4 between its troops and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a political party that was governing the province. The government declared victory in late November though the TPLF has vowed to fight on.

The conflict in Tigray has called into question whether Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, can hold together fractious ethnic groups in the country.

An official from Ethiopia’s National Disaster Risk Management Commission told Reuters on Wednesday that the figures cited by the administrator in Tigray were not official.

The commission’s Mitiku Kassa said 110,000 people were displaced within Tigray and 1.8 million were in need of assessment, though he said the actual number of displaced was likely to be far higher than its current tally.

A U.N. refugee agency official also said on Tuesday that Ethiopians were still crossing into neighbouring Sudan from Tigray.

“Some 800 people crossed from Ethiopia’s Tigray region into eastern Sudan in just the first few days of the new year,” spokesman Andrej Mahecic told reporters in Geneva.

A spokeswoman for Abiy’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the report that refugees were continuing to cross into Sudan.

More than 56,000 people have now crossed into Sudan from Tigray since the conflict started, according to the U.N. refugee agency’s latest data