Source: BBC

Ethiopia’s biggest sugar factory, which is located in an area where Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) rebels are active, has been unable to operate for a week because of security concerns.

Ethiopian Sugar Corporation’s spokesman Reta Demeke told the BBC that insecurity in the area meant it was impossible to deliver fuel to the Finchaa factory.

The fuel is needed to run the harvesting machines and other equipment at the factory, which is located in western Ethiopia, about 300km (186 miles) from the capital, Addis Ababa.

Mr Reta said reports that the plant had stopped work because of an attack by rebels was not true.

Bekele Dechasa, the top government official in Horro Guduru zone – where the factory is located – recently told the media that rebels had set tractors and sugar cane on fire. 

There has been no immediate comment from OLA, which is in a formal alliance with Tigrayan rebels in the north. 

Previously residents have accused the group of carrying out killings and bank heists around the sugar plant – allegations the rebels deny. 

Finchaa factory has an annual production capacity of 270,000 tonnes.

“Like the Tigrayan population, an estimated 25,000 Eritrean refugees subsisting in the two remaining UNHCR-supported camps in Tigray – Mai Ayni and Adi Harush – are suffering acutely from the Ethiopian government’s blockade of the region. Food and medicine have run out; relief organizations lack the cash and fuel they need to operate; and UNHCR itself has limited access to the camps.”

By Mike Slotznick, Counsel for The America Team for Displaced Eritreans

February 15, 2022

Summary

Like the Tigrayan population, an estimated 25,000 Eritrean refugees subsisting in the two remaining UNHCR-supported camps in Tigray – Mai Ayni and Adi Harush – are suffering acutely from the Ethiopian government’s blockade of the region. Food and medicine have run out; relief organizations lack the cash and fuel they need to operate; and UNHCR itself has limited access to the camps. In recent weeks, some camp residents have died from hunger, thirst, childbirth and treatable medical conditions. Some have died at the hands of federal forces or vengeful Tigrayan actors. As a consequence, some are fleeing south to new UNHCR facilities in Amhara. But the residents are reported as being held hostage within the camps by indeterminate Tigrayan actors. (Tigrayans are in control of the area). Their immediate evacuation from the two camps is essential.

Background

At the beginning of the war, in late November 2020 and the weeks following, Eritrean forces invaded the two more northerly camps in Tigray for Eritrean refugees, known as Hitsats and Shimelba. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations fled. Some refugees were killed in the crossfire among warring parties. The Eritrean forces also intentionally killed some of the refugees, and they forced or cajoled thousands of others to return to Eritrea. Their fate there is largely unknown. But observers fear that many were imprisoned or worse; and the conscription of some of the refugees by the Eritrean army – possibly to fight in the Tigray campaign – was reported. Just as shockingly, beginning in late December 2020, Eritrean forces entirely destroyed the two camps. The refugees who had been living there and who had not already fled scattered across Tigray, sought refuge in Mai Ayni and Adi Harush, or migrated to Addis. But occasional abductions by Eritrean forces were occurring in those two southern camps as well, continuing into the spring.

Two other UNHCR-supported camps exist for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia: in the Afar region, at Berhale and Asayta. In the fall of 2021, after the war had progressed into Afar, reports emerged that the refugees there felt gravely insecure – fearing the fighting, or possibly being targeted by the local Afar population or the invading Tigrayan troops. For some weeks in September and October, UNHCR was unable to access Berhale, and it expressed deep concern for the refugees’ safety.

As for Addis, it was teeming with Eritrean security agents; and they were hunting Eritrean refugees there door to door – kidnapping some to Eritrea – as the Ethiopian government forced others back to Adi Harush. Reports of that abuse seem to have subsided in the summer of 2021. Indeed UNHCR undertook to re-register in Addis some thousands of those who had fled from the camps in Tigray, and thus to provide a semblance of protection for them. But deep feelings of peril continued to haunt the refugees there.

In all – applying a global view – the invasion, repatriation, punishment and destruction visited upon the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, as perpetrated by forces from the very country from which they had fled, are seen as legally and morally extraordinary. Those events cemented the reputation of the Eritrean regime as one of the most vicious on the face of the earth. The events also established that the Ethiopian government, which had long protected the refugees, now would not or could not protect them from the Eritrean regime with which it had come to be allied since 2018; and thus that the refugees were simply not safe anywhere in Ethiopia.

But Eritrean forces were not the refugees’ only assailants. Although for many years they had felt tolerated and even welcomed by local Tigrayans in the neighborhoods of the camps there – they now felt Tigrayan wrath as well. Apparently seeking vengeance against even Eritrean refugees for the atrocities that Eritrean forces were committing across Tigray, from November 2020 through the spring of 2021 the refugees in the camps, and those fleeing the camps, suffered episodic killings, rapes and looting at the hands of largely indeterminate Tigrayans.

As a consequence of the refugees’ insecurity, UNHCR undertook to build a new camp for them at Alemwach, Amhara. The camp is still under construction, but several hundred refugees have found their way to the nearby Amhara towns of Dabat and Debark, where UNHCR has been able to provide for them.

Current Conditions in Tigray

As of January 2022, the combined population of Adi Harush and Mai Ayni was estimated at more than 25,000. But at that time reports emerged that the refugees there were suffering at the hands of both federal Ethiopian forces and Tigrayans. Tigrayan forces had retreated from Amhara and Afar and were now defending their home region. They had placed heavy military equipment, possibly cannons and the like, in the immediate camp vicinities, were firing them at federal and allied forces located in nearby Amhara, and were drawing reciprocating fire. Some refugees were killed and injured, including by way of a federal drone attack at Mai Ayni on January 5.

Meanwhile, by virtue of the blockade, the camps were without protection and outside communication; and indeterminate Tigrayans resumed episodic vengeance attacks against the refugees, including by way of killings, rapes and looting.

In addition, camp residents were dying of hunger and thirst – as UNHCR itself discovered, to its shock, upon returning to the camps after a three-week absence in January. Others were reduced to eating leaves to survive, and – through a near-total absence of medicine and medical services – deaths were occurring from malaria and during childbirth. Famished and terrified, some of the refugees have now tried to reach UNHCR protection in Dabat, and (as noted above) some hundreds of those have arrived safely. But others have been attacked by Tigrayans en route, with some of those fleeing having died or disappeared. Yet others have been prevented from fleeing the camps by Tigrayan threats to fine or imprison those who would make the attempt. The motives for that confinement are not apparent, but they may include such elements as using the refugees as human shields, or simply as targets for financial extortion.

Current conditions in Afar

In late January 2022, an organization representing the Eritrean refugees in Afar described the peril in which the refugees were finding themselves, and it urged the United Nations to quickly evacuate them all from the country.

Current conditions in Addis

In February 2022, a report emerged that the Eritrean embassy in Addis, in a menacing manner, had summoned some number of refugees to appear there. At the embassy they were interrogated – including about what they may have told UNHCR about the Eritrean regime – and they concluded that they had been the subjects of surveillance by the regime’s agents.

Current advocacy themes

Advocacy around these issues is mixed, particularly with respect to the refugees still in Tigray. Some voices urge a speed-up of the evacuation to UNHCR protection in Amhara; others urge an evacuation from Ethiopia altogether, whether immediately or in due course. (Even the Ethiopian government’s refugee agency, RRS, has urged their evacuation from Tigray.) Still others – certain refugees within the camps – reportedly maintain that the refugees are safest if they remain there. This last proposition is difficult to fathom, but it might be viewed within the context of several larger phenomena.

First, the global Eritrean diaspora is split as between those who seek to ally with the Tigrayans and who empathize with the Tigrayans’ suffering at the hands of federal, Eritrean and allied forces, versus those who cannot forgive the Tigrayans for the atrocities committed by a relative few of them against the refugees during the course of the war. Second, in the fog of war, one can expect vast realms of misinformation, disinformation, and even, on occasion, desperate individuals betraying their brethren in exchange for their own personal protection.

Conclusion

In the global scheme, elements of the atrocities committed against the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia may be nearly without recent precedent. The humanitarian blockade of Tigray and the forced starvation there is likewise beyond extreme, and the Eritrean refugees are among the victims. But unlike the Tigrayan population, the refugees are defenseless and have no one to even attempt to protect or provide for them. Advocates for the refugees believe that extraordinary and immediate measures for their protection and sustenance – matching the extraordinary needs and injustices that have befallen them – are thus eminently in order.

“If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated.”

Source: The Conversation

Author

1. Richard Reid

   Professor of African History, St Cross College, University of Oxford

Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (L) and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at an event in Ethiopia in 2018. Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images

The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region since the conflict broke out in November 2020. Eritrea shares a 1,000 km border with Ethiopia, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

These actions have both prolonged and worsened the hugely destructive conflict.

Eritrea’s involvement also has wider implications. It represents an attempt by Asmara to reassert itself on the regional stage, following two decades of relative diplomatic isolation.

The large-scale commitment of soldiers – as well as logistical and political support for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed – is the result of a remarkable turnaround in relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa. After almost two decades of hostility, Abiy struck a peace deal with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki in July 2018 . This appeared to usher in a new era of stability and cooperation.

But that’s not what transpired. In the following months, Abiy intensified his programme of political reform in Ethiopia. He consolidated his power at the expense of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The movement had dominated politics in Ethiopia since 1991.

The front was also Eritrea’s bitterest enemy. There had been a troubled history of relations between it and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dating back to the 1970s. This antagonism culminated in a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000.

The outbreak of the war in Tigray served a number of purposes for Isaias. Firstly, it gave him the opportunity to end Eritrea’s long-standing international isolation. It did this by enabling him to exercise influence in a conflict which threatened to completely destabilise the region. This was a deeply worrying prospect to a range of international actors.

Secondly, it reasserted his influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.

And lastly it provided an opportunity to seek revenge on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The front’s leadership outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily in the 1998-2000 war. It also outmanoeuvred Eritrea diplomatically in the years following the conflict.

Eritrea’s opportunistic policy

The government in Asmara has pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. Its aim has essentially been to gain regional superiority at Ethiopia’s expense.

Eritrea has sought to exercise leverage by getting involved in others’ conflicts. For much of the 2000s and 2010s, for instance, Asmara defied the international consensus on Somalia. This consensus was primarily orchestrated by the government in Ethiopia, at the time led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Reaching the consensus involved the creation of a Transitional Federal Government with broad international support.

Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers, supported in the air by the US, launched offensives against al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group which Eritrea was accused of supporting.

This led to the 2009 imposition of sanctions on Eritrea. There were also interventions in Darfur and eastern Sudan by the Eritrean government.

Eritrea’s regional policy has largely been influenced by Ethiopia, its much more powerful southerly neighbour. But Ethiopia has represented both an obstacle and an opportunity in the pursuit of regional dominance.

In many respects, the single biggest obstacle facing the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime in Asmara is a strong, united Ethiopia. A country capable of dominating the region in economic, military and diplomatic terms – and especially one covertly or overtly hostile to Eritrea itself. This was the case under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front regime led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

A weakened and disunited Ethiopia – with at least some political actors who are easy to influence – therefore represents an opportunity for Eritrea’s interests. This is because the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s vision for the country is as regional gatekeeper and pivot – secure in itself, cohesive and militarily potent.

In search of that status, the best scenario is to have Ethiopia unstable enough to allow opportunities for intervention and influence. Asmara would also want to be able to justify prolonged militarisation, which has become the hallmark of independent Eritrean nationhood. But, it wants to avoid Ethiopia’s total collapse.

Asmara’s best-case scenario is a prolonged, unresolved conflict in Ethiopia in which the presence of Eritrean forces and political support are still required by Addis Ababa.

Abiy’s assent to power and the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – combined with widespread and growing political protest in the preceding years – presented just such an opportunity.

Risky strategy

But this is a risky strategy.

Isaias has essentially harnessed his cause to that of Abiy. When things were going well against the Tigrayan forces – as in late 2020 and early 2021 – it looked like a justifiable policy, however catastrophic for the civilian population. But it could backfire.

There have been signs that negotiations between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership may be possible.

If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated. This would take him back to the pariah status he has occupied for most of the last two decades.

Further, in the longer term, an Ethiopia where various parties are reconciled to one another’s legitimacy could once again become a hostile entity on Eritrea’s southern flank.

Involvement in other people’s wars is inherently risky business. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime has frequently played with fire. It has done so domestically and regionally. Yet, to date, it has seemingly defied geopolitical gravity.

But the Eritrean army’s disproportionately violent and inhumane intervention in Ethiopia in pursuit of payback against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the regional stature Isaias has long craved could result in the most destructive blowback imaginable: a coalescence of Ethiopian antagonists and domestic opposition that presents an existential threat to the Eritrean government itself.

“The leaked document says that the Ethiopian government should talk to TPLF from a position of strength; Without dialogue, the conflict will go on with serious economic repercussions. The document mentions the US desire to remove Eritrean ruler Isaias Afwerki from power. Eritrea is already under sanctions from the US and EU.”

Source: My views on news

JANUARY 28, 2022 BY SAJID NADEEM LEAVE A COMMENT

A 51-page document of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry has been leaked. The document outlines a re-engagement strategy to repair fractures ties with the US and Western countries.

After the start of the Tigray conflict in November 2020, Ethiopian relations with the US and western countries deteriorated. EU and US accused Ethiopia of human rights abuses and deliberately blocking aid delivery to Tigray. The Ethiopian government reciprocated by labeling US and others as backers of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). US removed Ethiopia from AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) at the start of this year over human rights abuses.

After Tigray forces started their withdrawal from neighboring Amhara and Afar regions last month, Ethiopia-US relations saw an improvement. US President Joe Biden’s telephone conversation with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad, in the 2nd week of this month, was a clear indication that the two countries wanted to repair their bilateral ties.

The leaked document says that the Ethiopian government should talk to TPLF from a position of strength; Without dialogue, the conflict will go on with serious economic repercussions.

The document mentions the US desire to remove Eritrean ruler Isaias Afwerki from power. Eritrea is already under sanctions from the US and EU.

Sudan and Egypt are untrustworthy, the leaked paper claims. Sudan took advantage of the Tigray conflict and captured the long-standing disputed territory Al Fashaga on the Sudan Ethiopia border. Egypt and Sudan have been threatening Ethiopia against starting the 2nd filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). But despite threats, Ethiopia completed the 2nd filling in July last year.

It seems that the Ethiopian government is planning talks to end the Tigray conflict. But before the start of these talks, it wants to weaken Tigray militarily and economically through drone strikes and continuous siege.

Secondly, the government wants to pacify dissenting voices against the dialogue. Last month when the Ethiopian government released a few TPLF leaders, the move was criticized by some Amhara groups/individuals and diaspora members.

Those news outlets, which are critical of the government, have leaked this document. The leakage of the document could be an attempt to put pressure on the Ethiopian government to stop it from starting any dialogue with TPLF.

Human Rights Concern-Eritrea wishes to Remind the World of the Continued Detention of Patriarch Abune Antonios, Head of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, since January 2006

26 January 2022

Since January 2006 Patriarch Antonios has endured in the Eritrean capital, Asmara. He continues to be held under duress, with state agents ensuring that he cannot leave the premises. There has never been an opportunity for him to question and challenge this illegal detention in a court of law. He is detained arbitrarily and without charge or trial, solely at the whim of the Eritrean President and ruling clique in government.  He is being held virtually incommunicado, and is deprived of all contact with clergy and friends.

His imprisonment since January 2006 makes him one of the longest serving prisoners of conscience in Eritrea. His courage in resisting calls by the regime to submit his church to total governmental control caused him to suffer prolonged persecution and enforced silencing within his own country.  His detention is neither recognised nor accepted by the legitimate church representatives and members, despite many government attempts to replace him with a more compliant priest.

The patriarch’s detention violates at least six fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, found in Articles 3(liberty of person), 8 (effective remedy), 9 (no arbitrary arrest or detention), 11 (presumed innocent until proven guilty),13 (freedom of movement), 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), all of which have been denied him.

It is vital that the nature of his imprisonment is recognised by the international community for what it is – arbitrary detention. And it is important to note that this form of detention is similar to that used by the apartheid regime in South Africa, which instituted “Banning” Orders. Victims of these arbitrary legal measures could not leave their houses or meet with more than one person, or communicate with the outside world. At this stage in the history of Eritrea, it may be appropriate to note the similarities in the treatment of persons disapproved of by the regime: the same human rights abuses continue to this day as occurred in under apartheid—widespread use of torture, disappearances, unexplained deaths in detention, arbitrary illegal arrests and secret detention, and systematic police brutality unchecked by the law. The world must wake up to the fact that human rights abuses as severe and longstanding as under Apartheid are occurring in East Africa to this day.

Human Rights Concern-Eritrea (HRCE) appeals to the international community to stand up for this innocent and righteous religious leader on the 16th anniversary of his detention.

HRCE also calls upon all member states of the United Nations to put pressure on the government of Eritrea to release the 92-year-old Patriarch, who has been unjustly kept in isolation, away from the people and church he loves dearly.

—

Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (HRCE)

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

+44 7958 005 637

www.hrc-eritrea.org

Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) has investigated the asylum cases of 150 Eritreans who have fled to Norway, sought protection and been granted residence in the country. In 13 cases, the residence permit has been revoked. Four will be deported. Others can stay.

Original Article: Asyljuks avslørt

Note: Google Translated

ERITREA TOP: At an event in Oslo in August 2019 for Eritreans, Yemane Gebreab appeared. The man in the blue suit is the closest political adviser to Eritrea’s dictatorial president, Isaiah Afewerki. Many Eritreans in Norway have fled his brutal regime. (Private)

By Bjørgulv K. Bjåen, journalist21 / 01/2022 18:03

Since the autumn of 2019, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) has investigated the asylum cases of 150 Eritreans who have fled to Norway, sought protection and been granted residence in the country.

As of today, 13 residence permits have been withdrawn.

The order for investigation came as an instruction from the Ministry of Justice (JD) and the then Minister of Justice Jøran Kallmyr (Frp).

The background was news headlines on NRK. They told about an event in Oslo in August 2019 “where Norwegian-Eritreans celebrated the national service in Eritrea together with a high-ranking person from the Eritrean government apparatus, and where Eritrean refugees may have been present”, writes JD.

Many of the Eritreans who have been granted residence in Norway have fled the national service.

Has received tips about cheating

The UDI selected 100 random cases and 50 cases where they had received tips or put on information that there was incorrect information when applying for asylum, says Christine Roca, unit leader control at the UDI.

After the first round, the UDI sat down with 60 cases. 90 were put away. Decisions have now been made in 24 cases:

• 13 refugees have their residence permit revoked, either permanently or temporarily.
• 11 cases have been dropped, the UDI did not find sufficient samples on incorrect asylum grounds – or no samples.

36 cases are currently under investigation, by the UDI and the police.

Participation in Eritrean party

When the UDI considers revoking residence permits, it does so mainly on three grounds: Giving incorrect information in the case, giving incorrect information about identity or violating the terms of the permit.

In the instruction, the Ministry of Justice emphasizes that when refugees participate in events in support of the same authorities that one fears persecution from, it may «indicate that a residence permit and asylum status in Norway should be revoked.

– In none of the cases where we have made a decision on revocation, participation in the event in August 2019 has been used alone. But in some decisions, participation has been considered, says Roca.

Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) has investigated the asylum cases of 150 Eritreans who have fled to Norway, sought protection and been granted residence in the country.

The consequences of the 13 decisions are very different. Even though the UDI has uncovered cheating – incorrect information has been revealed, or important information was withheld – nine will not be deported from Norway, as is usual.

They have received new intermediaries, residence permits.

– Eight of the nine have been protected. In addition, one has been given a stay on the basis of strong human care, says unit leader Roca in the UDI.

She explains the outcome:

– A common assessment in recall cases is that the person should be deported and returned to their home country, and if it were not for the fact that the 13 are from Eritrea, they would in principle have been met with these sanctions.

– In these cases, returning to the home country will mean a great danger of persecution. Therefore, they have received a new, interim residence permit.

Four are leaving Norway

Christine Roca admits that the reaction to the cheating that has been uncovered may be perceived as inferior, but points out that the legislation states that persons should not be returned if they risk inhuman treatment when returning to their home country.

The last four who have received revocation decisions face two different reactions:

– Two are sent to EU countries where they have legal residence. Two will be returned to Eritrea when their age indicates that they will not be called up for community service, Roca said.

Bondevik was paid for praising posts about Kazakhstan

Have complained about the decision

Anyone who receives a decision in the UDI can appeal the decision and in the next round have the appeal assessed by the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE) if the UDI does not review the decision.

Ten out of 13 decisions have been appealed. Three of those who lost their residence permit, but received a new one, have accepted the UDI’s decision.

The consequence of being able to revoke the residence permit, but still get a new one, is the zeroing of lit housing in Norway. Thus, it takes longer before one can apply for a permanent residence permit and, in the next round, citizenship.